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ABSTRACT 
 
How does state ownership affect sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) investment 
abroad? This dissertation aims to answer this question by providing a general theoretical 
framework and a detailed deal-level analysis. I argue that two attributes of state 
ownership affect SWF investment behaviors. First, SWFs face greater discrimination by 
the host country than do private investors. Since the discrimination is heightened when 
the home and host countries have poor political relations, SWFs are more likely to invest 
in host countries with which they have better political relations. Furthermore, SWFs are 
likely to partner with other investors in order to mitigate the discrimination by the host 
country. Second, state ownership leads SWFs to be more risk-tolerant than private 
investors. The observable implication is that SWFs are less likely to be deterred than are 
private investors by institutional distance between the home and host countries when 
investing abroad. 
I also argue that even though state ownership may motivate SWFs to pursue 
strategic interests on behalf of the home government, different governments often have 
different strategic objectives.  This suggests that SWFs may behave differently even 
when investing in strategic industries. To illustrate this point, I investigate the energy 
industry and argue that SWFs from energy-poor countries are more likely to invest in the 
energy industry compared to other types of investors in pursuit of energy security for the 
home country. However, foreign investment in the energy industry is likely to face more 
resistance by the host country than investment in other industries. This resistance would 
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increase with the deterioration of bilateral relations, especially for SWFs from energy-
poor countries.  
To test these claims, I construct a unique dataset from several sources. My 
analysis covers more than 7,000 foreign acquisitions between 1981 and 2012. Using 
various model specifications, I find consistent evidence to support my main arguments.  
This dissertation contributes to the SWF studies as well as several relevant 
literatures. My interdisciplinary approach integrates theoretical arguments from 
international relations with existing international business literature. By examining the 
effect of state ownership on foreign investment, this dissertation enhances our 
understanding of the recent rise of state capitalism. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are large pools of capital owned and controlled 
by governments and invested in domestic and foreign markets.  In recent years, SWFs 
have grown rapidly in number and size (Gilson and Milhaupt, 2008); with total assets 
estimated at 5.78 trillion US dollars in 2013 (SWF Institute, 2014), SWFs invest more 
than double the assets managed by hedge funds worldwide. 
The growth of SWFs has raised many policy debates over the potential 
politicized nature of SWFs. Indeed, the fact that SWFs are owned and controlled by 
governments, and have large and continuous sources of funding, raises the concern that 
SWFs may use their portfolios to achieve certain political objectives (e.g., Summers, 
2007; Gieve, 2008). Therefore, the question of whether SWFs are politically driven 
plays a central role in debates regarding SWFs.  
However, this question may not be the correct one. The very fact that SWFs are 
state-owned predetermines that SWFs will be influenced by political motives – indeed, it 
would be surprising if SWF managers could ignore the preferences of a single powerful 
shareholder, even more so as some report directly to the head of state (Megginson and 
Fotak, 2014). Therefore, it is not whether or not SWFs are politically driven that must be 
examined. In this dissertation, I focus on the ways in which state ownership affects 
SWF’s foreign investments, and more specifically, how the state ownership affects the 
interaction between SWF investment strategies and the responses from the host 
countries. 
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Shifting the debate to these questions could generate important insights in our 
understanding of SWFs for two reasons. First, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to 
identify systematic evidence of the political motivations of an investor without making 
some strong assumptions. SWFs’ lack of transparency makes this task even more 
difficult. However, the impact of state ownership on SWF’s investment behavior could 
be easier to identify empirically, thus allowing scholars to draw clear implications from 
SWF investments. Second and more importantly, my dissertation takes into account the 
ways through which host countries can react strategically to SWFs with political 
motivations. Policymakers from host countries have expressed increasing concerns about 
the expanding role of governments as global investors in both target firms and host 
governments. Target firms become at least partially state-owned as a result of SWF 
investment and as such, many share a major concern that the target firms become less 
efficient than privately-owned firms following the acquisition. In addition, state 
investors are likely to have political or strategic interests instead of commercial ones, 
some of which may threaten the national security and sovereignty of the host countries. 
As a result, a host country may take action to ensure that its national security concerns 
are addressed. Thus, investigating SWF investment in light of state ownership provides 
valuable insight into the between SWF investment strategies and the responses from the 
host countries.  
As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, recent developments in political 
science have paid greater attention to how politics affect SWF investment through state 
ownership. However, the vast majority of this research is based on case studies (e.g., 
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Shih, 2009; Clark and Knight, 2011; Foldal, 2010). For instance, Shih (2009) compares 
SWFs from a highly unified autocracy (i.e., Singapore) and a fragmented authoritarian 
regime (i.e., China), and finds that neither of the SWFs pursues any geopolitical 
objectives, but for different reasons. Shih argues that the investment behavior of the 
Singaporean SWF is more likely to be driven by profit maximization, while the Chinese 
SWF may be too preoccupied with domestic political and bureaucratic infighting to do 
any international harm. However, this approach has two main shortcomings. It does not 
take into account the role of an important political factor--bilateral relations—in the 
SWF’s investment decisions. Furthermore, the results in Shih (2009) are driven by two 
case studies, thus providing limited implications because it does not systematically test 
the claim across countries and time.  
Meanwhile, various studies in finance literature have undertaken comparisons of 
investments by SWFs and private investors (Avendaño and Santiso, 2011, Johan et al, 
2013; Karolyi and Liao, 2015; Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009; Dewenter et al., 2010; 
Kotter and Lel, 2011). The scholars assume that the objective of private firms is profit-
maximization. They propose that systematic differences in the investment decisions 
between SWFs and private investors indirectly provide evidence that SWF investments 
have non-commercial motivations. Therefore, on the basis of the observed differences 
between SWFs and private investors, scholars conclude that SWFs are politically 
motivated. However, the research design of these studies is problematic because it 
ignores the fact that the observed foreign investment outcomes are due to interactions 
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between the institutional pressures from the host country and the potential objectives of 
the home government.  
This dissertation furthers the study of SWFs and proposes a theoretical 
framework to explore the impact of state ownership on SWF’s foreign investment and 
the strategic interaction between SWFs and the host countries. The core of my argument 
builds on two basic affects of state ownership. First, state ownership of an SWF brings 
with it the home country’s influence into the host country, and thereby triggers greater 
discrimination by the host country. Second, due to state ownership, SWFs can tolerate 
risks associated with foreign investment. This is not only because SWFs have a long-
term time horizon and do not face the same account ability to shareholders as private 
investors do, but also because they are obligated to further state’s ends, even at the 
expense of corporate wealth when necessary. Accordingly, I identify several factors 
underlying the investment decisions of SWFs in Chapter 4.  
In this dissertation, special attention is paid to the ways in which SWFs may 
pursue the strategic interests on behalf of their home governments, in particular when 
investing in strategic industries. Needless to say, different countries have different 
strategic interests; consequentially, SWFs may have heterogeneous investment 
preferences, even in industries that are globally considered to be strategic. Therefore, 
using the energy industry as an example because of its strategic importance, Chapter 5 
investigates how state ownership affects SWF investment in strategically important 
industries. By distinguishing between energy-poor and energy-rich countries, this study 
allows us to identify the heterogeneity in SWFs strategic objectives. It is worth noting 
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that Chapter 4 examines which country an SWF chooses to invest in as a result of the 
interaction between that SWF and a host government, and Chapter 5 explores which 
industry an SWF chooses to invest in based on its home government’s strategic goals.  
It should be noted at the outset that in this dissertation I only investigate SWF’s 
direct investments instead of portfolio investments. The former are considered to be 
more aggressive by making multibillion dollar acquisitions and exercising a certain 
degree of management control over the target firm. Therefore, I argue that the direct 
investments of SWFs are more likely to be associated with geopolitical factors than other 
types of investments. If one does not find evidence of the impact of geopolitical factors 
in these investments, the controversy regarding SWF’s potential political motivations 
may be unfounded. Table 1 lists the types of SWF investments examined in the current 
SWF literature. It shows that a majority of the studies investigate portfolio investment, 
with only three papers examining direct investment of SWFs. 
Here I use a broader rather than strictly defined definition of foreign direct 
investment (FDI). The standard definitions of FDI require a foreign firm to exercise 
ownership control over a company, generally using 10 percent of voting shares as a 
threshold. While SWFs acquire a block of shares smaller than 10 percent at times, these 
investments can be significant for two reasons. First, when share ownership is much 
dispersed, even stakes of 5 to 10 percent are important for control (Thatcher, 2013). 
Moreover, SWF investments have often involved major national companies, sometimes 
in strategically important industries such as high technology, energy and defense. 
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Foreign acquisitions of small magnitude in these industries may be sufficient to raise 
national security concerns by host governments.  
Defining Sovereign Wealth Funds 
Before proceeding, it is important to have a clear definition of SWFs. The term 
SWF was coined by Razanov (2005). While scholars have not reached a consensus on 
exactly what constitutes an SWF, most definitions suggest that SWFs are state-owned 
investment funds that make long-term domestic and foreign investments (Fotak et al., 
2008).  
Some institutions and researchers offer very broad definitions that encompass 
any investment vehicles funded by “sovereign wealth”, including government pension 
funds, development banks and other investment funds (Balding, 2008). This expansive 
definition leads to a group of heterogenous government funds being considered as 
SWFs, even though there are important differences between these funds in terms of 
organizational structure, investment objectives, compensation policies and degrees of 
financial transparency. However, using the expansive definition, government pension 
funds and SOEs would – inaccurately—be considered SWFs. SWFs are different from 
government pension funds which have well-defined liabilities. They are also distinct 
from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) which primarily focus on production or the 
provision of services (IMF, 2008). 
In this dissertation, therefore, I employ a narrower definition as in Truman (2007, 
2008) and Lyons (2007). As defined by Truman (2007), SWFs are “a pool of domestic 
and international assets owned and managed by governments to achieve a variety of 
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economic and financial objectives, including the accumulation and management of 
reserve assets, the stabilization of macroeconomic effects and the transfer of wealth 
across generations.” In Chapter 3, I will describe the characteristics of SWFs in greater 
detail. 
The Argument in Short 
My central argument is twofold.  First, host countries are concerned that SWFs 
may pursue non-commercial objectives; they may therefore discriminate against SWF 
investments compared to private investments in both pre- and post-entry phases.  
Positive political relations between home and host countries diminish such 
discriminatory treatment, thus providing SWFs with more freedom in their investments. 
The observable implication is that SWFs are more likely to be associated with 
acquisition deals than private investors in host countries with whom they have better 
bilateral relations. In order to reduce the discrimination SWFs encounter in host 
countries with whom their home country has poor bilateral relations, SWFs can choose 
to invest in a foreign country with other investors. Consequently, I argue that partnering 
with other investors helps SWFs mitigate discrimination and increases their likelihood of 
acquisition success when competing with private investors. 
Second, I argue that SWFs are likely to tolerate risks and uncertainty associated 
with foreign investment because SWFs do not face the same pressure from shareholders 
as private investors do due to SWFs’ “soft budget constraints” and little explicit 
liabilities to be paid to shareholders. Moreover, there is no clear principal to monitor the 
fund performance in SWFs. Even when the performance is evaluated, economic returns 
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are not the only criteria that affect the tenure of fund managers. In essence, SWF 
investment decisions are not held at the same level of accountability as private investors, 
and they may be willing to sacrifice economic gains when pursuing political interests for 
the home country.  The observable implication is that SWFs are less likely to be deterred 
by institutional distance between the home and host countries than private investors are 
when investing overseas, even when institutional distance increases risks and uncertainty 
of foreign investment (Eden and Miller, 2004).  
Going beyond this general theoretical framework, I investigate SWF investment 
behavior in the energy industry as a case to study the heterogeneous motivations of 
SWFs. The energy industry is an intriguing case because it generates significant 
implications both economically and politically for political leaders. Host countries may 
be concerned that a foreign country’s SWF could take control of a large oil company, 
thereby giving the SWF the power to redirect natural resources to the SWF’s home 
country or sell these resources at a discounted price. A more urgent concern is that 
giving a potentially adversarial home country access to scarce and strategically 
important energy resources in a host country helps to strengthen very military 
capabilities of the home country that would be used against the host country in the event 
of a militarized conflict. 
However, the energy industry is politically sensitive only for SWFs from a 
particular type of countries. On the side of the home country, SWFs from energy-poor 
countries are more likely, due to their need for energy security, to invest in the energy 
industry than are SWFs from energy-rich countries. Furthermore, I argue that energy 
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security concern induces SWFs from energy-poor countries to be more likely than 
private investors to invest in the energy industry from the same energy-poor countries. 
Turning to the host country side, foreign investment in this industry is likely to face 
more resistance by the host country than foreign investment in other industries. Because 
of the strategic importance of the energy industry, this resistance would be greater when 
there are poorer bilateral relations between the home and host countries. Moreover, 
SWFs from energy-poor countries are likely to encounter closer scrutiny by host 
governments because SWFs from energy-poor countries may invest in the energy 
industry not purely for financial reasons. As a result, SWFs from energy-poor countries 
are more sensitive to the bilateral relations between the home and host countries than are 
SWFs from the energy-rich countries or private investors from both types of countries.  
Empirical Contributions 
To test these claims, I construct a new dataset from several sources, including 
Thomson Reuters Security Data Corporation’s (SDC) Platinum, Bureau van Dijk 
(BvD)’s Zephyr, and Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ. My analysis covers more than 7,000 
cross-border acquisitions (both SWF and private investments) for the period 1981-
2012.This dataset is unique in that it covers private investments as a benchmark and 
includes investments involving multiple acquirers. This dataset contributes significantly 
to the existing body of SWF acquisition datasets and leads to a new understanding of 
SWF investment at the deal level.  
In order to examine the impact of bilateral relations, I take advantage of a new 
events dataset as well as other commonly used measures such as security alliance and 
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the similarity of UN voting records in order to capture various dimensions of interstate 
relations. Using this variety of inputs sheds light on the nuances of how bilateral 
relations between states affect foreign investment. More specifically, my results suggest 
that investors are more likely to look to media reports and alliance ties than to the pattern 
of UN voting records to assess whether they will be welcome in a host country. Using 
various model specifications, I find consistent evidence to support my main arguments.  
Broad Implications of the Project 
This dissertation contributes to the SWF literature by addressing the role of 
international relations in issues concerning international business and finance. Previous 
political science research on SWFs primarily focuses on the country characteristics 
(Shih, 2009; Clark and Knight, 2011; Foldal, 2010; Chwieroth, 2010), but they fail to 
explain the role of bilateral relations in SWF investment decisions. However, all SWF 
investments are bilateral in nature, and I develop a theoretical framework to incorporate 
the role of bilateral relations between two countries in order to understand SWF 
investment decisions. In addition, I extend the analysis to deal-level data, which allows 
me to elucidate the differences between SWF and private investors in investment 
behavior.  
Meanwhile, although there is a growing literature on SWFs in finance, very little 
attention has been paid to the role of political factors in SWF investment decisions. A 
thorough search of the literature reveals that Knill et al. (2012) and Johan et al. (2013) 
are the only two studies that focus on the role of interstate political relations in SWF 
investment decisions. Surprisingly, both studies find that SWFs tend to invest in 
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countries with which they have weaker political relations. My work goes far beyond 
their studies by developing a theoretical framework based on the nature of state 
ownership, employing more comprehensive data from which to draw empirical 
evidence, as well as improving the measures of interstate political relations.  
This dissertation is also relevant to the studies of FDI because I highlight the role 
of government ownership in FDI. The existing literature on FDI mostly applies to firms 
that are structurally separate from home-country governments and may not hold for 
firms that are themselves partly or wholly state-owned (e.g. Putnam, 1988; Henisz, 
2000; Li and Resnick, 2003). Therefore, this dissertation extends previous studies of FDI 
by examining the impact of government ownership in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
investment.  
In addition, this dissertation sheds light on a rising phenomenon in the global 
economy, i.e., state capitalism. Previous studies have found differences in international 
investment patterns between operating SOEs and private firms (Knutsen et al., 2012, 
Duanmu, 2014). My study departs from these studies in two significant ways. First, most 
previous studies infer the political factors of SOEs based on different international 
investment patterns between SOEs and private firms. However, these differences can be 
due to several factors. For example, they may be due to SOEs’ inefficient choice of 
targets or lower effectiveness in assessing likely outcomes (Megginson and Netter, 
2001). They could also result from differences in management capabilities brought by 
the investing firm to the target, but not necessarily due to political objectives that result 
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from state ownership. Thus, it is critical to isolate political influences by modeling them 
explicitly rather than drawing inferences from differences in investment patterns. 
Second, my work departs from previous studies in that I argue that comparing 
SWFs to private investors allows us to clearly identify the effects of state ownership on 
investment behavior. Unlike SOEs, SWFs are purely investors, not operating entities. 
They typically do not expand abroad on their experience operating at home, nor do they 
build firm-level capabilities to be exploited in foreign markets. Thus, it is unlikely that 
any differences in sensitivity of SWFs and private investors to geopolitical factors are 
related to operational capabilities.  
Furthermore, this study extends the theory of liability of foreignness (LoF) by 
examining how foreign state control or ownership alters the LoF. Starting with Hymer 
(1976), scholars in international business have recognized that foreign firms face the 
LoF, i.e., disadvantages against domestic firms when doing business abroad. While there 
is considerable discussion in the literature about how the LoF can affect firm 
performance (Zaheer, 1995; Miller and Parkhe, 2002; Perez-Batres and Eden, 2008), few 
studies distinguish how the liability varies across heterogeneous firms. This study fills 
this gap in the literature and helps to understand the effect of foreign state ownership on 
the LoF. 
Finally, this dissertation follows the new direction in the field of international 
political economy (IPE) by emphasizing the importance of micro-level analysis. Most 
studies in this field focus on the country-level analyses or sector-level analyses and infer 
the mechanisms driving the behavior of individual firms from macro-level variables. In 
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recent years scholars have started to use firm-level data to understand IPE issues such as 
corruption (Jensen et al., 2010), political risks (Jensen, 2008) and property rights 
(Weymouth and Broz, 2013). In this dissertation, I have collected comprehensive data 
from multiple sources on SWF acquisitions, an approach that is superior to most studies 
in the current literature. The micro-level data analysis that I supply not only provides 
valuable new insights into IPE issues, but also enables us to understand the variation in 
firm behavior within countries.  
Organization of the Dissertation 
Chapter 2 evaluates the current scholarship on SWFs as well as the broader 
literature on FDI, foreign aid, and SOEs, and identifies their limitations in our 
understanding of SWF investments. After reviewing the state of the literature, I move on 
in Chapter 3to describe the characteristics of SWF investments based on my newly 
constructed dataset.  
The central question of this study is how state ownership affects SWF 
investments. Chapter 4 offers a theoretical framework to answer this question. I first 
discuss how discriminatory treatment affects SWF investments compared to private 
investors, as well as the investment strategies of SWFs in order to mitigate 
discrimination. Then I turn to the impact of state ownership on SWF investment 
regarding risk-taking behaviors. I ground my theoretical arguments with statistical 
analysis by using a deal-level dataset drawn from 1987 to 2012. 
In Chapter 5, I study the heterogeneous motivations within SWFs by analyzing 
foreign investment in the energy industry. My data analysis suggests that SWFs from 
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energy-poor countries are more likely to invest in the energy industry compared to either 
SWFs from energy-rich countries or private investors from energy-poor countries. 
Chapter 6 concludes and discusses my future research agenda.  
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CHAPTER II  
EXISTING THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS 
 
Understanding the SWF investment requires us at the very least to review the 
scholarship on two general research questions. First, what are determinants of foreign 
investment? Second, how does state ownership affect foreign investment decisions? 
These are familiar questions to IPE scholars, but not necessarily in the context of SWFs. 
This dissertation is the first step in a broader research agenda that seeks to understand 
the role of a state in foreign investment by SWFs.  
The overall objective of this chapter is to provide a review of extant research. In 
addition to the work that specifically investigates SWF investments, I also review three 
related literatures: foreign direct investment, foreign aid, and the internationalization of 
SOEs. Related to the first question, FDI is a common form of foreign investment, and 
scholars have identified a number of political determinants. Considering that foreign 
investments by SWFs broadly fall into the category of FDI, it is important to present a 
review of this literature and illustrate the ways in which my study fits into the larger 
study of FDI. 
When it comes to the second question concerning the role of a state, studies of 
foreign aid and the internationalization of SOEs have offered numerous insights. Like 
SWFs, foreign aid is an important foreign policy tool to project state power into the 
territory of other states. As pointed out by Alesina and Dollar (2000), while FDI pays 
more attention to economic incentives such as policies on property rights protection in 
the host countries, foreign aid flows tend to serve broad foreign policy purposes and 
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respond to political considerations. Hence, the literature on foreign aid is helpful in 
understanding how political factors potentially shape the preferences for foreign 
economic policy such as the cross-border investments of SWFs. 
Finally, SWFs are not the only vehicle for sovereign investment abroad. 
Although SOEs have traditionally been operating exclusively in the domestic market, 
they have increasingly competed with private firms in the global market in recent 
decades. One may consider that SWF is a special form of SOE, thus the literature on the 
SOEs may inform us about the political determinants of SWF investment. 
The contribution of this dissertation is threefold. First, the FDI literature pays 
little attention to the home country’s government interest in shaping foreign investment. 
My theoretical argument highlights the important role of state ownership in foreign 
investment through SWFs. Second, unlike the allocation of foreign aid that largely 
reflects the foreign policy goals of the greater powers, SWF investment offers an 
excellent opportunity to investigate the potential financial impact of developing 
countries. Third, the existing literature finds that state-owned MNEs differ from their 
private counterparts with respect to objectives, institutional pressures by the host 
countries, and investment strategies. These differences are used to draw an inference 
about political influence of state ownership. In this dissertation, I will explicitly model 
the political factors to examine the underlying mechanisms through which state 
ownership shapes SWFs’ investment behavior.  
In what follows, I first survey the existing literature on SWFs in order to identify 
key arguments that have been put forth by various scholars. Considering that foreign 
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investment by SWFs is one type of FDI, I discuss the key political determinants of FDI 
identified in the literature. Notably one significant difference in this study from the 
research on FDI is that I highlight the role of state ownership in SWF’s investment 
behavior. As a result, I survey theories from the foreign aid and SOE literature. 
Specifically, I demonstrate that while the earlier studies on SOEs may shed light on 
SWFs, one requires a specific theory to understand the overseas investment of SWFs.  
Current Research on SWFs: What Has Been Done? 
There is a small but growing body of literature that studies SWF’s investment 
behavior; the majority of this literature is motivated by the question of whether SWFs 
are politically driven. Overall, we can distinguish three broad strands of research 
approach that examine the non-commercial objectives of SWFs: (1) the investigation of 
SWF objectives by exploring their target selection (2) the impact of SWF investment on 
target firms’ performance, and (3) the political determinants of SWF investment. The 
existing studies have primarily focused on the first two approaches.  
By and large, scholars in finance and international business research are 
interested in investigating SWFs’ target selection. Scholars compare the firm (Avendano 
and Santiso, 2009; Kotter and Lel, 2011), industry (Dyck and Morse, 2011) and host 
country (Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2008) characteristics of SWF targeting firms with 
those of other institutional investors (e.g., mutual funds, pension funds, and other 
government acquirers). The rationale is that if SWF investment behaviors do not 
resemble that of private investors, SWF investment decisions may be driven by some 
noncommercial objectives.  
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Yet these studies of target selection offer contradicting conclusions. By analyzing 
international holdings of 20 SWFs in public traded firms in 58 countries over the period 
of 2002-2007, Fernades (2009) evaluates the effects of country and firm characteristics 
on the probability of being chosen by an SWF. His study refutes the suspicion that SWFs 
might aim to import corporate intelligence to their home countries, because he finds that 
SWFs do not have a particular preference for high-tech firms (as proxied by the ratio of 
R&D to assets). Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009), on the other hand, claim that SWFs 
may have non-financial motives. Based on their newly collected data on public equity 
investments by SWFs during 1996-2008, they find that SWFs invest disproportionately 
in oil companies and financially constrained firms. They suggest that these investments 
in strategic industries are driven by non-financial motives.  
I argue that explanations of the mechanisms underlying this connection remain 
unclear. As I show in Chapter 5, not all SWF investments in the energy industry are 
politically driven. SWFs from energy-poor countries invest in this industry to pursue 
energy security for the home country. By contrast, SWFs from energy-rich countries 
may have more cumulative knowledge and experience about the oil industry than other 
new business domains and thus make it more profitable to invest in foreign oil 
companies; this has nothing to do with political objectives. Moreover, if SWFs aim to 
increase the wealth of future generations and to improve the efficiency of global asset 
allocation, SWFs should have invested in better performing firms. But there are chances 
that SWFs are either just not good at picking winners or they are long-term investors 
(Knill, Lee and Mauck, 2012). Furthermore, Chhaochharia and Laeven(2009) ignore the 
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diversity of SWFs by using public pension funds as a single benchmark. Although it is 
appropriate to compare Government Pension Fund of Norway with public pension funds, 
but less so for other SWFs such as Khazanah, Mubadala, and Temasek, which behave 
more like private equity funds (Castelli and Scacciavillani, 2012).  
The second research approach focuses on examining the impact of SWF 
investment on target performance. Scholars either investigate the impact on operational 
measures of performance, such as ROA (return on assets), ROE (return on equity), net 
profit margin (Fernades, 2009), or perform an event study on the market reaction to 
SWF announcements (Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009; Dewenter et al., 2010; Fotak et 
al., 2008; Kotter and Lel, 2008). The logic of this approach is that SWF investments 
undermine firm performance because they are at least partially driven by some non-
commercial objectives. However, the findings in this line of research remain 
inconclusive. The studies investigating SWFs’ impact on operational measures of 
performance contend that SWF ownership is positively valued by the market (Fernades, 
2009). However, scholars employing event study posit that SWF investments have a 
positive effect on target firms’ stock prices in the short-run (around the announcement 
date) but have generated ambiguous results on firm performance in the medium-term to 
long-run. Meanwhile, Bortolotti et al. (2010) identify a negative effect of SWF 
investment on firm performance, and Kotter and Lel (2009) find no substantial impact. 
While these findings clearly have some relevance for understanding SWFs, it is not the 
target performance that concerns the recipient governments the most, but the political 
motivations of the SWF’s home country.  
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Kotter and Lel (2011) extend this line of research, and they develop an 
explanation linking SWF motives with their transparency. They argue that SWFs with 
non-commercial objectives are more likely to be opaque in order to conceal information 
about their investment activities. By investigating the acquisitions of public and private 
targets by SWFs over the period of 1984-2009, Kotter and Lel (2011) find that the 
market participants react favorably to investment by transparent SWFs, suggesting that 
they consider transparent SWFs as profit-oriented investors. Undoubtedly the positive 
impact of SWF transparency on the market reaction supports that SWFs should increase 
their disclosure standards. Nevertheless, the fact that investments by opaque SWFs are 
less welcomed by market participants is one thing; whether those investments are driven 
by any political motives is another. In other words, market participants may have 
completely different concerns than do recipient governments.  
Mostly due to the lack of direct examination about the causal direction in these 
two approaches, the objectives of SWF investment remain unclear. As a consequence, 
some scholars start to shift their attention to directly examine the political determinants 
of SWF investment, both at domestic and international levels, as the third approach. 
Berstein et al. (2013) show that at the domestic level, the involvement of politicians in 
SWFs provides an explanation for the propensity of SWFs to invest domestically. In an 
analysis of investments in public firms by 29 SWFs between 1984 and 2007, Berstein et 
al. (2013) find that SWFs in which politicians are involved are more likely to invest in 
domestic assets. However, they cannot conclude whether such home bias is poor 
investment choice or whether the investments are “distorted by political or agency 
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considerations.” Both interpretations are possible and have been illustrated by cases in 
other studies. For instance, Le Borgne and Medas (2008) demonstrate the poor 
performance of SWFs in the Pacific island countries due to their weak public financial 
management systems and lack of spending controls. Shih (2009) shows that the 
investment decisions of China’s SWFs are affected by domestic political infighting. 
Regardless of which interpretation holds, neither can justify the validity of potential 
policy concerns by recipient countries. If it is the former case, the lack of financial 
knowledge and experience may prevent SWF countries from intentionally doing any 
harm by using such an “economic weapon”. If it is the latter case, the leaders in SWF 
countries may be overwhelmed by domestic considerations, which give more weight to 
social welfare or political returns instead of any geopolitical agenda. 
At the international level, Knill, Lee and Mauck (2012) suggest that political 
relations between a SWF sponsoring country and recipient country is a significant 
determinant of SWF investment for the over SWF 900 acquisitions of public and private 
targets considered. Specifically, they find that SWFs tend to invest in countries with 
which they have weaker bilateral relations. These results contrast with the international 
trade/FDI and bilateral relations literature. They interpret the results as an indication of 
at least partially non-commercial motives in SWF investment decisions.  
These empirical results are clearly mixed, though some of the variations can be 
explained by the differences in time periods, SWFs, and investment types as well as by 
differences in the operationalization of the dependent and independent variables. A most 
widely used empirical approach is to estimate the likelihood that a fund will target a 
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specific firm using a logit model or other discrete choice model (e.g., Kotter and Lel, 
2009; Fernandes, 2009).  
This dissertation contributes to the SWF literature in several ways. First, I argue 
that it is important to revisit the fundamental research question in the studies of SWF. 
The current debate about SWFs is whether they are politically motivated. However, 
testing an individual’s motivation is empirically difficult because the motivations 
leading to the investment decision are inherently hard to observe. More importantly, 
focusing on whether SWFs are politically motivated overlooks the fact that the host 
country can react strategically to politically motivated SWFs. Even when SWFs pursue 
strategic interests on behalf of the home country, the host government will not watch 
idly while SWFs exert undue influences, as the host governments will ensure that their 
national security concerns are addressed. Consequently, we should understand the role of 
state ownership on SWF investment by considering it as an interaction between the 
SWFs and host governments. In particular, we should examine how state ownership 
creates additional barriers to entry for SWFs and the consequent responses from SWFs.  
Second, I analyze the direct investment of SWFs, while most studies focus on 
equity investment by SWFs. Some SWFs invest indirectly through equity investment. 
For instance, the Government Pension Fund of Norway allocates the majority of its 
wealth into thousands of pension and investment funds operating across global capital 
markets. In this case, their activities in global capital markets are almost “invisible” so 
that their asset management activities have never raised any political concern in Western 
countries. In contrast, other SWFs such as Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), 
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China Investment Corporation (CIC), Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) and 
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) make direct investments in 
both domestic and foreign firms. They are considered to be more aggressive in their 
asset allocation; therefore, these investments most often attract attention from media and 
generate suspicion from the Western political world (Castelli and Scacciavillani, 
2012:82). I argue that the direct investments of SWFs are more likely than other types of 
investment to be associated with political motivations. If one does not find evidence of 
the impact of geopolitical factors in these investments, the suspicion that SWFs can act 
politically could be unfounded.  
Third, I explicitly analyze and model bilateral political relations in my study. 
Although there is plenty of finance literature examining factors that render a target firm 
attractive to SWF investment, bilateral political relations have only been marginally 
analyzed in this context. Most studies concentrate on macroeconomic factors and deal-
specific factors.  
The exception to this is Knill, Lee and Mauck (2012), as noted earlier. Though 
similar in their works on examining the effect of bilateral political relations on SWF 
transactions for public and private acquisitions, my study in Chapter 4 differs in terms of 
the empirical strategy. First, Knill et al. (2012) employ the similarity of UN voting 
records as a proxy for political relations by assuming that countries with dissimilar 
voting patterns in the UN have conflicting political interests. However, as Kastner 
(2007) notes, one obvious caveat of using this measure is that any particular vote in the 
UN may or may not concern issues about which home and host countries seriously care. 
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In Chapter 4, I will explore various measures of bilateral relations. The most commonly 
used measures include both hostile relations (such as militarized interstate disputes, 
economic sanctions, transnational terrorist incidents) and supportive relations (such as 
foreign aid, trade ties, foreign investment, alliances, similarity of voting patterns in the 
United Nations General Assembly). Some scholars also use events data such as Global 
Data on Events, Location, and Tone (GDELT), Conflict and Peace Data Bank 
(COPDAB), World Events Interaction Survey (WEIS), which code daily interactions 
between states on an intensity scale ranging from most conflictual to most supportive 
(e.g., Thyne, 2006). While these political events may be less costly and stable than the 
commonly used indicators, the former can be found in numerous anecdotes in the media 
and are more visible and well-advertised to foreign investors. Thus, the effect of daily 
political events on cross-border M&A deals may be as strong as that of the commonly 
used indicators, or even stronger. Second, Knill et al. (2012) conduct country-level 
analysis instead of transaction level, using either the dollar amount or the number of 
SWF investment in a given country in a given year as a dependent variable. Thus, they 
are unable to control for much unobserved heterogeneity across industries, funds, and 
years. 
Finally, it is important evaluate the heterogeneity among SWFs when considering 
their behaviors and impacts. I provide a detailed analysis of SWFs investment in the 
energy industry in order to understand by example the heterogeneity within SWF groups. 
As I will show in Chapter 5, the energy industry is politically sensitive only for SWFs 
from a particular type of country.  
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In sum, this dissertation addresses several shortcomings in the current 
understanding of SWF investments outlined above and provides new evidence on the 
objectives of SWF investment. In particular, I contribute to the literature by shifting the 
debate to a more appropriate question, focusing on the acquisition investment of SWFs, 
assessing various alternative measures of political relations, and investigating the 
heterogeneity within SWF groups. 
FDI Determinants: The Big Picture 
Before turning to more detailed analysis of SWF investments, it is important to 
demonstrate how my dissertation fits into the larger picture. Due to state ownership, 
SWFs may be directed to pursue government objectives, rendering their investment 
decisions subject to political influence. The literature on FDI has offered three 
explanations of the political determinants of foreign investment that may shed light on 
SWF studies.  
In the first account, the location choice of foreign investment has been attributed 
to the political institutions of the host country (Oneal 1994; Henisz 2000; Jensen 2003, 
2006; Li and Resnick 2003; Li 2006). Some scholars claim that authoritarian regimes 
promote a stable investment environment and attract FDI because they are less subject to 
policy uncertainty that results from electoral cycles (Huntington 1968; Oneal 1994; 
Tuman and Emmert 2004). At the same time, autocratic countries may offer more tax 
incentives to foreign investors and impose fewer restrictive regulations (Li and Resnick 
2003). Alternatively, others believe that democratic institutions attract FDI as they are 
more likely to reduce political risks for foreign investors and protect property rights 
 26 
 
(Jensen, 2003, 2006; Biglaiser and Danis, 2002; Li and Resnick, 2003). It is worth 
noting that the theoretical debate on the relationship between regime type and FDI has 
not been resolved by empirical research because the empirical studies generate 
contradictory results (e.g., Li and Resnick, 2003; Choi, 2009; Jensen, 2003; Li, 2009; 
Harms and Ursprung, 2002; Busse, 2004).  
The second explanation, in part overlapping with the first one, emphasizes 
political stability in the host country. Scholars argue that political instability in the host 
country has a negative effect on FDI flows (Schneider and Frey, 1985), albeit with 
mixed empirical results (Woodward and Rolfe, 1993; Olibe and Crumbley, 1997; Sethi 
et al., 2003). Globerman and Shapiro (2003) find that political instability does not 
influence the probability of whether a country receives any FDI inflow, but reduces the 
amount of FDI inflow a country receives.  
The political environment of a host country is common to all of its potential 
foreign investors. If democratic regime and political stability can explain the investment 
flows alone, then one cannot explain why a host country is attractive to foreign investors 
from one country but not from others. Therefore, FDI should also depend on political 
factors that are dyad-specific. By stressing bilateral relations between the home and host 
countries, the third theoretical account in FDI literature supplies a more convincing 
explanation for the political determinants of FDI. The mainstream of international 
political economy literature suggests that friendly bilateral relations between states 
promote FDI. From the perspective of the home and host governments, interstate 
military conflict may lead to policy changes that decrease bilateral investment due to 
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security externalities (Li and Vashchilko, 2010). From the perspective of economic 
actors, investors consider economic dealings with counterparts from rival countries 
riskier and thus preemptively avoid investment in countries with conflicting interests.   
However, the empirical evidence on this account remains inconclusive. Some 
studies find a positive relationship between political relations and economic relations in 
general (Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2007), while others find it only within certain dyads (Li 
and Vashchilko, 2010) or certain types of investment (Li, 2006). Although extant 
research in FDI provides important insights, this literature has failed to provide a 
reasonable answer to at least three main issues. First, previous studies often begin with a 
premise that host countries attempt to attract FDI. Drawn from their findings, scholars 
make suggestions on how to improve the attractiveness of host countries, such as 
democratization or improving property rights protection. This is partly because most 
host countries that they have examined are emerging and developing countries, which 
heavily depend on foreign capital and investment for economic growth. Nevertheless, 
outward FDI from the developing countries such as China and India has rapidly 
increased in the last few decades. This new phenomenon not only casts doubts on the 
generalizability of previous findings, but also raises important questions regarding their 
investment strategies and motivations, especially when investors from developing 
countries undertake investments in developed countries.  
Second, most studies in the FDI literature generally concentrate on overall flows 
without distinguishing among different types of FDI. Firms can invest abroad in either 
the form of greenfield investment or mergers and acquisitions (M&A), and the majority 
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of aggregate FDI flows are created in the latter form (Kang and Johansson, 2000; Chen 
and Findlay, 2002). However, few studies in the IPE literature have examined the 
political determinants of cross-border M&A. In this respect, previous findings on FDI 
may be biased to some extent. For example, Davis and Meunier (2011) show that 
political shocks between states do not undermine trade or investment flows, in part 
because sunk costs reduce incentives for state and private actors to link political and 
economic relations. However, it is unclear whether it is because investors are 
constrained by sunk costs or because the political tensions between states are not too 
intense to change their investment behavior. M&A investment does not require investors 
to build a new establishment as greenfield investment does, implying a lower level of 
sunk costs. Consequently, examining M&A investment will facilitate a better 
understanding of how diplomatic climate between states influence FDI.  
Finally, most studies assume that multinationals invest abroad by exploiting their 
ownership-specific and internalization advantages and secure higher returns (Dunning, 
1998; Li and Resnick, 2003; Jensen, 2003). This study challenges this assumption by 
taking into account other objectives in investment decisions. In addition to pursuing 
profits, multinationals, especially those with state ownership, may undertake foreign 
investment for non-economic objectives. In this regard, foreign aid offered by the 
official government may be more relevant to the present study, because foreign aid 
serves as an instrument to engage other nations in pursuit of foreign policy goals. Since 
SWFs may also be directed to pursue those foreign policy goals, the following section 
briefly reviews the political economy of foreign aid allocation.   
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Political Economy of Foreign Aid 
The previous literature on foreign aid concludes that donors have four main 
considerations in their foreign aid allocation decision, namely (1) development concerns, 
(2) commercial importance, (3) strategic importance, and (4) ideological concerns. First, 
considerable debate focuses on the impact of foreign aid on economic growth. In his 
seminal work, Boone (1996) finds that foreign aid finances consumption rather than 
investment, although the foreign aid that can more efficiently promote the society-wide 
development would come from aid financing investment. Hansen and Tarp (2000) offer 
an extensive review of this debate and conclude that foreign aid can promote growth in 
developing countries.  
Second, existing studies demonstrate that donor countries’ motivation for 
providing aid also arises from their commercial interest in securing trade benefits. 
Scholars stress that a higher level of total exports of donor countries to the recipient 
countries results in greater aid allocation (Dudley and Montmarquette 1976; Neumayer 
2003). Younas (2008) goes further and claims that OECD countries allocate more aid to 
recipient countries who import goods in which donor countries have a comparative 
advantage in production.  
Third, strategic motives behind foreign aid have been identified in the previous 
paper. While there is general agreement that donors rarely give aid without strategic 
considerations (Easterly 2006; Moyo 2009), the measurement of “strategic interest” 
varies from study to study. Previous research has found that foreign aid receipts are 
positively related to arms imports (Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Hess 1989), similarity of 
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voting patterns with the donors in the general assembly of the United Nations (Dreher 
and Jensen, 2003), Security Council membership (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006), former 
colonial ties (Alesina and Dollar, 2000), etc. These strategic interests are also discussed 
in the cross-border investments of SWFs. Just as donors may provide foreign aid for 
geopolitical reasons, there is a great concern about the role of politics in investment 
decisions of SWFs. Thus in this dissertation I consider some types of “strategic interest” 
employed in the foreign aid literature. Specifically, I consider the case of the energy 
industry in Chapter 5 because it allows us to investigate the heterogeneous motivations 
of SWFs from energy-poor and energy-rich countries.  
Finally, foreign aid may also be driven by more than material interests. Studies 
investigate the impact of ideological values, such as democracy and human rights on aid 
allocation (Allison and Beschel, 1992; Clad and Stone, 1992; Deibel, 1993; Diamond 
1992).  
A survey of the foreign aid literature uncovers some important determinants of 
foreign economic policy. I advance this literature by expanding the analysis to other 
foreign policy behaviors, i.e., SWF investment. The allocation of foreign aid largely 
reflects the foreign policy goals of the greater powers, with most of the existing literature 
exclusively focusing on the U.S. foreign aid. The foreign investments of SWFs provide 
scholars of international relations with a unique opportunity to evaluate the potential 
financial influence of the developing countries. While in certain respects the foreign aid 
theories can be readily applied to the cross-border investment of SWFs, there are 
inevitable gaps. For instance, given the fact that most SWFs are established by 
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developing countries with less political power, the motivation of promoting ideological 
values is unlikely, at least in the short term, and is not explicitly considered in the 
present study. Consequently, this dissertation generates some implications for what to 
expect from current SWF investments in the era of global capitalism.  
Insights from the SOE Literature 
It should be noted that SWFs are not the only financial vehicle that countries use 
to invest abroad. SOE is another way through which countries undertake foreign 
investments. Like SWFs, SOEs are subject to significant influence by home country’s 
government, serving national interests or those of ruling elites.  Their participation in the 
private market looks substantially like those of SWFs. Particularly when engaging in 
investment activities abroad, both SOEs and SWFs raise concerns about whether such 
investment is driven by commercial or political objectives, which leads to rising 
protectionist policies. Given these similarities between SOEs and SWFs, does the SOE 
literature offer any useful insights in the current investigation on SWFs? In other words, 
how does state ownership affect SOE investment abroad? 
Previous scholarship focuses on investigating the political impact of state 
ownership from the perspectives of the home and host countries, respectively. From the 
home country’s perspective, the home government may encourage SOEs to engage in 
foreign investment for non-economic objectives. Those objectives include seeking new 
markets, obtaining technology, securing resources, promoting foreign policy goals and 
exporting social policies to host countries (Vernon 1984, Anastassopoulos, Blanc et al. 
1987). 
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From the host country’s perspective, the non-economic objectives of SOEs are 
often considered as detrimental to the host country (Globerman and Shapiro, 2009). As a 
consequence, SOEs face a higher level of institutional pressures by the host country than 
do private enterprises (Chen and Young, 2010; Globerman and Shapiro, 2009; Nyland, 
Forbes-Mewett, and Thomson, 2011; Sauvant, 2010). As a result, institutional pressures 
eventually induce SOEs to make extra efforts to gain local legitimacy. Cui and Jiang 
(2012) support this view in their investigation of Chinese outward FDI projects during 
2000-2006. They find that the effects of host institutional pressures on a firm to choose a 
joint ownership structure are stronger when the share of equity held by state entities in 
the firm is high. 
As a result, these incompatibilities between home country’s strategic interests 
and host country’s resistance largely affect the cross-border investment by SOEs 
(Gordon and Tash, 2009; Kowalski et al., 2013; Shapiro and Globerman, 2012). 
Research has shown that indeed SOEs’ FDI patterns differ from those of private firms 
from the same home country, with respect to investment location (Knutsen et al, 2011, 
Duanmu et al, 2014), size (Wang et al, 2013), entry mode (Meyer et al, 2014), and level 
of ownership of subsidiaries (Pan et al, 2014).  These studies mostly rely on the 
experience of a single country – China1
Moreover, these differences can be a result of several factors. Besides political 
objectives of state ownership, these differences may be due to inefficient choice of 
targets by SOEs (Megginson and Netter, 2001) or differences in management 
 – and their generalizability is unknown.  
                                                 
1 The only exception is Knutsen, Rygh and Hveem (2011).  
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capabilities brought by the investing firm to the target. Thus, one should explicitly model 
the political influences rather than drawing inferences from differences between SWF 
investment and private investment. 
Despite these limitations, do the theories on SOEs apply to SWFs? Do we need a 
special theory for SWFs? Although many of the characteristics of SOEs and SWFs are 
similar, a number of differences are notable; thus, SOE theories may not hold for SWFs 
for the following reasons. First, paying attention to objectives and investment portfolio 
illuminates critical differences between SWFs and SOEs. Because SWFs are commonly 
funded by the transfer of foreign exchange assets or oil revenue, they are set up to pursue 
broader objectives than SOEs. These objectives include diversifying and improving the 
return on exchange reserves or oil revenue, shielding the domestic economy from 
commodity price fluctuations, accumulating savings for future generations or other 
unspecified objectives. In contrast, the SOE is held by the central or local government 
and is funded by the government grants and corporate profits. SOEs are often driven by 
industrial/regional policy and/or the supply of public goods (often in utilities and 
infrastructure). For example, SOEs in China have been seen as maintaining employment 
in order to reduce social tensions that might arise through massive layoffs of workers. 
However, it is unlikely that the Chinese government would make employment 
preservation a goal of SWFs investing abroad.  
Finally and most importantly, unlike SOEs, SWFs are purely investment vehicles 
and not operating enterprises. They typically do not expand abroad on their experience 
operating at home. Nor can they build firm-level capabilities to be exploited in foreign 
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markets. Thus, if one identifies any differences in sensitivity of SWFs and private 
investors to geopolitical factors, it is unlikely that the differences are related to 
operational capabilities. Consequently, comparing SWF foreign investment behavior to 
that of private investors allows us to identify more clearly the effects of state ownership. 
Conclusions 
To summarize, current scholarship on SWFs has not systematically looked at the 
potential political determinants of SWF investment. At best, we have partial answers to 
the question. Furthermore, I contend that scholars should shift their attention from 
focusing on whether SWFs have political motivation to the question of how the nature of 
state ownership affects SWF investment and their interaction with host countries. 
Meanwhile, current literature on FDI finds that the political regime, political stability, 
and bilateral relations between the home and host countries are important when MNEs 
make investment decisions. However, it fails to consider the role of state ownership in 
shaping the foreign investment behavior. Foreign aid literature informs us that the state 
can employ foreign economic policy to serve the development, commercial, strategic 
and ideological objectives. These objectives reflect the foreign policy goals of the great 
powers such as the United States, but may not be generalizable to that of developing 
countries. Finally, prior research on the internationalization of SOEs argues that the 
incompatibilities of home country’s strategic interests and host country’s institutional 
pressure make the cross-border investments by SOEs different from their private 
counterparts. Nevertheless, the effect of state ownership on such difference may be 
confounded by different operational capabilities in SOEs and POEs. Unlike SOEs, SWFs 
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are purely investors and not operating entities. Thus, comparing SWFs and private 
investors allows us to identify the effects of state ownership more clearly. With these 
insights, it is now possible to move on to a new theory of SWFs. 
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CHAPTER III  
A PRIMER ON SWF INVESTMENT 
 
In the previous chapter I reviewed the recent scholarships on SWFs. One 
limitation of these studies is that they fail to explain the micro-level mechanism 
underlying SWF investment, in part because these studies are based on data at the 
country level.  
Investigating deal-level data advances our understanding of SWF investment 
because it allows us to account for heterogeneity in the individual transactions. For 
instance, the negotiations over investments vary considerably from deal to deal. The 
individual transactions that SWFs engage in are situated in complex circumstances 
derived from the involved parties’ technological and organizational skills, global 
experience, industries, entry mode, institutional environment as well as diplomatic 
climate during the transaction period. Hence, using country-level analysis fails to explain 
a large portion of the variation in individual transactions.  Moreover, a recent 
development in the field of IPE has emphasized moving from country-level data to 
individual- and firm-level data. Scholars have generated micro-level evidence to 
understand corruption (Jensen et al., 2010), political risks (Jensen, 2007), property rights 
(Weymouth and Broz, 2013) and other IPE issues.  
This dissertation follows this new development by investigating the political 
determinants of SWF investment through the lens of deal-level data. In what follows, I 
briefly discuss the deal-level data of SWF investments that I have collected, and 
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summarize the basic statistics concerning the characteristics and recent growth of SWF 
investments based on this newly collected dataset. 
My dataset has several important features. First, distinct from most studies on 
equity investment by SWFs (e.g., Fotak et al, 2008; Fernandes 2009), my dataset 
contains the direct investments of SWFs. As discussed in Chapter 2, equity investments 
in global capital markets such as those by Norway’s SWF are almost “invisible” so that 
their asset management activities have never raised any political concern in Western 
countries. In contrast, other SWFs focused on direct investment in either domestic or 
foreign markets are considered to be more aggressive in their asset allocation. These 
SWFs claim that commercial motivation is primarily responsible for their choices of 
direct investment instead of equity investment. That is, they attempt to avoid investment 
expenses to private-equity firms, which typically charge 2% on assets and take 20% of 
any profit (Wall Street Journal, 2014). However, financial analysts argue that these 
investments are more likely to be associated with political motivations than other types 
of investment (Castelli and Scacciavillani, 2012:82). Hence, the analysis of direct 
investment deals allows me to investigate the role of geopolitical factors, if such a role 
exists, in these investments. 
Second, my dataset also includes acquisition deals by private investors. Most of 
the SWF studies in the finance literature examine governance features, investment 
patterns and financial impact of SWFs without using other wealth managers as a 
benchmark. In doing so, these studies provide stylized facts about SWF investments, 
which are interesting and important for an academic financial audience. Nevertheless, 
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we cannot go beyond these stylized facts and suggest whether SWFs pursue non-
commercial objectives by adopting this research design. A benchmark investor is 
essential when exploring the objectives of SWF investments—one should expect that 
SWF investment decisions diverge from those of benchmark investors if SWF 
investments have political motives.  
Unfortunately, there is no consensus on what constitutes the benchmark investor 
when studying the investment profile of SWFs. Some studies look at other large 
institutional investors, such as hedge funds, mutual funds, or pension funds (Avendano 
and Santiso 2009). There are some similarities between SWFs and these classes of 
investors. For instance, SWFs are similar to hedge funds in that both are stand-alone, 
unregulated pools of capital to purchase large ownership stakes in foreign companies 
(Bortolotti et al. 2010). SWFs resemble pension funds in respect to long-term investment 
horizons and preference for diversifying across multiple investment categories. 
However, important differences remain between SWFs and these investors, such as 
objectives, funding sources, and regulations. More specifically, unlike mutual and 
pension funds, SWFs represent foreign government assets with no specific liabilities to 
be paid to shareholders (Kotter and Lel 2008). SWFs also differ from hedge funds in that 
the former uses little leverage.2
                                                 
2 Leverage is the degree to which an investor or business is utilizing borrowed money. On the one hand, 
companies that are highly leveraged may be at risk of bankruptcy or unable to find new lenders in the 
future. On the other hand, leverage can increase the shareholders’ return on investment and often there are 
tax advantages associated with borrowing.  
 Since the focus of this dissertation is how state 
ownership affects SWF investment overseas, I use private investors as a broad 
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benchmark. To that end, I have also collected data on cross-border acquisitions both by 
SWFs and private investors.  
It is important to collect data on SWF acquisitions from multiple sources. Similar 
to other studies (Bortolotti et al., 2009; Bernstein et al., 2013), I collected the acquisition 
data by SWFs from a number of financial databases. For example, Hartmann (2005), 
after searching for a number of deals from several transaction data sources, find that a 
significant number of deals could be missed if a single data source is used. Those 
missing deals are generally either small or undisclosed. In addition, SWFs may also have 
incentives to hide information on purchases of foreign strategic assets; therefore 
collecting data from multiple sources is necessary.  
In sum, an analysis of SWF acquisitions requires a more comprehensive data 
collection, including information on acquisitions both by SWFs and by private investors. 
To assess the objectives of SWF investment, I also investigate the role of joint 
investment.  
Proceeding from here, I first discuss the data sources from which I collected 
information on the cross-border acquisitions and detail the construction of the SWF 
acquisition data used in this dissertation. I then present statistics on sample selection and 
the characteristics of SWF acquisitions. To illustrate the evolution of SWF acquisitions 
over time and across countries, I describe their temporal variation and geographic 
distribution. I also provide some evidence on joint investment. The final section provides 
conclusions.  
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Data Sources and Construction 
In order to get a complete picture of SWF acquisitions, I combined the cross-
border acquisitions from three financial databases, namely Thomson Reuters SDC 
Platinum, BvD’s Zephyr, and Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ. Each data source has its 
own advantages and disadvantages, but they complement each other in order to obtain a 
complete picture of SWF investments. For example, SDC offers the longest M&A data 
since 1980 and is the industry standard used by investment banks, law firms, and media 
outlets around the world. However, because it covers only larger transactions and a 
higher proportion of publicly-listed targets, using this source exclusively would 
introduce a sample selection bias. By contrast, Zephyr, with no minimum deal value for 
a transaction to be included, covers deals of smaller value than SDC. Furthermore, 
Zephyr contains a direct link, via the BvD identification number in Orbis, to each firm’s 
ownership information.  This could facilitate identifying the foreign investments of 
SWFs through their majority-owned subsidiaries. Finally, Capital IQ claims that it offers 
more accurate and timely data than other data sources. I also use it to further extend and 
produce more coverage of SWF investments.   
Data Collection Procedure 
My data collection followed a three-step procedure. As a first step, I collected 
acquisition data in all the countries by searching the SDC Platinum database with a 
positive value for the data point “Buyside Sovereign Wealth Fund Involvement Flag”. A 
number of data items were collected, including the announcement date, transaction 
value, percentage of shares acquired, the target’s and the acquirer’s names, their industry 
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sectors, countries of domicile, SWF involvement flag, as well as SWF name and role.3
Table 2
 
As shown in , I ranked the acquirer countries by the number of SWF acquisitions, 
and concentrated on the top ten active SWF countries that have at least 10 cross-border 
acquisitions by SWFs. As shown in column (4), this captures 96.85 percent of the SWF 
transactions. Those with fewer acquisitions are not considered because otherwise it is 
hard to compare SWF with private investors from the same home country.  
SWFs often invest through a myriad of subsidiaries. For example, China’s State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) invests in foreign equities mainly through 
its Hong Kong-based subsidiary SAFE Investment Company (Chhaochharia and Laeven 
2009). Thus in my second step, I used the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (SWFI) list 
of SWFs and gathered all ownership information for these funds from Bureau van Dijk’s 
Orbis database to identify the subsidiaries of SWFs. Then I obtained cross-border 
acquisition data by SWFs and their majority-owned subsidiaries (in which SWF has at 
least a 50% ownership stake) from Zephyr and Capital IQ database.  
Thirdly, I combined the transaction data from the three data sources (SDC, 
Zephyr, and Capital IQ) and deleted the duplicate observations. Because no universal 
transaction identification codes exist among various data sources, and some deal 
variables (such as the announcement date, target’s and acquirer’s names) are recorded 
differently in these data sources even for the same transaction, I identified the duplicate 
observations using the keywords: announcement year, month, the target’s country code, 
and its primary SIC codes, and then manually checked for accuracy.  
                                                 
3 The role of SWFs in most cases includes acquirer and its immediate, intermediate, or ultimate parent. In 
some cases, the SWF also plays a role on the target side.  
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Since I am interested in the role of bilateral political factors in SWF investment 
decisions, I only considered cross-border deals. I applied a number of filters commonly 
used in the M&A literature (Gaspar, Massa et al. 2005, Betton, Eckbo et al. 2008). If 
SWFs invest in foreign firms for reasons of political “blackmail” or espionage, it would 
be plausible to suspect that these objectives should be more evident in large transactions. 
Accordingly, attention should be primarily focused on large transactions in assessing 
SWFs’ potential political objectives.4 More specifically, I excluded acquisitions with 
total assets of less than US$10 million and the fractional stake in the target less than 5 
percent, which cutoffs are commonly used in M&A literature (e.g., Ben-Amar and 
Andre 2006; Yen and Andre, 2007). Furthermore, since divestitures,5 spin-offs,6 
repurchases,7 and self-tenders8 often undertake different considerations from 
acquisitions, these types of restructuring activities were excluded. Targets from tax 
havens such as British Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands were also excluded. The final 
dataset covers 7142 acquisitions (both SWF and private investments) in 145 target 
countries from 10 SWF acquirer countries and 26 non-SWF countries over the period of 
1981-2012.9
                                                 
4 This is not inconsistent with the earlier justification of the use of  various data sources because some 
deals with a market value of slightly over US$10 million may be excluded in SDC but not in Zephyr.  
5 Divestiture means the partial or full disposal of a business unit through sale, exchange, closure or 
bankruptcy.  
6 Spin-off means divisions of companies that then become independent businesses with assets, employees, 
intellectual property, technology, or existing products that are taken from the parent company.  
7 Repurchase means that a company buys back its own shares from the marketplace, reducing the number 
of outstanding shares. 
8 Self-tender means that a company buys back its own shares through a tender offer for a price well above 
fair market value. 
9 Since SWFs sometimes invest with private investors in non-SWF countries, the 26 non-SWF acquirer 
countries are included.  
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While the dataset offers a unique SWF acquisition data, two limitations in 
constructing the dataset should be noted. The first limitation is that I collected SWF 
deals from SDC, Zephyr, and Capital IQ, yet only rely on SDC for non-SWF deals (see 
Table 3) because applying the above mentioned steps on a much larger number of 
private acquisitions would require heavy manual work.10 Thus, I checked whether we 
can only rely on SDC for non-SWF deals. SDC is considered as the most comprehensive 
and widely used data source for M&A transactions. If a majority of the non-SWF deals 
in Zephyr and CIQ are covered in SDC, the sample selection bias may be acceptable. 
Otherwise, one may be concerned that acquisition investments by private investors are 
underrepresented. As it demands tremendous time and effort to test it for all the sample 
countries,11
                                                 
10 Identifying the duplicate transactions in the three data sources is difficult because there is no common 
identifier among the various sources. Matching based on company’s name is also not feasible for this large 
number of private acquisitions as there are different spellings, languages, abbreviations or even slight 
misspelling of the same company’s name.  
11 To test it for all the sample countries, one needs to download and combine all the acquisition data from 
the three sources and delete the duplicate transactions.  
 I assess it only in Singapore’s case, which has the most number of 
acquisition transactions according to the SDC database. Before proceeding further, two 
points should be noted. First, while SDC covers data as early as 1981, when Singapore’s 
SWF was established, I examine SDC data only from 1986 here in order to make it more 
comparable with Zephyr and Capital IQ databases. Second, in order to compare 
duplicate deals across data sources instead of within data sources, “duplicate” 
transactions with the same year, month, target country code, and target industry within 
the same data source are removed before comparing the duplicate deals across data 
sources.  
 44 
 
Table 4 reports the results for Singapore’s transactions. It shows that SDC 
database covers more than 80% of the private investment deals from Zephyr database 
(3,040 duplicate deals out of 3,836 for Singapore) and 70% from Capital IQ (519 out of 
718 for Singapore).  In addition, SDC covers a total of 7,992 cross-border private deals 
for Singapore, much larger than the 3,836 in Zephyr and the 718 in Capital IQ.  
Consequently, relying on SDC to measure private investment deals allows us to capture 
the majority of all the recorded private deals, at least in the case of Singapore.  The size 
of the sample is large enough to be representative of the underlying population of cases. 
Another concern regarding the dataset is the treatment of deals with multiple 
acquirers. 481 among 7142 acquisition deals (both SWF and private investments) are 
acquired by more than one investor, 168 of which involve at least one SWF. I treated 
those deals as separate ones, so the unit of analysis is deal-acquirer. The three data 
sources have various coding schemes when multiple acquirers are involved and this 
leads to missing values. Zephyr has the cleanest data with respect to multiple acquirers. 
However, I could not identify the acquirer names when there are multiple acquirers in 
SDC because the entries for acquirer names are coded as “investor group” in those cases. 
Furthermore, in Capital IQ with multiple acquirers, about a quarter of investors’ nations 
(15 out of 64) and Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes (12 out of 64) are 
missing. Although the dataset is still far from perfect, to my knowledge, this dataset 
represents a major advancement of SWF acquisition dataset in the current literature.  
 45 
 
Characteristics of Sample Countries 
The final sample consists of 7142 cross-border acquisition deals (622 acquired by 
SWFs and 6520 by private investors) from the following ten SWF countries: China, 
South Korea, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Libya, Malaysia, Oman, Qatar, Singapore, and 
United Arab Emirates (UAE). The data are from SWF inception years for the respective 
sample countries through 2012. While Norway has the largest SWF in the world in terms 
of asset value, this country is not included because as noted earlier, Norwegian SWF 
allocates the majority of their assets into debt securities instead of M&A transactions.  
These ten countries are ideal for a study of cross-border acquisitions by SWFs. 
Most of the sample countries are authoritarian regimes except for Malaysia and South 
Korea, with a democracy score less than six. Those authoritarian countries are good 
samples to test my research hypotheses. Given the nature of authoritarian regimes, 
dictators are, presumably, subject to fewer institutional constraints to exercise control 
over sovereign wealth for reasons of political positioning than political leaders in 
democratic regimes. Therefore, the influence of political factors is expected to be 
stronger in this sample than in democratic countries such as the United States. If one 
fails to find that political factors have an impact on SWF investment in this sample, it 
would be less plausible to suspect political objectives of SWFs.  
Table 5 lists the target countries, ranking them from largest to smallest number of 
cross-border acquisitions by SWFs. It covers 145 target countries from 1981 to 2012. 
India leads the list with 217 deals, followed by the United States with 206 deals.  
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Table 6 reports descriptive statistics on the SWFs covered in my sample, 
including their names, country of origin, year of inception, estimated asset size, and 
source of funding, taken from SWF Institute (SWFI). While half of the SWFs in my 
sample obtain their funds from oil revenues, the other half obtain their funds from other 
sources, such as foreign exchange reserves. Oil-based funds are mostly located in the 
Middle East. 49 additional SWFs are listed in the SWFI yet not covered by my sample 
because they are small in terms of asset value under management, non-federal funds,12 
sovereign pension funds (SPFs),13
Summary Statistics 
 or not actively engaged in cross-border acquisitions. 
The 17 SWFs of the sample manage $3250.4 billion of assets in total, about 65 percent 
of the total assets owned by all SWFs. 
Temporal Evolution 
In order to present the characteristics of SWFs covered by my sample, this 
section provides some summary statistics. I begin with the temporal evolution because 
some scholars recognize the possible change over time in the SWF investments (Beck 
and Fidora 2009). While the first SWF was established in Kuwait in 1953, I begin my 
study from the early 1980s because SWFs became active only over the past decades. 
Figure 1shows trends in cross-border acquisitions acquired by SWFs in the top ten 
countries by years. The pattern shows that SWFs began to invest abroad from the mid-
                                                 
12 The non-federal funds such as Alaska Permanent Fund and Permanent Wyoming Mineral Trust Fund are 
excluded because the present study focuses on political determinants at national level such as bilateral 
political relations and institutional distance between the home and host countries, and not at individual 
state level.  
13 The SPFs such as Australia Future Fund and Canada Pension Funds are excluded because they typically 
have limited foreign investment assets, and they differ significantly in terms of governance structure 
because of the nature of the liabilities on their balance sheets (Aizenman and Glick 2008).  
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1980s. This is because most oil producing countries set up the first wave of SWFs after 
the increase in oil price in the 1970s and 1980s. The second wave of SWFs was set up in 
the wake of the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. Most emerging countries in East 
Asia shifted from debtors to creditors and held more foreign reserves than necessary. 
The consequence of this can be observed in the rapid increase in the number of cross-
border acquisitions by SWFs from 2000 onward.  
Table 7 presents summary statistics by year on the number and the cumulative 
value of cross-border acquisition deals involving at least a five percent stake in a target 
firm.14
Four interesting findings stand out. First, as also demonstrated in 
 In Panel A, I report those associated with SWF acquirers and, in Panel B, those 
with private acquirers as a benchmark. In each panel, I present the total number of deals, 
the number of deals in which transaction values are reported, the average and cumulative 
deal value, the number of abandoned deals, those involving less than 10% of target 
shares, those involving more than 50% but less than 100% of target shares, and those 
involving buyouts of target firms. My overall sample across all years constitutes 7142 
deals cumulatively totaling $332 billion in value.  
Figure 1, Table 
7 shows that a significant increase in SWF acquisitions occurred in 2007 and 2008, in 
terms of both deal number and cumulative deal value.15
                                                 
14 This threshold is chosen because owners who possess more than five percent of the shares would have 
some degree of managerial control on the firm. Besides, there is no general disclosure requirement for 
shareholders that hold less than five percent of a company’s equity.  
15 This justifies that year dummies in the empirical models are necessary.  
 About 23% of all SWF 
acquisitions and 37% of the cumulative value were concentrated in those two years. 
Acquisition activity by private investors also increased during 2007-2008, but not as 
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rapidly in terms of the cumulative value of all deals (only 28%). This change is primarily 
because SWFs took stakes in large financial institutions during the beginning stages of 
the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. However, as bank stocks tumbled and the crisis 
further expanded, SWFs significantly reduced their investments (Jory, Perry et al. 2010).   
Second, about 66% of the SWF deals (360 out of the total 546) report deal 
values, while such ratio for private investors is slightly lower at 62% (4107 out of 6533). 
Thus, there is no evidence that SWFs are substantially less transparent than private 
investors from the perspective of disclosing the deal values. Various factors can explain 
why the companies do not disclose deal value. It is probably because the deal value is 
too small to report, countries (usually the seller countries) have varying disclosure 
standards and regulatory requirements, or the parties to the transaction choose to not do 
so.   
Third, comparing the deal values of acquisitions by SWFs with those by private 
investors in column (3) and (4), it is clear that the average deal value involving an SWF 
acquirer is similar to that of private investors ($4 billion versus $3 billion). However, the 
cumulative transaction values of SWF acquisitions are only one-third of that of private 
ones. This is not surprising as total SWF assets are relatively small compared with the 
more than $50 trillion of funds managed by private investors (Beck and Fidora 2008).  
Since many scholars and policymakers fear that SWFs are used strategically and 
politically to exercise significant influence over foreign firms, the fourth finding 
concerns how often an SWF seeks active control of a company. As regards the stake 
acquired in target companies listed in the last three columns of Table 7, SWFs are 
 49 
 
passive investors. 61% of SWF deals involve more than 50% of a company’s 
outstanding capital, while 88% of private deals do.16
Compared to private investors, SWFs’ reluctance to control foreign firms either 
stems from regulatory restrictions of host countries or from the willingness of SWFs 
themselves, or from both. In other words, this may result from a number of regulations 
that prevent SWFs from acquiring control over U.S. firms (Rose 2008). An alternative 
explanation is that SWFs increase monitoring costs by other investors because SWFs 
might not hold purely commercial motives in the target firms. If these increased agency 
costs lower the share prices of target firms and if SWFs are purely commercially 
motivated, it would provide SWFs with the incentive to invest passively in order to 
reassure other investors of their passivity. Nevertheless, these increased agency costs 
would be less important for SWFs with political objectives if the political gains are 
weighted over economic loss. Note that not taking majority stakes does not mean that 
 Equality testing of these 
proportions indicates that these proportions are not statistically significant. This provides 
further evidence to support the notion that SWFs are not more likely to exercise 
significant control over foreign firms than are private investors. In fact, some SWFs such 
as the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority have a stated policy to avoid majority stakes in 
foreign companies (Balin 2008). Additionally, both China and Russia have promised the 
U.S. Treasury that they would stay out of strategic purchases in the next five years 
(Lowery 2007).  
                                                 
16 This ratio is calculated based on the sample in which the information on percentage of shares acquired is 
available.  
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they are insignificant: at times, stakes of 6-7 percent are the largest ones in the company 
(Thatcher 2012).  
Geographic Distribution 
Among the controversies about SWFs, one specific concern is that SWFs may 
predominately invest in certain countries to serve political objectives, thus posing a 
threat to national interests of host countries. Thus, I turn to the geographic distribution of 
SWF acquisitions. In Table 8, I report the deal number and deal values by acquirer 
country (Panel A) and by target country (Panel B).  
On the one hand, some countries initiate more cross-border acquisitions through 
SWFs than others. The countries that have the most intensive cross-border M&A activity 
acquired by SWFs include Qatar (42% of deals among the ten SWF countries, 68% of 
deal value), Kazakhstan (36%, 15%), Libya (25%, 48%), United Arab Emirates (20%, 
43%), and Singapore (8%, 47%). By raw cumulative deal value, however, Singapore 
leads the list with 291 deals and $51 billion of deal activity, both statistics that far 
exceed any other country in the sample. Such domination can be explained by largely, 
though not exclusively, by the differences in fund sizes and the willingness to engage in 
direct investments. For example, the two Singapore funds, Temasek Holdings and the 
Government of Singapore Investment Corporation, spent $15.7 billion in 2013, 
accounting for about a third of direct investments by state investors globally that year 
(Wille 2014). 
On the other hand, the recipient countries of SWF investments are geographically 
diverse. As shown in Panel B of Table 8, the United States is the largest target market, 
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with 64 deals. Besides large industrialized economies, SWFs also allocate sizable assets 
in emerging markets. In terms of number of SWF deals, China is the largest target 
market (58 deal counts), followed by India (35).  
Joint Investment 
It is important to stress that my data also include transactions involving multiple 
acquirers. In Table 9, I report the SWF acquirer countries ranked from highest to lowest 
fractions of joint acquisitions measured by cumulative deal value by acquirer country. 
The SWF acquirer countries in which joint acquisitions dominate SWF deals include 
South Korea (81% of deal value, 50% of deal counts), Kuwait (37%, 40%), and Libya 
(44%, 33%). More importantly, in terms of raw numbers, it also shows that a 
concentration of joint acquisitions occurs in Singapore (62 deals and $128 billion).  A 
closer look at the data shows that 28 of these joint acquisitions are in India, 15 in 
Indonesia, 15 in China, and 11 in the United States.  
To further investigate the identity of partners who jointly invest with SWFs, 
Table 10 presents data on deals acquired by at least one SWF.17
                                                 
17 Notice that the number of joint acquisitions is fewer than that in Table 8, because this table only relied 
on Zephyr and Capital IQ databases. Information about who is the co-investor is unavailable in SDC, as 
co-investors are coded as “Investor Group”. 
It shows that when 
participating in joint acquisitions, SWFs appear to have a preference for private firms as 
partners instead of other SWFs. One explanation for the greater proportion of joint 
acquisitions with private investors is that SWFs attempt to minimize political opposition 
by the host country by investing with private investors.  
 52 
 
Conclusion 
In sum, a comparison of cross-border acquisitions by SWFs and private 
investors, which is summarized in Table 11, highlights several important characteristics 
of SWF acquisitions. Overall, SWFs appear to follow an investment strategy similar to 
that of private asset managers. Although there are great differences in number and value 
of acquisitions by SWFs and private investors, they have similar fractions of deals that 
disclose information regarding the transaction value.18 However, these descriptive 
statistics are subject to over-simplification. Such similarity between SWFs and private 
investors may be inextricably linked to different political and macroeconomic 
determinants. In other words, the investment patterns of SWFs may be dictated by 
political and strategic considerations, which may have little to do with private 
investments. For instance, the observed nondisclosure behavior of SWFs and private 
investors may arise from different considerations. Whereas private investors may 
respond more to the economic and institutional variables (e.g., the host country’s 
jurisdiction does not impose a disclosure obligation),19
                                                 
18 The difference is not statistically significant. 
19 This is consistent with the institution-escape view in the international business literature that emphasizes 
the outward foreign direct investment as escape response from the home country institutions.  
 SWFs are probably constrained 
by the host country’s political pressures when acquiring strategic assets and are thereby 
reluctant to disclose certain types of information. In this circumstance, the political 
factors do not contribute to the investment patterns of SWFs and private investors to the 
same extent, albeit with similar patterns observed. Hence, this raises a more interesting 
question: are SWFs and private investors equally sensitive to political factors? Further 
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in-depth analysis with statistical tools in the next chapter will help test inside the “black 
box” and examine the political and economic determinants of SWF investments.  
Moreover, although government ownership of SWFs makes their investment 
sensitive from a political perspective, my data suggests that SWFs appear to avoid 
controlling shares in the target firms and prefer joint acquisitions compared to private 
investors. It is not straightforward, however, to ascertain whether those strategies that 
SWFs utilize to stay out of the public limelight in host countries are a result of restrictive 
regulations of host countries or a choice of SWFs. This topic has important implications 
because if it is the former case, SWFs may exert influence behind the scenes. In order to 
answer this question, I will develop a theoretical framework of SWF investment by 
taking into account key political and institutional factors and will undertake various 
empirical analyses in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER IV  
THE EFFECT OF STATE OWNERSHIP ON SWF INVESTMENT 
 
How does state ownership affect SWF investment abroad? Or, to put it 
differently, how does state ownership raise entry barriers and yield competitive 
advantages or disadvantages for SWFs? How do SWFs deal with additional entry 
barriers and take advantage of the opportunities provided by state ownership? In this 
chapter, I first address these questions in order to understand the ways in which state 
ownership influences SWFs’ investment behavior.  I then test my arguments based on 
the dataset of deal-level cross-border acquisitions by SWFs and private investors. 
As Drezner (2008) noted, “SWFs sit at the intersection of high finance and high 
politics.” The interplay of finance and politics induces SWFs to behave in at least two 
different ways. First, SWFs can be employed by the home government as an investment 
vehicle to pursue political goals. Recognizing this, host countries are often concerned 
that home countries may be using SWFs to further political or non-economic goals. 
These politically motivated investments may generate risks for the national security of 
the host countries. Therefore, host states are more cautious about SWF investment and 
impose more restrictions on SWFs compared to private investors, especially when they 
have survival concerns in an anarchical, self-help system especially when they feel that 
the home country is a threat to national security. Since the discrimination is higher 
against SWFs from potentially adversarial home countries, SWFs are more likely to 
engage in acquisition deals in host countries with which they have better bilateral 
relations. Furthermore, in order to alleviate the additional discrimination, SWFs may 
 55 
 
also choose to invest in a foreign country with other investors. Consequently, I argue 
that partnering with other investors helps SWFs mitigate discrimination and increase 
their likelihood of acquisition success when competing with private investors. 
The second way in which the interplay of finance and politics affects SWF 
behavior is that SWFs may seek economic gains through political leverage, thus giving 
SWFs a competitive advantage over private investors. Although both SWFs and private 
investors face risk and uncertainty when investing abroad, SWFs can tolerate a higher 
level of risk and uncertainty due to state ownership. This is because SWFs have “soft 
budget constraints”, little explicit liabilities, no clear principal to monitor their 
performance, as well as the need to pursue political interests at the expense of profits 
when necessary. One observable implication is that SWFs are less likely to be deterred 
by institutional distance between the home and host countries than private investors are 
when investing overseas, even when institutional distance increases risks and 
uncertainty.  
To evaluate my arguments, I use an original dataset on SWF investments that I 
have constructed. As discussed in Chapter 3, this dataset has information on several 
important characteristics of SWF acquisitions. Using this newly collected dataset, I 
analyze the SWF acquisitions at the deal level from 1987 to 2012. I employ logit models 
to estimate the effects of bilateral relations, institutional distance and joint ventures on 
the observed cross-border acquisitions. My statistical analysis demonstrates that better 
bilateral political relations and greater institutional distance between the home and host 
countries increase the likelihood of cross-border acquisitions by SWFs relative to private 
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firms. Furthermore, my analysis suggests that SWFs are more likely to engage in joint 
ventures than are their private counterparts.   
In what follows, I first investigate how discriminatory treatment by the host 
government results in greater additional costs for SWFs compared to private investors 
and how SWFs deal with the additional discriminatory treatment. Next, I consider how 
state ownership affects SWFs’ ability and willingness to tolerate risks with regard to the 
uncertainties of foreign investments. I then discuss the definition and measurement of 
variables as well as the model specification. Finally I present the empirical results.  
Discriminatory Treatment and SWF Investment 
The first effect of state ownership on SWF investment is with respect to the 
discriminatory treatment by host countries. Starting with Hymer (1976), scholars in 
international business have recognized that foreign firms face disadvantages compared 
to domestic firms when doing business abroad. Zaheer (1995) introduces the notion of 
LoF, defining it as additional costs faced by foreign firms but not by local firms. Many 
other studies (Delios and Henisz, 2000; Nagarajan, 2001) also recognize that due to 
political factors, host governments systematically discriminate against foreign investors 
and give preferential treatment to domestic firms.. As specific examples, Delios and 
Henisz (2000) find that governments are more likely to expropriate foreign firms 
compared to domestic ones, and Mezias (2002) points out that foreign subsidiaries face a 
significantly greater number of labor lawsuits in the United States than do domestic 
firms.  
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The underlying logic of this discriminatory treatment is derived from several 
fundamental premises in the international relations literature. First, international anarchy 
is the principal force shaping the motivations and behaviors of states (Waltz, 1959). 
States that operate in an anarchy system must be concerned first with survival before 
anything else. Second, because gains from economic exchanges between states can turn 
into military, security or other advantages, economic exchanges such as international 
trade can generate security externalities (Gowa, 1989). If improvement in military power 
occurs for one side in a pair of potential adversaries, a state concerned about its survival 
would be more cautious in its economic activities with its adversary (Kirshner, 1999; 
Gowa and Mansfield, 1993). It is clear, then, that states have incentives to use economic 
statecraft to reward friends and punish foes (Mastanduno, 1998; Skalnes, 2000). Host 
countries therefore tend to encourage trade and investments with political allies, for 
example granting subsidization of political-risk insurance (e.g., Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation in the United States) and access to capital (e.g. state banks in 
China). In addition, they often impose additional barriers and restrictions on trade and 
investment with political adversaries such as sanctions (Biglaiser and Lektzian 2011). 
I contend that this logic also applies to SWF investments. If the gains from their 
economic exchanges are used for military ends, then gains to SWFs are much more 
likely to raise host country national security concerns than are gains to private investors. 
As government-controlled entities, SWFs have a reputation for lacking transparency, 
being susceptible to government influence, and pursuing national political objectives. 
Thus, SWFs under foreign state control are likely to face greater discrimination abroad 
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through political backlash and legal restrictions than are private foreign firms. Such 
discriminatory treatment is not only present in barriers prior to entry, but also occurs 
post entry. Due to state ownership, even a priori justified SWF investment may be 
discriminated by the host country. This post-entry discrimination may be in the form of 
expropriations, breaches of contract and discriminatory taxation that can negatively 
affect the expected returns of an investment. 
Several host countries have explicitly expressed concerns over SWF investments. 
Hillary Clinton, as the U.S. Secretary of State, called for regulating SWFs (Badian and 
Harrignton, 2009). The German government has announced that it would introduce 
measures that restrict SWF investments, especially if SWFs attempt to invest in strategic 
industries. French President Nicolas Sarkozy has claimed that he would protect French 
companies against possible takeover by SWFs (The Economist, 2008).  
These discriminatory treatments faced by foreign investors are particularly 
salient when the home and host countries have adverse bilateral relations. For example, 
if the relationship between the home and host governments goes sour, the host country 
may be concerned that an SWF with direct ownership in a foreign firm would 
manipulate production or availability of scarce goods or resources for the benefit of its 
home market, or an SWF in control of strategically important industries would threaten 
the national security of the recipient country. 
Thus, host governments are more likely to restrict SWF investments from 
potentially adversarial home countries than they are from allies. For example, when the 
management of six US ports fell into the hands of the UAE SWF-owned company DP 
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World (DPW) through a sale, various American politicians protested against it by 
arguing that it would compromise the United States’ national security, and ultimately 
derailing the deal. Interestingly, the management of the same US ports had already been 
in foreign hands prior to the proposed deal – with a British firm Peninsular and Oriental 
Steam Navigation Company (P&O) operating them.  In another good example, China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), a Chinese state-owned company, had to 
drop its bid to buy an American oil company Unocal when facing mounting opposition 
from within the US Congress. These examples clearly demonstrate the negative impact 
that poor bilateral relations can have on SWFs foreign investments. 
In comparison, private investors are discouraged by poor political relations to a 
lesser degree than are SWFs. On the investors’ side, private firms lack incentives to link 
political and economic relations because they typically operate for profit maximization. 
In addition, sunk costs prevent them from changing investment patterns in response to 
fluctuating political tensions between the home and host countries (Davis and Meunier, 
2011). On the host country’s side, private investments can lead to more efficient 
economic outcomes than do investments by state-owned enterprises (e.g., Dewenter and 
Malatesta, 2000). If the host government imposes economic sanctions on private foreign 
investment in response to worsening political relations with the home country, the host 
country would discourage private foreign capital in the future and thus lose more 
economic efficiency than it does by sanctioning SWFs. Furthermore, unlike SWFs, 
traditional funds such as pension funds generally have clearly defined liabilities. In other 
words, key participants know – at least with a high degree of confidence – for what 
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purpose, when, and how much the assets will be managed (Rozanaov, 2009). Thus, the 
relative transparency of private firms reduces the security concerns of host governments.  
In sum, SWFs face additional discriminatory treatment compared to their private 
counterparts, but the level of discrimination is contingent upon the quality of bilateral 
relations between the home and host countries. That is, SWFs encounter a lower level of 
discrimination when the home and host countries have amicable bilateral relations. 
Consequently, SWFs are more likely to invest in countries that are friendly to their home 
country. Without a friendly diplomatic climate, SWFs face a higher level of 
discrimination than do private investors, and thus are less likely to acquire the target 
firm.  
It should be noted that an alternative explanation for the fact that SWFs are less 
likely to enter politically hostile hosts is that SWFs may want to avoid hostile states as 
the latter is often associated with higher risks. Indeed, deteriorating bilateral relations 
between states could increase the risk of seizure of investment returns, while an 
improvement in the bilateral relations can guarantee foreign investors a better protection 
of property rights and reduce expropriation risks. I argue that private investors may 
attempt to avoid hostile host countries in order to prevent economic losses, but this may 
not hold for SWFs. As illustrated below, SWFs have a greater ability to accept risk than 
do their private counterparts due to state ownership. Therefore, SWFs are less likely to 
enter politically hostile host countries primarily as a result of the discrimination by host 
governments rather than because of higher risk tolerance of SWFs.  
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Hypothesis 1: Bilateral relations between the home and host countries are 
positively related to the likelihood of a target firm being acquired by a SWF rather than a 
private investor.  
SWFs’ Strategies to Overcome Discrimination 
Given the discriminatory treatment that SWFs face when making overseas 
investments, SWFs adopt various strategies to mitigate the discrimination. One of these 
strategies is to partner with other investors.  
First, teaming up with other investors will reduce discrimination. As discussed 
earlier, SWFs face a higher level of discriminatory treatment and find it difficult to 
obtain legitimacy as compared to private investors, in particular in countries with which 
they have poor bilateral relations. These disadvantages impose constraints on overseas 
investments by SWFs. International business scholars argue that multinationals can 
overcome LoF by creating joint ventures (e.g., Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997). Joint 
ventures can minimize uncertainty and risks involved in international operations, 
especially if those joint ventures are with local partners. This is because domestic firms 
possess country-specific knowledge and skills as well as the ability to work with the 
government and political economic system in the host country (Shan, 1991). Moreover, 
joint venture partners’ reputation can provide the endorsement of foreign investors and 
that helps mitigate the discriminatory treatment by host countries (Bauma and Oliver, 
1991; Stuart et al., 1999).  
Jointly investing with other investors helps SWFs alleviate discrimination in a 
variety of ways. Firstly and most importantly, because SWFs face more entry barriers 
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from host countries, partnering with private firms can diminish the concerns that SWFs 
are in pursuit of non-financial objectives. In addition, SWFs often are not interested in 
operating and managing the acquired firms; thus, collaborating with private firms in 
acquisitions implies that the management of the acquired firms would be left to the 
private partners. This tying hand strategy sends a credible signal to the host government 
that SWFs are likely to be constrained and prevented from acting to serve the home 
government’s political agenda or managing the firm contrary to the free market 
principle.  
Secondly, besides choosing private firms as partners, SWFs may undertake 
foreign investments with SWFs from other countries. As discussed earlier, SWFs are 
likely to encounter a higher level of discrimination if the home and host countries have 
hostile political relations. If an SWF invests with other SWFs from countries that have 
closer diplomatic ties with the host country, this may cause the host government to 
identify it as a “friend’s friend”, thereby reducing the security concerns. For example, 
CIC, China’s SWF, formed a joint venture with funds from South Korea and Singapore 
and invested in a natural-gas project in the United States. The presence of funds from 
South Korea and Singapore may have made CIC's involvement more palatable 
(Economists, 2010).   
One may argue that private firms can also choose to engage in joint ventures. 
With private firms, though, the choice of ownership mode (joint venture versus wholly 
owned subsidiary) is a result of weighing costs and benefits. It should be noted that 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) face relational hazards arising from the monitoring 
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costs, dispute settlement, and opportunistic behavior of their joint-venture partners 
(Buckley and Casson, 1998; Henisz and Williamson, 1999; Henisz, 2000). As will be 
illustrated below, SWFs are more risk tolerant than private investors. Because SWFs 
face greater discrimination in the host country than private investors, and because SWFs 
are more tolerant of the relational hazards resulting from joint ventures, the benefits of 
joint ventures are more likely to outweigh the costs for SWFs. Therefore, I propose that: 
Hypothesis 2: Partnering with other investors is positively related to the 
likelihood of a target firm being acquired by a SWF rather than a private investor. 
Risk Tolerance and SWF Investment 
Now I turn to another effect of state ownership – risk tolerance. Although all 
investors prefer to avoid risks in international operations, SWFs are more likely to 
tolerate risks resulting from the uncertainties of foreign investment for the following 
reasons. 
First, unlike private firms that are typically financed by equity and loans, SWFs 
are funded by governments, typically transferring from official foreign exchange 
reserves. These funds have “soft budget constraints” (Kornai, 1980) and expect that the 
home country will rescue them should they get into trouble. This confidence in the 
state’s bailout is not unfounded. For example, after suffering large losses during the 
2007 global financial crisis, Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) received more 
than $40 billion of new cash from its home government (Bloomberg, 2008). When 
“losses do not matter, and the efficient use of the resource is of no consequence” (Jalan, 
1990:198), SWFs are likely to be more risk tolerant than private investors.  
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Second, due to state ownership, SWFs have few explicit liabilities to 
shareholders. The lack of explicit liabilities increases SWF’s risk tolerance for two 
reasons. First, it enables SWFs to operate over a long-term investment horizon. Thus 
compared to traditional agencies managing foreign exchange reserves such as central 
banks and financial ministries, SWFs are designed to be less risk averse (Lu et al., 2009). 
To seek a higher rate of return for foreign exchange reserves, SWFs are able to shift 
from bond and index to other types of assets. Second, standard portfolio theory suggests 
that investors with fixed liabilities are more risk averse (Beck and Fidora, 2008). In other 
words, if a pension fund has fixed liabilities and is subject to recurring future payments, 
the fund would be more risk averse on the portfolio and would keep a higher share of 
fixed income securities. Consequently, the lack of explicit liabilities leads to SWFs’ 
willingness to take greater risks. 
Third, there is no clear principal or owner in charge of monitoring the fund 
performance (Sheshinski and Lopez-Calva, 2003; Le Borgne and Medas, 2008). SWFs 
are often entangled in conflicts of interest at home. These conflicts of interest occur 
between the incumbent government and key societal interests, represented by members 
of the legislature or the ruling elite. For example, many oil producing countries and 
Asian exporters have accumulated massive reserves—far more than they need for 
balance of payments purposes. While some organized domestic interests prefer to use 
those massive reserves immediately, many governments “parked” those revenues in 
long-term investment vehicles under SWFs (Clark and Knight, 2010).  
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Another example of conflicts of interests is the common tension between the 
central bank and the ministry of finance (Clark and Monk 2010).  The central bank, 
which is often charged with maintaining price stability and managing official foreign 
reserves, tends to be conservative in how they manage foreign reserves.  In contrast, the 
ministry of finance, when facing enormous excess foreign reserves, may be more 
aggressive in their investment strategies.  For example, in Brazil (Wheatley, 2010) and 
Taiwan (China Post, 2008), the central bank and the ministry of finance often have 
conflicting interests in the management of SWFs.20
                                                 
20 In Australia, for another example, competition between the Treasurer and the Prime Minister for power 
within the governing coalition affects the Future Fund (the country's pension fund) (Clark and Knight 
2010). 
These conflicts of interest make it 
less likely that SWFs are efficiency and profit driven. They also provide rationales for 
shirking and facilitate the principal-agent slack.  
Finally, the majority of SWFs officially state that they are established to achieve 
higher economic returns for the home country’s foreign exchange revenues. While 
economic returns are sometimes used as a measure of fund performance, financial 
underperformance alone may not affect the tenure of managers. Top managers of SWFs 
ultimately are subject to evaluation not simply by public shareholders, but by political 
officials who assess them largely on how successfully the funds have served the state’s 
objectives. Therefore, if a home country aims to secure strategic resources in certain 
countries for example, then the SWF has to invest in those countries even if the 
investment increases the fund’s exposure to a higher degree of risk.  
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In sum, state-owned entities tend to be more willing to take risks (Meggison and 
Netter, 2001). Given their greater appetite for risk, SWFs should, therefore, be less 
sensitive to riskier host conditions than are private investors. 
The political economy and international strategy literature has shown that 
institutional distance generates greater LoF and discourages FDI (Eden and Miller, 2004; 
Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; Zaheer, 1995). Likewise, MNEs tend to invest in countries 
with institutions similar to those at home, having developed non-market capabilities 
(managerial experience and expertise) in navigating environments characterized by high 
corruption, political risk and instability, and so on (Lecraw, 1977; Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2006, 2011; Holburn and Zelner, 2010). 
Thus, although both SWFs and private investors prefer to invest in host countries 
that are more similar to their home countries, SWFs are more risk tolerant compared to 
private investors when facing a higher level of institutional distance between the home 
and host countries. Thus, I propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The institutional distance between the home country and the host 
country is positively related to the likelihood of a target firm being acquired by a SWF 
rather than a private investor. 
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Empirical Strategy 
The empirical analysis covers 6,191 cross-border acquisitions from 22 acquirer 
countries to 86 target countries between 1987 and 2012.21 Of the total dataset, 481 deals 
or about 8 percent are acquired by an SWF.22The deal is the unit of analysis.23
Key Explanatory Variable 1: Bilateral Political Relations 
 
The quality of bilateral relations is a key concept in my theoretical framework. I 
constructed four variables to capture the effects of bilateral political relations: diplomatic 
risks, alliance, defense pact, and UN voting dissimilarity. The first of these is a primary 
indicator of bilateral political relations in this study for reasons that I will detail below. 
Notably, most of the empirical studies on the subject of trade and FDI rely on the 
Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) dataset—a dataset that records threats and displays 
of force between states. This dataset is relevant because such threats or displays of force 
between states indicate hostile political relations. Although studies using the MID 
dataset have yielded many insights into the relationship between economic linkages and 
conflict, they often miss low-level disputes that do not result in wars. Moreover, military 
conflict is a rare event. Indeed, no war occurs between acquirer and target countries in 
our sample. Besides, an additional drawback of MID data is that the diplomatic relations 
between states is broader than conflict. By excluding cooperation events, the MID 
considers only a tiny portion of interstate activities.  Thus, as suggested by several 
                                                 
21 The unit of analysis is deal-acquirer instead of deal-acquirer-target because an observed deal only 
involves one target firm yet is probably initiated by multiple acquirers.  
22 The availability of empirical measures of independent variables limits the dataset from 7,142 deals to 
6,191. Excluded deals represent about 16 percent of the original dataset. 
23 Technically, a deal with multiple acquirers is treated as multiple observations. For example, if three 
acquirers co-invested in a target firm, this transaction was coded as three observations with different 
acquirers.  
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scholars (Reuveny 2003; Pevehouse 2003), events data may be a better measure of 
interstate conflict than MID.  
Hence, my measure of diplomatic risks employs the events data - Global Data on 
Events, Location and Tone (GDELT). To aggregate daily events recorded in the dataset, 
one needs to take into account the level of conflict or cooperation embodied in each 
event case. Therefore, the day by day interactions are separately transformed into two 
annual flows of cooperation and conflict using the Goldstein (1992) scale. This scale 
gives weights between 0 and +10 (respectively 0 and -10) to each category of events 
according to the amount of cooperation (or conflict) embodied in each event case. Both 
indicators are then combined into a single net indicator of dyadic political relations 
between country i and country j at time t following the transformation defined by 
Desbordes (2012):  
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 = −∑𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + ∑𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓∑ 𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + ∑𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 + 𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷  (1) 
in which f and w stand respectively for the frequency and the weight of a given event. 
The numerator describes the sum of adjusted weights of each type of cooperative and 
conflictual events, in which the adjusted weights are obtained by multiplying the 
Goldstein scores of each type of event by its observed frequencies. The denominator 
encompasses the total number of cooperative, conflictive, and neutral events occurred 
during the year examined. Since the Goldstein scales apply a positive sign for 
cooperative events whereas negative for conflictive events, the formula has a minus sign 
attached to capture the diplomatic “risks” so that a higher score means higher interstate 
 69 
 
diplomatic risks. For example, the United States’ average diplomatic risk with Iraq 
during 1980-2012 is 0.44, as the two countries were engaged in wars twice in 1990-91 
and 2003, respectively. In comparison, the relevant figure with its ally South Korea, is as 
low as -2.23, indicating a closer interstate relationship.  
Notice that previous scholars have employed alternative aggregation strategies of 
events data. Reuveny and Kang (1998) create a net cooperation variable by summing the 
Goldstein scores over all the events, i.e., ∑(𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 ). Similarly, Goldstein and 
Pevehouse (1997) and Polachek (1980) use the weighted sum of cooperative and 
conflictual events, i.e.,∑𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + ∑𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 . As noted in Gasiorowski (1986) 
and Lowe (2006), simply summing Goldstein scores makes this measure sensitive to the 
number of events reported, which is subject to the interest of mass media and economic 
size of the foreign country. This coverage bias can be eliminated by using the average 
Goldstein score in equation (1), which also makes the diplomatic risk measure easier to 
compare across time and countries (Desbordes 2010). 
My second measure of bilateral political relations is twofold: alliance and 
defense pact. The variable alliance is a dummy variable that equals one if target and 
acquirer countries are in alliance (including defense, neutrality, nonaggression, or 
entente), and zero otherwise. The variable defense pact is also a dummy variable, with 
one indicating that the two countries have a defense pact alliance and zero otherwise. 
Thus, I anticipate that SWF acquisitions are more likely to occur among countries with 
alliance and/or defense pact. The data come from the Correlates of War (COW) 
database. Table 12 provides a breakdown of SWFs’ and private investors’ acquisition 
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deals between themselves and countries with alliance ties. It exhibits sufficient variation 
in security alliances so that the empirical results are not driven by a few cases.  
My third measure of bilateral relations is voting alignment in the United Nations 
(UN) General Assembly. We expect that countries with similar voting patterns in the UN 
are less likely to disagree on each other’s foreign policy positions, and thus have more 
friendly bilateral relationships. Previous research has shown a positive relationship 
between voting alignment and both bilateral trade (Dixon and Moon, 1993) and less 
conflict (Gartzke 1998). In contrast to the events data, UN voting alignment is a direct 
measure of government behavior. The UN voting Affinity measure is based on the 
dataset constructed by Bailey et al. (2013) and calculated by Gartzke’s S-scores (Gartzke 
2006): 
𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷 ,𝑖𝑖 ,𝐷𝐷 = 1 − 2 ∗ 𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷 ,𝑖𝑖 ,𝐷𝐷/𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷 ,𝑖𝑖 ,𝐷𝐷  (2) 
in which𝑑𝑑 is the sum of metric distances between votes by dyad members in a given year 
and 𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑 is the maximum possible metric distance for those votes. The distance 
between votes is calculated by first coding one for approval for an issue and zero for 
disapproval. Since the S-score is on a [-1,1] scale and highly skewed to the right,24
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈_𝑣𝑣𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣_𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷 ,𝑖𝑖 ,𝐷𝐷 = ln⁡[𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷 ,𝑖𝑖 ,𝐷𝐷 ∗ (−1) + 2]⁡25 
 the 
following transformation is used to remove the high skew: 
(3) 
As shown in Panel B of Table 14, these three measures of bilateral political 
relations are not highly correlated. This implies that these three measures may provide 
                                                 
24 In other words, a majority of country pairs in my sample have similar UN voting records. 
25 For robustness I also use an untransformed measure of UN voting similarity. Results are similar and 
therefore omitted for brevity. 
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information on different aspects of bilateral relations. More specifically, diplomatic risks 
focus on the intensity of interstate cooperation and conflict events on a daily basis. 
Whereas alliance and defense pact reveal states’ common interests by explicitly sharing 
formal alliance ties, UN voting suggests that states may be implicitly aligned with or 
diverged from each other on foreign policy positions. Therefore, I include these three 
sets of measures in the same model to capture different aspects of bilateral 
relations.26
Among the three sets of measures of bilateral political relations, I consider 
diplomatic risks as my primary independent variable because it has several advantages 
compared to the other two. First, while states rarely fight militarily with each other, they 
do experience episodes of improving and deteriorating relations over time. Similarly, 
only a tiny fraction of country pairs change their alliances status over my sample period. 
In contrast, a key advantage of events data is that it has more temporal variation than 
traditional measures to reflect the instances of cooperation and conflict. Panel A in 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of diplomatic risks between China, a large SWF 
However, it should be noted that different aspects of bilateral relations 
sometimes overlap, and it is difficult to distinguish them exclusively from one another. 
For a pair of alliance partners, for example, alliance measures different levels of support 
that one alliance member promises to the other; diplomatic risks may contain 
cooperation events on military, economic, and policy support between the two alliance 
partners; and UN voting may also reveal similar foreign policy positions on particular 
topics.  
                                                 
26Multicollinearity is not a problem here as none of the correlations among these predictors exceed 0.25 in 
any (sub)sample. 
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sponsoring country, and the United States, Kuwait, and the Philippines. They clearly 
diverge. For instance, the diplomatic risks between China and the US increased in 1990 
because the US imposed a number of economic sanctions on China following the 
Tian’anmen Incident. In the early 1990s the diplomatic risks between China and the 
Philippines dramatically increased since China passed a law declaring the South China 
Sea as its territory in 1992, triggering protests from around the region including the 
Philippines. In contrast, the Sino-Kuwait diplomatic relations improved when China 
resolutely opposed Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait during the Gulf Crisis in 
1990.  
A second desirable property of diplomatic risks is that it allows the analyst to 
view diplomatic relations from a directed dyad perspective. In other words, the events 
data records both for the China versus Singapore dyad in 2007 and the Singapore versus 
China dyad in 2007, so that it is possible to measure how the political events are 
directed. Panel B in Figure 2 reveals that the bilateral political risks between directed 
dyads are different, albeit closely following one another. This directed dyad feature is 
particularly important to the present study because the observations on directed dyads 
coded in both directions make it possible to specifically model the investment decisions 
from one state to another. The decision by the host country to initiate a conflictive event 
against the home country is more relevant to international business activity than simply 
the emergence of a conflictive event between two states, because the former causes 
foreign investors to have a higher cost and a competitive disadvantage of doing business 
abroad.  
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Finally, diplomatic risks is my primary measure because it is observable. Since 
the goal of this analysis is to explore whether SWFs and private investors respond to 
bilateral political relations differently, it is important to assume that bilateral political 
relations are equally observable to both SWFs and private investors. Note that the event 
data come from media reports. While some foreign investors employ experts to analyze 
political risks of foreign investment, media reports are still a common source of 
information for foreign investors who interpret the bilateral political relations. Thus, 
investors are able to observe diplomatic risks and use this information to make 
inferences about their business ramifications.  
Key Explanatory Variable 2: Institutional Distance 
In order to test the argument about the influence of institutional distance on the 
probability that an SWF acquires a target firm, I constructed two institutional distance 
variables. The first variable is based on data from the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG), and I focus on scores of three items in political risk subcomponents that are 
relevant for an international acquisition deal: law and order, bureaucracy quality, and 
corruption. The institutional distance is calculated by taking the summation of the 
absolute difference between country i and country j at time t for each item.  
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𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷_𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷 ,𝑖𝑖 ,𝐷𝐷= �𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷 ,𝐷𝐷 − 𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 ,𝐷𝐷 �+ �𝐵𝐵𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑_𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷 ,𝐷𝐷
− 𝐵𝐵𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑_𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 ,𝐷𝐷| + |𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷,𝐷𝐷
− 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 ,𝐷𝐷| 
(4) 
  Second, political regime distance should also matter for private investors more 
than for SWFs. Hence, I include regime distance as another broad measure of 
institutional distance. For each state, I first obtained regime data from the Polity IV 
dataset (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002) and generated a policy score of -10 to +10 by 
subtracting AUTOC score from its DEMOC score. Higher scores indicate a more 
democratic regime. Regime distance is the absolute value of the difference between the 
Polity scores of the two states in the dyad (Lai and Reiter, 2000). Larger values of this 
measure represent dissimilarity between home and host countries, and thus I expect a 
positive coefficient for regime distance.  
Similarly to those measures of bilateral relations, I find these two variables of 
institutional distance are not highly correlated with each other (r=-.03), largely because 
they capture different aspects of institutional distance. For example, the construction of 
institutional distance does not account for democratic accountability. As a result, I 
include both variables in the same model.  
Key Explanatory Variable 3: Multiple Acquirers 
I argued earlier that SWFs may engage in joint ventures to mitigate 
discriminatory treatment. To test whether this strategy works, I constructed a dummy 
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variable multiple acquirers. It was coded one if the deal was acquired by more than one 
investor, zero otherwise. In my sample, about 17% of the SWF deals involved multiple 
acquirers, which is almost three times that for private investments (6%). In all cases, 
SWFs jointly invested with private firms and/or other SWFs.27
Control Variables 
 
To account for potential confounding variables, I include a number of control 
variables. First, I include several traditional gravity model variables that have been used 
in the international trade literature, such as home country’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), host country’s GDP, and geographical distance. GDP data in constant 2005 U.S. 
dollars are taken from the WDI. On the one hand, when the home country has a larger 
economic size, private investors are more likely to make cross-border acquisitions 
relative to SWFs. Unlike SWFs that are readily funded by sizeable foreign exchange 
reserves, private investors must accumulate capital before undertaking investment 
projects. Since such capital stock is directly influenced by the economic size of a 
country, the home country’s GDP should be positively associated with private 
investment relative to SWF investment.  
On the other hand, SWFs are more likely to pursue targets in host countries with 
large asset markets than are private investors. Countries with large GDP volume create 
more business opportunities for high-profile acquisitions, which can be an important 
consideration for SWF investments. Moreover, arguably SWFs serve a strategic role in 
                                                 
27 The multiple acquirers variable in original data sources is constructed as follows. In SDC, deals with 
‘investor group’ as acquirers were coded as multiple-acquirer deal. In Zephyr and Capital IQ, deals with 
more than one firm as acquirer (separated by semicolons) were coded as multiple-acquirer deal. Hence the 
information on the partner’s identity (whether private firms or other SWFs) is incomplete as it is limited to 
onlyZephyr and Capital IQ data sources.  
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improving the sponsoring country’s sovereign status on the world stage by engaging in 
the financial market with powerful states (Dixon and Monk 2012). Yet such political and 
diplomatic motivations are not a primary concern for private investors. Accordingly, 
SWFs should have a higher exposure to the large market of powerful states than private 
investors do. As a result, I expect that the coefficient of home country’s GDP is 
negative, and that of host country’s GDP positive.  
I include a geographical distance variable, which was obtained from the French 
Research Center in International Economics. This variable is defined as the great circle 
distance in kilometers between two countries’ capitals. Previous studies find that 
geographical distance increases information costs in international M&A transactions. 
Countries that are geographically proximate can be expected to involve lower 
information costs (Böckerman and Lehto 2006, Grote and Umber 2006). As discussed 
above, SWFs may be more risk tolerant than private firms.  Therefore, I expect that 
SWFs are more likely than private firms to invest in countries with greater geographical 
distance. 
While the geographical proximity between the home and host countries addresses 
mainly the cultural aspect of information costs, the legal aspects are also important. Most 
studies in M&A literature include a dummy variable indicating whether the home and 
host countries share the same legal system and show that the presence of a common legal 
system has a positive effect on cross-border M&As. However, in the present study we do 
not have any theoretical reasoning to predict whether SWF or private investors are more 
sensitive to countries having the same legal system; I therefore exclude this variable in 
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the model. However, one expectation could be that British Common law origins are 
more likely to attract cross-border acquisitions by private investors relative to SWFs. 
This is because the Common law acts as a powerful counterbalance that has promoted 
private property rights instead of a tool of the State (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2003). 
Therefore, I include UK legal origin in host country, which is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the origin of the company law is the English common law, and zero if the 
origin is French Civil, German Civil, or Scandinavian Civil. According to legal theories, 
the English common law evolved to protect private property owners against the crown, 
whereas the civil codes were constructed to solidify the power of the state (Beck et al. 
2003). Due to such better protection of private property rights, UK legal origin is 
expected to have a negative effect on cross-border acquisitions initiated by SWFs 
relative to private firms. 
Some recent anecdotal studies find that SWFs have acquired a significant amount 
of assets in the financial service sector. For example, five large international banking 
corporations28
                                                 
28 These international banking companies are UBS, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, Merril Lynch, and 
Barclays. 
 alone received more than US$45 billion from SWFs since 2007 (Beck 
and Fidora 2008). Such good appetite in finance service sector is probably driven by 
either the opportunistic investment motive or an incentive to signal cooperation with 
more powerful states during the global financial crisis in 2007-2008. Therefore, I include 
a deal-level variable finance, a dummy variable that equals to one if the target is in 
financial service sector and zero otherwise. I expect that finance is positively associated 
with SWF acquisitions relative to private ones. 
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Additionally, some fear that SWFs have strategic interests in the energy industry 
of foreign countries, which trigger a number of national security questions. To test 
whether SWFs are more likely to invest in energy industry, I include a dummy variable 
energy. It was coded as one if the target firm is in the energy industry, otherwise zero. I 
expect a positive relationship between energy and the likelihood of SWF acquisitions 
relative to private acquisitions. 
Table 13 provides the detailed definitions of these variables. Table 14 displays 
the summary statistics and correlations of the variables from equation (1). It does not 
reveal any multicollinearity problems. All correlations are well below the commonly 
used cut-off threshold of 0.7, and a maximum variance inflation factor (VIF) is 2.26. 
While tests reveal the presence of heteroskedasticity in these models, I perform all 
estimations using robust standard errors. 
Model Specification 
To assess the claims about the effects of bilateral political relations, institutional 
distance, and joint ventures on SWF acquisitions, I specify and estimate the following 
logit model: 
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𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷 ,𝑖𝑖 ,𝐷𝐷 = 1)= ∅{𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ,𝑖𝑖 ,𝐷𝐷−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷 ,𝑖𝑖 ,𝐷𝐷−1+ 𝛽𝛽3𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑣𝑣𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷 ,𝑖𝑖 ,𝐷𝐷−1 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷 ,𝑖𝑖 ,𝐷𝐷−1+ 𝛽𝛽5𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑣𝑣𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷 ,𝑖𝑖 ,𝐷𝐷−1 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛_𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷+ 𝛽𝛽7𝑣𝑣𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑣𝑣𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷ℎ𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷 ,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 ,𝐷𝐷−1+ 𝛽𝛽9𝑈𝑈𝐾𝐾𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝑣𝑣𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑣𝑣𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽10𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷 ,𝐷𝐷−1 + 𝛽𝛽11𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ,𝐷𝐷−1 + 𝛽𝛽12𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛+ 𝛽𝛽13𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝑣𝑣𝑑𝑑} 
(5) 
in which i refers to the home country, j refers to the host country, and t refers to the year 
when the deal was announced. In the model, the dependent variable SWF acquisition 
was coded one if the target firm was acquired by an SWF and zero if it by a private 
investor. I estimate how these factors affect the SWF and private investors from the 
same home country. Intuitively, such a design presumes that acquisitions initiated by 
private investors offer a reasonable benchmark through which we can understand the 
nature of SWFs. If both SWFs and private investors are able to observe those political 
factors, and if they are affected similarly by those factors, then the concern that SWFs 
make investment decisions for political reasons is not warranted.  
Because SWF acquisition is a dichotomous dependent variable, I employ a binary 
logistic regression model. It is worth noting that the coding of my dependent variable 
shares some similarities with existing studies. To explore motives for cross-border 
acquisitions led by government-controlled acquirers, Karolyi and Liao (2009) offer the 
most comparable results to my study. By using a dependent variable that equals one if 
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the acquisition was initiated by a government-controlled acquirer, and zero if it was by a 
private acquirer, Karolyi and Liao estimate a logit model to predict whether the 
influence of firm-level and deal-specific factors are different for those deals involving 
government-controlled acquirers versus private acquirers. The advantage of this 
approach is that it allows us to compare SWFs with other institutional investors.  
The UN voting dissimilarity, geographical distance and GDP variables are 
logged to reduce skewness. The diplomatic risks, defense pact, UN voting dissimilarity, 
GDP, regime distance and fuel exports variables are all lagged one year to reduce 
potential reverse causality, as well as to account for real time lags. All models have 
clustered standard errors at the dyad level.  
Before discussing my results, I should note that my estimations are likely to be 
affected by selection bias. My data consists of only the investments involving target 
firms that were available to foreign acquirers. If poor bilateral relations between the 
home and host countries increase the discriminatory treatment against SWFs rather than 
private investors, some target firms may be available only to private investors but not to 
SWFs. Consequently, my sample is not randomly selected, which probably leads to 
sample selection bias. Nevertheless, this bias may not be too problematic because my 
estimates do not capture the effect of bilateral relations on these investments that were 
never undertaken. My results therefore underestimate the overall effect of bilateral 
relations. Future studies can eliminate this selection bias, yet doing so should only 
strengthen my results.  
 81 
 
Empirical Results 
Table 15 reports the estimation results from two logit models. The main results 
are also presented graphically in Figure 3, where the marginal effects of the key 
independent variable in Model 1 are plotted.29According to the hypotheses developed 
above, I expect that better bilateral relations are correlated with a higher likelihood of 
SWF acquisition. The results in Model 1 provide evidence supporting my argument. The 
coefficient estimate of diplomatic risks is negative and statistically significant at the.05 
level. This finding is consistent with the theory. At lower levels of diplomatic risk, a 
target firm is more likely to be acquired by an SWF because the political relations 
between the home and host countries are better. To illustrate the substantive effects, I 
simulated the marginal effects.30 It suggests that if diplomatic risks between the home 
and host countries rise from the lowest level to the highest level (meaning worse 
bilateral relations), the probability of SWF investments decreases by 7.6 percentage 
points, which represents an 84% decrease.31
The other proxy for bilateral political relations is alliance. As expected, the 
coefficient estimate is positive and strongly significant, indicating that countries within 
security alliances are more likely to have SWF acquisitions. Substantively, if the host 
country has an alliance partnership with the home country with other factors remaining 
constant, the probability of SWF acquisition increases from 4.5% to 19.4%, an increase 
of 14.9 percentage points. This finding also holds in Model 2, which replicates the 
 
                                                 
29 The software Coefplot (Jann 2014) was used to produce the plot.  
30The marginal effects are computed where all continuous variables are set to their mean, and dummies are 
set to zero if not otherwisespecified. 
31 The software Clarify (King, Tomz& Wittenberg, 2000) was used to compute the probabilities. 
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specification structure of Model 1 and uses defense variable. The substantive effect is 
slightly less than alliance (from 4.7% to 17.3%). 
In contrast, UN voting dissimilarity is negative and statistically insignificant. 
This indicates that we do not find any evidence that UN voting pattern has an effect on 
the likelihood of an SWF versus private acquisition. This result implies that foreign 
investors more likely to look elsewhere such as media reports (the primary source of 
events data) and alliance ties between states than to UN voting patterns to assess whether 
they will be welcome in a host country. This is probably because UN voting is a poor 
proxy for the bilateral political relations as discussed above. 
I then turn to the measure of institutional distance. As predicted by the theory, 
the coefficient estimate for institutional distance is positive and significant. 
Substantively, when institutional distance between the home and host countries increases 
from the lowest level to the highest level, the probability of SWF acquisitions increases 
by 7.2 percentage points (from 2.9% to 10.1%). This effect is large compared to that of 
other independent variables. It suggests that a higher institutional distance between the 
home and host countries increases the likelihood of being acquired by an SWF and that 
private investors are more sensitive than SWFs are to institutional distance. Thus, there 
is considerable evidence to support hypothesis 3.  
In line with my expectations, regime distance is positive and statistically 
significant, even after controlling for the host country’s political regime in all these 
models. In other words, the greater dissimilarity in regime type between the home and 
host countries, the more likely we are to observe an SWF acquisition between these two 
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countries. Therefore, SWFs are less sensitive to regime distance than private investors 
are. Note that this positive relationship between regime distance and SWF acquisitions 
remains significant even when controlling for the host country’s regime. 
Note also that the estimate of multiple acquirers has the expected positive sign 
and is statistically significant. It suggests that partnering with other investors can help 
SWFs mitigate discriminatory treatment and increase their likelihood of acquisition 
success when competing with private investors. The results provide strong support for 
hypothesis 2: SWFs are more likely to engage in joint ventures than private investors are 
in order to mitigate discriminatory treatment.  
The control variables also produce some interesting results. The coefficient 
estimate for the host country’s fuel exports is positive but not significant. This means 
that the resource endowment of the host country does not have a significant impact on 
SWF investment.  
As expected, the coefficient estimate of geographical distance has a positive 
effect and is statistically significant. Since greater geographical distance often involves 
more information costs and risks for foreign investors, this supports the claim that SWFs 
are more willing to take risk due to the absence of explicit liabilities than are private 
firms (Beck and Fidora 2008).   
The coefficient estimate of a home country’s GDP has a statistically significant 
and negative effect on the likelihood of SWF acquisitions, as I anticipated. Large 
economic size of a home country often means there are large pools of capital and more 
private investors. Therefore, it is not surprising that large economic size of home 
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countries encourages more private acquisitions than SWF acquisitions. Note that I 
expect that in order to pursue high-profile investment opportunities and/or to improve 
sovereign status in the global system, SWFs are more likely to invest in countries with 
large economic size than are private firms. As the estimation results indicate, however, 
we find no evidence for this conjecture.  The coefficient estimate of host country’s GDP 
is positive albeit not statistically significant. Furthermore, the coefficient estimate of 
British legal origins is not correlated with a propensity for SWF acquisitions in both 
models. Finally, target firms in finance and energy industries are more likely to be 
acquired by an SWF than by a private investor.32
Robustness 
  
In sum, my results offer consistent evidence that positive bilateral political 
relations, less institutional distance, and joint investment increase the likelihood of SWF 
versus private investments.  
Robustness checks further improve my confidence in the findings. To address 
potential omitted variable bias, the following additional control variables were included 
in the analysis in Table 16. First, an alternative operationalization of my primary 
independent variable diplomatic risks gives further insights into the effects of bilateral 
political relations on SWF acquisitions. Following Hinz (2014), the diplomatic 
cooperation from country i towards country j is defined as  
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷_𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 = 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 13𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 − 13𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 − 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓
𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 + 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓  (6) 
                                                 
32 Energy variable is excluded in Model 1 because otherwise the model does not reach convergence.  
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in which 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 is the count of “material cooperation” events in a year t initiated in 
country i towards country j.  Hence, 𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 , 𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 , 𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 are the counts of “verbal 
cooperation”, “verbal conflict” and “material conflict” respectively. The former two 
were given positive weights, and the latter two were given negative weights. Assuming 
verbal exchanges, with a weight of one-third, have less consequence, the index describes 
the mood of political relations on the [-1,1] interval. In interpreting these results, it is 
important to recognize that higher value of this measure indicates better political 
relations, whereas lower value indicates more hostile bilateral relations. As such, I 
expect the sign of the coefficient estimates in my model to be reversed when using 
diplomatic cooperation instead of diplomatic risks.33
Table 16
  Indeed, as shown in Model 3 of 
, the effect of bilateral political relations on the likelihood of SWF acquisitions 
relative to private ones does not depend in any significant way on which measure is 
used.  
The second way in which I address potential variable bias is that I consider some 
alternative explanations for my findings. One may argue that discriminatory treatment is 
determined not only by entry barriers targeting investors from a specific home country, 
but also by the host country’s overall restrictions on foreign investments (Pandya 2014). 
To address this concern, I include host country’s FDI restriction in Model 4. The data on 
90 countries for the period 1970-2000 was obtained from Pandya (2014). The results 
show that the effects of key explanatory variables (diplomatic risks, institutional 
distance, regime distance and multiple acquirers) do not change, even though there is a 
                                                 
33 The correlation between diplomatic cooperation and diplomatic risks is -0.79. 
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substantial reduction in the sample size (from 6,191 to 4,028) when the variable FDI 
restriction is included. The coefficient of FDI restriction is negative but not statistically 
significant.  
Another possible explanation of my findings is that cross-border acquisitions by 
SWFs are generally not welcomed by host countries compared to those by private 
investors, unless there is strong reciprocity in economic exchange activities between the 
home and host countries. As noted by Crystal (2003), producers often have an incentive 
to use domestic barriers as a bargaining tool in order to expand foreign market access. 
To show that my findings hold even when controlling for economic reciprocity, I re-
analyze the models with the natural logarithm of trade between the home and host 
countries in Model 5, an indicator of economic interdependence. This alternative 
analysis yields no substantive changes in the main results of theoretical interest, and the 
coefficient of trade is not statistically significant.  
Finally, SWFs might employ other investment strategies to deal with 
discrimination. For example, SWFs may choose different levels of ownership stake On 
the one hand they may choose to acquire a lower level of ownership shares in order to 
overcome discrimination by host countries. Previous scholars argue that an MNE 
chooses the lower levels of control when it is difficult to obtain legitimacy in the host 
country (Xu and Shenkar, 2002; Eden and Miller, 2004). In the context of SWF 
investment, host countries fear that the home country would use their economic clout to 
pursue strategic goals. A higher level of ownership shares increases the management 
control of the target firm, thus posing more potential national security threats to the host 
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country. This would lead to more concern and scrutiny by the host government, thus 
making the SWF investment more difficult. On the other hand, a higher level of 
ownership shares enhances resource commitment and risks (Delios and Beamish, 1999). 
As noted earlier, since SWFs are more risk tolerant than private investors are, SWFs are 
more likely to pursue higher ownership stakes. These arguments suggest that the net 
effect of ownership stake on SWF investment is ambiguous. To empirically test the 
effect of the level of ownership stake, I include a variable called ownership stake in 
Model 6. The result indicates that the coefficient of the variable is negative and 
statistically significant. It suggests that although SWFs can tolerate risks and are willing 
to pursue high ownership stakes, they are unlikely to do so because of restrictions by the 
host country. Thus, lowering the ownership stake shares increases the likelihood of 
SWF’s acquisition success when competing with private investors.  
Conclusions 
This chapter provides a first step in the unveiling of the political determinants of 
SWF foreign investment. In particular, I present the ways in which SWFs behave 
differently from private investors. I also argue that state ownership affects SWF 
investment in two important ways. Firstly, due to state ownership, SWFs face greater 
discriminatory treatment by the host country than do private investors. Secondly, 
because the state backs them, SWFs are more tolerant to the risks associated with foreign 
investment. By using bilateral relations and institutional distance between the home and 
host countries as the proxies for discriminatory treatment and risks associated with 
foreign investment, respectively, I hypothesize that the likelihood of SWF investment 
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relative to private investment would increase when the quality of bilateral relations is 
better and the level of institutional distance is higher. In order to mitigate the 
discriminatory treatment by host countries, SWFs are more likely to team up with other 
investors than their private counterparts are. The empirical analysis covering 6,191 
cross-border acquisitions from 1987 to 2012 offers strong support for these claims.  
Note that the theoretical argument and empirical tests have only identified the 
overall pattern of SWF investment. However, it is important to avoid over-generalizing 
the findings from this model, as the strategic goals may vary from country to country. 
Hence, in pursuit of strategic goals for the home government, SWFs from different 
countries may have different investment preferences even in industries that are globally 
considered to be strategic. As I will show in the next chapter, even though the energy 
industry is widely considered to be strategically sensitive, not all SWFs have the same 
interest in investing in this industry.  
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CHAPTER V  
SWF INVESTMENTS IN ENERGY INDUSTRY 
 
“I don’t care about how many tons of oil to ship home; I care about whether 
stocks are worth more money.” 
Lou Jiwei, Chairman of China Investment Corp.34
My focus on the energy industry stems from several considerations. First, SWFs 
have been actively participating in energy investments since the early 1990s. More than 
$76 billion has been invested in energy assets and companies in the past five years by 
SWFs across the world, and more investments will be required to meet the expected 
energy demand growth (
 
 
“Our targets are not just financial – we want to add value to the local economy, 
local enterprises, employment and exports.” 
Suppiah Dhanabalan, Chairman of Temasek (Financial Times, 2002) 
 
In the previous chapter, I argue that the nature of state ownership implies that 
SWFs may advance strategic interests on behalf of the home government. This is 
particularly true when SWFs invest in strategic industries. However, strategic interests 
vary from country to country. Hence, SWFs’ investment preferences resulting from these 
strategic interests can be quite different from each other, even in commonly considered 
strategic industries. In order to study the heterogeneity within SWF groups, this chapter 
investigates the role of state ownership in SWF investment in strategic industries, paying 
particular attention to the energy industry. 
Finley 2012). Observers have predicted that the rising 
                                                 
34 Bloomberg, October 28, 2009. “CIC Seeks Commodities, Property as Hedge, Lou Says (Update 1)”. 
Available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aw8rv5tEHI28 
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investment trend will continue, in particular in China, Japan, and the EU (Clark 2011). 
Therefore, the strategic value of the energy industry is generally agreed upon, even 
though what constitutes a strategic industry depends on a nation’s level of economic 
development, political institutions and other factors.  
Second, investments in the energy industry generate significant implications for 
political leaders, both economically and politically. In economic terms, energy is the 
most basic power source of economic activities. Particularly for resource-scarce 
countries, energy security is often viewed as a bottleneck for economic development. In 
order to secure energy supplies, overseas investments in the energy industry from these 
resource-poor countries have been increasing. For resource abundant countries, natural 
resource ownership exposes them to economic volatility, which could have an adverse 
impact on economic growth. 
In political terms, international cooperation and conflicts in the world today are 
rooted in resource politics. This is illustrated by Daniel Yergin’s famous quote, “oil 
consists of 10% economy and 90% politics” in his observation of the energy industry in 
the 1930s.35
                                                 
35 Daniel Yergin, chairman of the Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA) and a celebrity of the 
international oil industry, offered this statement to describe the European oil market at that time.  
 For example, previous scholars have long recognized the close relationship 
between natural resources and violent activities. On the one hand, armed conflict is a 
means to gain access to valuable resources (Keen, 1998; Berdal and Malone, 2000). On 
the other hand, natural resources give rise to armed conflict not only by financing 
belligerents (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Fearon, 2004), but also by weakening the 
ability of political institutions to peacefully resolve conflicts. Contrary to the 
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conventional wisdom that abundant resources bolster economic growth and thus promote 
political stability, the resource curse literature provides evidence that countries with 
abundant natural resources are associated with a higher risk of political instability and 
armed conflict (Collier, 2000; Ross, 1999). 
Meanwhile, energy is also of great importance to energy-poor countries, which 
influences these countries’ SWF investment behaviors. For example, China’s hunt for oil 
has shaped its foreign policy toward its neighbors such as Russia, as well as toward 
regions as far as sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. Consequently, when the SWF 
becomes a foreign policy tool in the energy field, the strategic importance of energy 
makes the foreign investments in this industry more complicated and politically 
sensitive. 
In sum, the energy industry is one of the most strategic sectors. However, I argue 
that SWFs engage in energy investment in various manners, depending on the level of 
energy resources in their home countries. Countries with SWFs generally fall into two 
categories: energy-rich and energy-poor. From the home country’s perspective, SWFs 
from the energy-poor countries are more likely to invest in the energy industry than 
SWFs from the energy-rich countries due to the concern over energy security. Moreover, 
SWFs from energy-poor countries should be more likely to invest in the energy industry 
than private investors from the same energy-poor countries. Turning to the host 
country’s perspective, due to the strategic importance of the energy industry, foreign 
investment in this industry is likely to face more resistance by the host country 
government. The resistance would be even higher with the deterioration of bilateral 
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relations between the home and host countries. Moreover, because energy-poor countries 
have incentives to invest in the energy industry not based solely on financial motivation, 
SWFs from energy-poor countries are likely to encounter closer scrutiny by the host 
governments and thus are more sensitive to the bilateral relations between the home and 
host countries than other investors.  
To subject these arguments to empirical tests, I evaluate quantitatively the 
determinants of SWFs’ likelihood in investing in the energy industry by using data of 
6,382 cross-border acquisitions (with 713 deals in energy industry) from 1992 to 2012. 
The statistical findings largely support my theoretical expectations.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses 
the key motivations of SWF investments in strategic industries and elaborates my 
argument on SWF investments in the energy industry. Then I detail the research design 
and report the empirical results. Finally I conclude with a discussion of implications of 
my findings.  
Theoretical Framework of SWF Investments in Energy Industry 
Scholars in both IPE and international business have recognized that firms in 
strategic industries require specific theoretical consideration and empirical analysis 
(Mahon and Murray, 1981; Reger, Duhaime, and Stimpert, 1992), especially when it 
comes to studying their impact on conflict initiation (Dorussen, 2006; Geonner, 2010; Li 
and Reuveny, 2011), patterns of international expansion and their exposure to regulatory 
risk in different countries (Bonardi, 2004; Delios and Henisz, 2003). In what follows, I 
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first summarize the motivation of SWF investments in strategic industries. I then 
contextualize my argument in the case of the energy industry.  
The Motivations of SWF Investments in Strategic Industries 
Before I outline the motivations of SWF investments in the strategic sector, it is 
important to specify the definition of strategic industry. Earlier studies use this concept 
to describe industries of military significance–in other words, the extent to which goods 
can, directly or indirectly, contribute to the adversary’s military power. They typically 
include financial, mining, steel, telecommunications, transportation, utilities, oil, and 
military-related production (Manzetti, 1994; Megginson et al., 1994, 2004). However, 
some scholars claim that it is difficult to identify a priori if an industry is strategic, 
because any industry is strategic if it is needed to pursue a given strategy and has no 
substitutes (e.g. Baldwin, 1985; Forland, 1991). In the context of SWF investment, 
strategic sectors generally include natural resources, defense or other politically sensitive 
industries. I will use this last one as the working definition in my dissertation.  
In this dissertation, I argue that SWFs may undertake foreign investments in 
strategic industries to facilitate national economic development or enhance political 
influence abroad. First, governments may make extensive use of strategic SWF 
investment to promote the national economic development. One prominent example is 
China’s use of one of its SWFs – the CIC –as an instrument to pursue national raw 
materials policy. The CIC seeks access to raw materials and energy to ensure it satisfies 
rapidly growing domestic energy demands in manufacturing and infrastructure industries 
(Miracky et. al, 2009). In addition, governments are also interested in gaining access to 
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intangible resources in order to promote their national economies. For example, 
partnering with foreign companies may provide opportunities for gaining knowledge and 
developing expertise in a particular industry. We observe that SWFs’ investments by 
Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Qatar are considered strategic tools to promote the development 
of their respective aerospace sectors (Haberly, 2011).  
The second and perhaps more prominent concern about SWF investments to host 
countries is that SWFs may acquire strategic assets as a foreign policy tool. That is, SWF 
investments with non-financial motivation could affect national security, especially 
when investments are in the defense industry, public and private infrastructure, high 
technology, financial markets, or natural resources. In one instance, by investing in the 
Myanmar Fund in 1995, Singapore used its SWFs as a diplomatic tool to open channels 
to Burma (Balding, 2012). In a more recent instance, the Qatar Investment Authority and 
the Olayan Group of Saudi Arabia cooperated with IDB Holdings of Israel to invest in 
an emerging markets fund in 2010 (Financial Times, 2010). Although the investment 
giants of Qatar and Saudi Arabia do not need IDB’s capital to launch the fund, their 
decision to involve an Israeli company may signal their readiness to cooperate with 
Israel (Globes, 2010).36
The Classification of SWFs 
 
As noted earlier, the energy industry provides a useful context for SWF 
investment research. This is because energy security has become central to international 
relations due to the increasing demand and competition for geographically concentrated 
                                                 
36“An economic-diplomatic declaration”. Globes. August 12, 2010. http://www.globes.co.il/en/article-
1000581594 
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resources, the concerns with resource scarcity, the fear of depletion in the near future, as 
well as the potential social and political effects of climate change (Vivoda 2010). Due to 
the strategic importance of energy, SWF investment in this industry raises a number of 
geopolitical concerns. For example, a host country may be worried if a foreign country’s 
SWF takes a controlling stake in a large oil company, thereby giving it the power to 
redirect natural resources to the SWF’s home country or sell these resources at a 
discounted price. A more urgent concern is that giving a potential belligerent access to 
scarce and strategically important energy resources helps to strengthen the military 
capabilities of the home country, which may be used against the host country in the 
event of a militarized conflict.  
Moreover, the energy industry allows us to analyze the objectives of SWFs by 
comparing different investment behaviors among SWFs and within the same home 
country. To do so, we need to first differentiate between two types of SWFs according to 
their countries’ energy resource endowment: countries that are rich in energy resources 
and countries that are not. To measure the energy resource endowment, I use the average 
net energy imports as a percentage of energy use. Energy use refers to consumption of 
primary energy before transformation to other end-use fuels, which is equal to 
indigenous production plus imports and stock changes, minus exports and fuels supplied 
to ships and aircraft engaged in international transport. A negative value of the average 
net energy imports as a percentage of energy use indicates that the country is a net 
exporter and thus is energy-rich, whereas a positive value indicates that a country is an 
importer and energy-poor. Table 17 provides a breakdown of SWF countries in my 
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sample. The energy-rich countries are Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, and 
UAE, whereas the energy-poor countries include China, Singapore, Malaysia, and South 
Korea.37
Comparing SWFs from Two Types of Countries 
 
From the home country’s perspective, the difference in energy resource 
endowment makes SWFs from energy-rich and energy-poor countries fundamentally 
different in their concern over energy security. As a result, the energy endowment of the 
countries induces SWFs to have different investment preferences in the energy industry, 
as elaborated in the next section.  
The literature of international business research suggests that firms engage in 
FDI not only to exploit their existing assets in host countries through FDI, but also to 
learn or gain access to strategic assets (such as technology, marketing, and management 
expertise) available in the host country (e.g., Lecraw, 1993; Dunning, 1995; Kumar, 
1998). The former form of FDI is called asset-exploiting FDI, whereas the latter is 
strategic asset-seeking FDI. With this background, I argue that SWFs from energy-poor 
countries invest in the energy industry for asset seeking. This is because SWFs are 
funded by large current account surpluses. These exports mainly come from the 
manufacturing industry, or from transportation, information or communication 
                                                 
37 In Column (7), I report another classification obtained from the SWFI website. This website classifies 
countries that established SWFs into two groups according to the source of the foreign exchange assets: 
SWFs from commodity countries, which are funded by commodity exports that are either owned or taxed 
by the government, and SWFs from non-commodity countries, which are usually established through 
transfers from the official foreign exchange reserves.  It shows that all the energy-rich countries are 
commodity countries except for Malaysia. While Malaysia is a net energy exporter, its Khazanah Nasional 
is classified as a non-commodity SWF because it is partly financed by government debt (Lyons 2008) 
instead of commodity revenues. Since I focus only on energy, the classification according to their energy 
resource endowment fits my theory better, and will be employed in this study. 
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technology sectors, which all require substantial amounts of energy or electricity as 
inputs. 
As a consequence, concern for energy security is explicitly placed at the top level 
of the government agenda in these countries. As stressed in the Chinese government’s 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan38 and the Twelfth Five-Year Plan of Energy,39
Sun, Li et al. 2014
 the government 
should actively participate in overseas exploitation of energy resources, expand energy 
trade and technical cooperation and improve transportation, finance and other abilities in 
order to jointly safeguard global energy security. Therefore, from the perspective of the 
Chinese government, the SWFs’ overseas investments in the energy industry will 
accelerate the realization of the “going global” and energy-related strategy of the Twelfth 
Five-Year Plan ( ). 
In order to meet the increasing demand for energy in energy-poor countries, these 
countries invest in energy for the purpose of gaining access to energy resources. For 
example, Singapore’s SWF, Temasek, set up an investment unit focused on liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) in 2013, reflecting the SWF’s growing portfolio of energy assets and 
underscoring the increasing importance of LNG as a relatively clean-burning energy 
source (Wall Street Journal, 2013).40
                                                 
38 The Twelfth Five-Year Plan is the abbreviation of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan for National Economic 
and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China. Available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2011-03/16/c_121193916.htm (in Chinese). 
39Available at http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-01/23/content_2318554.htm (in Chinese). 
40 “Singapore’s Temask Sets Up LNG Investment Firm Pavilion Energy”. 
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2013/04/05/singapores-temasek-sets-up-lng-investment-firm-pavilion-energy/ 
 LNG is an area where Singapore sees an 
opportunity, because although Singapore does not have any gas fields of its own, it 
wants to be a center for storage and shipment of the fuel. Thus, the energy investments 
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by SWFs helps effectively enhance energy security and functions as a hedge against the 
risk of global energy prices rising. 
Moreover, SWFs from energy-poor countries may also aim to gain access to 
technology and expertise to develop energy production at home. Because industrialized 
economies such as the United States have effective regulations governing the export of 
dual-use and other strategically sensitive items, the transfer of the technology and 
expertise is particularly important when investing in the Middle East and Africa. For 
instance, China and Saudi Arabia signed an oil cooperation agreement that inaugurated a 
“strategic oil partnership” between the two countries in 1999. Some researchers and 
officials who are familiar with upstream oil and gas production in China suggest that 
Saudi Aramco, a Saudi national oil company, may have been a source of advanced 
technology and expertise that  has enabled Chinese energy companies to improve their 
production from and management of existing fields at home(Leverett and Bader 2005).  
In contrast, SWFs from energy-rich countries may have different investment 
preferences. The energy-rich countries do not face challenges to security of oil supplies 
as their energy-poor counterparts do. Instead, these countries face two challenges: first, 
natural resources are exhaustible, and their consumption and export leads to their 
depletion. Second, the international market for commodities is characterized by a high 
level of price volatility. Accordingly, energy-rich countries may wish to diversify their 
economies from natural resources. 
Given these challenges, SWFs from energy-rich countries can help them 
diversify their economies. Since a surge in resource exports leads to a real appreciation 
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of the country’s exchange rate and this hurts other exporters and producers in import-
competing sectors, The UAE, for example, is using its funds for rapid diversification of 
its economy away from oil toward tourism, aerospace and finance. Such a diversification 
motive is as legitimate as the desire to raise the efficiency of its economy through 
acquiring stakes in leading global companies (Reisen 2008). Given their lack of concern 
about energy security and the intention to diversify, SWFs investing on behalf of an 
energy-rich home country may not invest in the energy industry as much as SWFs from 
energy-poor countries do.  
In sum, I argue that SWFs from energy-poor countries have different incentives 
than do SWFs from energy-rich countries for their investment in the energy industry. 
Thus, my theoretical framework generates the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: SWFs from energy-poor countries are more likely to invest in the 
energy industry than SWFs from energy-rich countries.   
Comparing SWFs and Private Investors 
As discussed earlier, SWFs from energy-poor countries are likely to invest in the 
energy industry in order to mitigate energy security concerns at home; such investments 
are not just economically but also politically motivated. Whereas for SWFs, political 
objectives sometimes dominate economic objectives in foreign investments, that is less 
so for private investors. Given SWFs’ political objectives, I further argue that investment 
behaviors of SWFs and private investors are different even within the same energy-poor 
countries.  
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To begin, SWFs can be required to serve the political mandates of the home 
government. The logic is similar to that of government ownership in some domestic 
enterprises. First, governments may be involved in strategic industries such as oil and 
gas, telecommunications, and banking because those industries are too important to be 
left in the hands of the private sector. Second, governments may step in to correct market 
failures. For instance, SOEs may be created in order to provide public goods or support 
research and development (R&D) activities. Third, state ownership can be a response to 
social welfare and stability issues. Furthermore, governments may establish SOEs to 
safeguard employment because large layoffs could significantly affect the stability of the 
national economy. As a consequence, firms with dominant state ownership are generally 
operated for government objectives instead of profit maximization (He, 2010). In the 
same way, SWFs from energy-poor countries are likely to invest in foreign energy firms 
in order to pursue energy security on behalf of the home country.  
In contrast, private investors are less willing to sacrifice their profit for the sake 
of the national interests of the home country than are SWFs. Unlike SWFs, which are 
part of the home government, private firms are structurally separate from the 
government (Cui and Jiang, 2012). As a result, the profit-seeking firms may not always 
align with government interests (DiMaggio, 1988; Oliver, 1991; Scott, 2005). Moreover, 
private investors receive fewer economic benefits from the government in practice, thus 
they have fewer incentives to pursue government objectives and bear the associated risks 
and costs by themselves. Hence, the investments by private investors are more likely to 
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be determined by the market process. Given the different objectives of private investors 
and SWFs, I generate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: SWFs from energy-poor countries are more likely to invest in the 
energy industry than private investors from the same energy-poor countries.   
The Effect of Bilateral Relations on Energy Investment 
While energy-poor countries have an interest in investing in energy industry, we 
have to also consider the perspective of the host country, because a cross-border 
acquisition in the energy industry is likely to face resistance from the host countries. For 
acquisitions engaged in by SWFs from energy-poor countries, such political or public 
resistance could be strong, due to the host country’s fear that the investments are being 
used as the means to pursue energy security.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, bilateral relations between the home and host 
countries are positively associated with SWF investment. Foreign investments in 
politically sensitive industries are more closely watched by host governments than 
investments in other industries (Zhang and He, 2009). In particular, if the operation of a 
target firm involves military production, infrastructure, or natural resources, the 
acquisition of this firm may be blocked by political forces. For instance, the US 
government requires that transactions involving regulated industries should prepare to 
submit for extra layers of approvals after review by the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) (Wachtell et al., 2008). These regulated 
industries include energy, public utilities, gaming, insurance, telecommunications, 
financial institutions, defense, etc.  
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Due to the strategic importance of the energy industry, foreign investment in this 
industry would be closely watched by the host government. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
friendly states pose less of a security threat to each other. Therefore, better bilateral 
relations would reduce barriers to foreign entry in the energy industry and increase the 
likelihood of acquisition success. Chinese investment in Canada provides an excellent 
example. For most of the previous decades, diplomatic ties between the two countries 
remained limited, and China did not actively invest in the Canadian energy industry. 
With the strengthening of bilateral relations since 2009, China’s SWF and state-owned 
oil companies rapidly increased their investment in the Canadian energy and mining 
sectors (Castelli and Scacciavillani, 2012: 143-44). As a result, I have the following 
hypothesis concerning the role of bilateral relations on SWF investment in the energy 
industry: 
Hypothesis 3: Foreign investors from countries that have better bilateral relations 
with the host country are more likely to invest in the host country’s energy industry.   
I argue that SWFs from energy-poor countries are more sensitive to the quality of 
bilateral relations between the home and host countries when investing in a foreign 
energy firm. When they invest in the energy industry overseas, SWFs from energy-poor 
countries can be perceived by the host countries not simply as business entities being 
driven by profit maximization, but as political actors pursuing energy security for the 
home country. This concern by the host country is the most prominent when the home 
and host countries have hostile political relations. If SWFs from energy-poor countries 
seek to enter a hostile host country, the latter would worry that giving a potential 
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belligerent access to scarce and strategically important energy resources could lead to a 
dangerous increase in military capabilities of the home country, in turn giving the home 
country a military advantage against the host country if the two states go to war. Driven 
by this national security concern, hostile host countries are more inclined to adopt 
policies to discriminate against SWFs from energy-poor countries. As a result, SWFs 
from energy-poor countries prefer to invest in the energy industry of the host countries 
with which they have better bilateral relations. This observation generates the following 
testable hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4. Better bilateral relations have a stronger positive effect on the 
likelihood of energy investments by SWFs from energy-poor countries than on the 
likelihood of those by other types of investors. 
Empirical Strategy 
This section first describes the data used in the empirical analysis that was 
performed to test my four hypotheses, specifically the measures of dependent and 
independent variables. I then outline the specification of the empirical model.  
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable energy firm. It was coded as one if 
the target firm is in the energy industry, and zero otherwise. The pie chart in Figure 
5shows the distribution of industries that received cross-border acquisitions by SWFs 
from ten countries between 1981 and 2012. The industries that received the most SWF 
investments were finance (208 deals), services (81), and manufacturing industries (78). 
As shown in Column (5) of Table 17, 62 acquisitions were allocated to energy 
 104 
 
industries, with 30 from Singapore, 13 deals from UAE, and 10 from China. Figure 
5also presents a pie chart based on the total values in the industry. The total transaction 
value in energy industry is 19,552 million US dollars, the second highest ranking only 
after the finance industry (US$53,781 millions). Hence, we can argue that energy is an 
attractive industry for cross-border investments by SWFs.  
Although Abu Dhabi undertook the first SWF investment in the energy industry 
in 1987,41
As noted earlier, I classify SWF sponsoring countries into two groups: energy-
rich and energy-poor countries. The countries in the former group in my dataset are 
Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, and UAE, whereas the latter include China, 
Singapore, Malaysia, and South Korea. 
 I restrict my sample period to 1992-2012 because the majority of SWFs only 
actively participated in energy industry since 1992. 
Table 18 reports the summary statistics on the 
energy investments by the four types of investors separately, i.e., SWFs from energy-
poor countries, private investors from energy-poor countries, SWFs from energy-rich 
countries, and private investors from energy-rich countries. Several results stand out. 
First, it is clear that in energy-poor countries, the proportion of energy investments to the 
total number of deals by SWFs (12.84%) is larger than that by private counterparts 
(10.22%). In energy-rich countries, this proportion by SWFs (12.32%) is slightly lower 
than that by private investors (13.62%).  
As shown in Column (5) of Table 17, the Singapore SWFs are the most heavily 
represented in my sample of energy investments. Temasek and Government of 
                                                 
41 The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) bought a 5% stake in the French oil company Total 
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Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) together account for half of the SWF 
investments in the energy industry. This is not surprising because Singapore is almost 
completely reliant on energy imports (98%, see Column (2) of Table 17), especially 
from neighboring Indonesia and Malaysia. Accordingly, this is consistent with my 
earlier argument that SWFs from energy-poor countries tend to invest in energy 
industries in order to ensure long-term energy security.  
Second, perhaps the most noteworthy differences are that the cumulative deal 
values by private investments in energy industries as a proportion of total deals is about 
twice as much as that by SWFs. Nonetheless, this result should be interpreted with 
caution. As shown in Table 19, about 31% of energy deals by SWFs have missing deal 
values, resulting in an understatement of the value of all investments.42 Consequently, I 
do not use deal value as a dependent variable in the main models.43
Independent Variables 
 
Since the dependent variable is dichotomies, I employ logit regression and robust 
standard errors. I also include year fixed effects to control for some unobservable factors 
driving energy investments in a particular year, as we observe greater numbers of energy 
investments in certain years. 
The main independent variables of interest in Model 1 are three dummy variables 
indicating three types of investors, i.e., SWFs from energy-rich countries, private 
                                                 
42 The percentage of transactions with missing deal values in energy industries is the highest for private 
investors in energy-rich countries (50.93%) and the lowest for SWFs from energy-poor countries (20.93%). 
This suggests that SWFs tend to disclose more information compared to private investors in both types of 
countries. 
43 As shown below, a robustness check shows that the results remain the same using deal value as a 
dependent variable. 
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investors from energy-rich countries, and private investors from energy-poor countries. 
SWFs from energy-rich countries was coded one if the acquirer was an SWF from an 
energy-rich country, zero otherwise. The other two variables were coded in a similar 
manner. According to hypothesis 1 and 2, I expect that SWFs from energy-poor 
countries are more likely to invest in the energy industry than are the other three types of 
investors.  Hence, I omitted the dummy variable SWFs from energy-poor countries 
because I use it as the reference category. As a result, the coefficient estimates of the 
other investors dummies should be interpreted as their likelihood to invest in the energy 
industry relative to SWFs from energy-poor countries, I expect negative coefficient 
estimates of these three types of investors based on my theoretical arguments above.  
In order to assess the impact of bilateral relations on energy investment, I include 
diplomatic risks used in Chapter 5. As suggested by hypothesis 3, I expect that the 
coefficient of diplomatic risks is negative and statistically significant. Furthermore, to 
test hypothesis 4, I generate an interaction term of SWFs from energy-poor countries and 
diplomatic risks.  
Control variables include macroeconomic (home country’s energy use per capita, 
host country’s GDP and fuel exports, as well as crude oil price), political (host country’s 
political regime) and deal-level variables. First, to test whether energy investments are 
driven by the energy needs of the home country, I construct a variable capturing the 
energy security of the home country. There are several indicators to capture energy 
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security,44
For another macroeconomic control, I examine whether the abundance of natural 
resources in the host country influences the likelihood of energy investments. To that 
end, I use a measure of fuel exports as a percentage of merchandise exports that is taken 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Some recent work suggests that 
instead of export shares, studies of natural resources should use indices of resource 
endowments, that is, how much is under the ground(
 and I use energy use per capita to capture energy security because energy 
intensity of the economy is the most relevant for the size of impacts of energy shortages. 
I also include the host country’s GDP because it is robustly associated with FDI 
in a number of studies and is a common indicator of market size in host economies.  The 
expectation is that its coefficient will be positive.  
Brunnschweiler and Bulte 2008). 
However, as noted by Kolstad and Wiig (2008), natural resource rents are more 
attractive to investors than are the resources in the ground. Therefore, export shares are a 
better proxy than resource endowment. I expect that the presence of natural resources in 
the host country increases the likelihood of investments in energy industries.  
Crude oil price represents an important factor in energy investments. Prices give 
an indication of the supply in relation to demand, reflecting scarcity and thus depletion 
of energy resources. Due to oil being a dominant energy carrier in most parts of the 
world, oil price is seen as a crucial indicator in the energy market (Kruyt et al., 2009). 
The data is obtained from BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2014.  
                                                 
44 See Kruyt et al. (2009) for an extensive review on indicators for energy security.  
 108 
 
Political institutions in host countries have long been believed to be conductive 
to FDI (Busse 2003, Jensen 2003). This is more important to energy investments because 
host governments control either the actual energy supply or the conditions under which 
investors develop the energy fields. Accordingly, energy investments may be related to 
political regimes in host countries. More specifically, democratic countries offer better 
property rights protection than authoritarian regimes (Li and Resnick 2003), thereby 
reducing risks and uncertainty – this is particularly important for energy investments. 
Thus, I include a variable host country’s Political regime that measures the degree of the 
democratic regime. The index is taken from the Polity IV project and ranges from -10 
(fully autocratic) to +10 (fully democratic). 
Finally, I include a dummy variable multiple acquirers to control for the possible 
effects of joint ventures. The variable was coded one if the firm is acquired by a joint 
venture, and zero if the firm was unilaterally acquired by an investor. Since investment 
in energy industries usually takes a great deal of capital and a “matching appetite for 
risk” (The Economist, 1998), I expect that multiple acquirers are more likely to invest in 
energy firms. Table 19 presents the summary statistics and Table 20 reports the 
correlation matrix of variables.  
Empirical Results 
I report the results of logit models in Table 21. In Model 1, the coefficient 
estimates of SWFs from energy-rich countries, private investors from energy-rich 
countries, and private investors from energy-poor countries are negative and statistically 
significant. Substantively, the estimates of these dummy variables indicate that energy 
 109 
 
investments are less likely to be acquired by energy-rich SWFs, energy-rich private 
investors and energy-poor private investors, compared to energy-poor SWFs (the 
reference category). This finding provides supporting evidence to Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Figure 6 plots the marginal effects of each type of acquirer. It shows that the probability 
of energy investment is highest for SWFs from energy-poor countries. Compared to 
SWFs from energy-poor countries, SWFs from energy-rich countries and private 
investors from energy-poor countries are less likely to invest in the energy industry by 
7% and 5%, respectively.  
With respect to the impact of bilateral relations between the home and host 
countries, the various specifications in Table 21 all suggest that a lower level of 
diplomatic risk (i.e., better bilateral relations) is more likely to be associated with energy 
investment. Substantively, the move from the lowest to the highest levels of diplomatic 
risks (i.e., worse bilateral relations) in the sample lowers the probability of energy 
investment by 8.9 percentage points (from 11.4% to 2.5%), which is a 78% decrease in 
probability. Thus, hypothesis 3 is strongly supported.  
To assess the moderating effect of bilateral relations, I include only the dummy 
variable for SWFs from energy-poor countries and its interaction with bilateral relations 
in Model 2.This model specification allows me to test Hypothesis 4 regarding the 
relative importance of bilateral relations for SWFs from energy-poor countries. The 
interaction term is positive and statistically significant. Figure 7 plots the predictive 
margins of energy-poor SWFs with 95 percent confidence intervals. It shows that the 
negative effect of diplomatic risks on energy investment is stronger when the target firm 
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is acquired by an SWF from energy-poor countries than by other types of investors, 
although the two confidence intervals overlap a bit. These results suggest that bilateral 
relations do help SWFs from energy-poor countries in cross-border acquisitions, which 
is consistent with my hypothesis. 
The results of most of the control variables are consistent with my expectation. 
Across all models, multiple acquirers increase the likelihood of energy investments. The 
effect of oil price is positive and statistically significant, showing that a rise in the real 
price of crude oil seems to make foreign investors more interested in the energy industry.  
Countries with more democratic regimes tend to attract more investments in the 
energy industry across all models. This result confirms that when investing in the energy 
industry, secure property rights protection in host countries play a fundamental role to 
foreign investors because the investments in extractive industries cannot be easily 
disinvested in response to political change.  
The coefficient estimate of a host country’s GDP is negative and statistically 
significant. This result suggests that energy investments are not motivated by market 
seeking. Moreover, a country with a large market size provides more investment 
opportunities other than energy resources. While host country’s GDP and political 
regime are highly correlated (0.618) in the estimation sample, their variance inflation 
factor (VIF) scores are 1.92 and 2.42, respectively, and do not exceed the threshold of 10 
for serious multicollinearity. 
In addition, the coefficient estimate of energy use per capita of the home country 
is negative and statistically significant, thereby indicating that the low level of energy 
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use in the home country increases the likelihood of energy investments. One issue with 
the energy use variable is that it captures the amount of resources each person consumes. 
For example, while energy security is crucial for China, this variable is underweighted 
by the large size of the population. Therefore, exploring an alternative measure of energy 
security in future research would help us to understand the impact of the home country’s 
energy security concerns on energy investment.  
As a robustness check, I test the results with respect to an alternative 
classification of SWFs. I use commodity and non-commodity SWFs obtained from the 
SWF Institute as an alternative classification methodology of SWFs. As noted earlier, 
Malaysia as a resource-rich country now belongs to the group of non-commodity 
countries, and the rest of countries remain in the same group. The results are shown in 
the first column of Table 22. As seen from Model 3, the key explanatory variables have 
stable results regardless of the classification of SWFs used.  
Finally, I extend my model to deal value data, despite the problem of missing 
data in deal values in many observations. I use the natural logarithm of real transaction 
value as a dependent variable. I employ OLS regression models with a sample of all the 
foreign acquisitions in the energy industry. As shown in Model 4 in Table 22, the key 
results remain the same. Compared to SWFs from energy-poor countries, other investors 
are involved in energy deals with smaller transaction values. Moreover, diplomatic risks 
are negatively associated with deal value in the energy industry.  
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Conclusions 
In this chapter, I investigate the heterogeneous preferences of SWF investments 
in strategic industries, paying particular attention to the energy industry. I begin by 
reviewing two types of SWF countries, i.e., energy-rich and energy-poor countries. The 
energy resource endowment of SWFs has different implications for the investment 
strategies in the energy industry. In particular, in pursuit of energy security for the home 
country, SWFs from energy-poor countries are more likely to invest in the energy 
industry compared to either SWFs from energy-rich countries or private investors from 
both type of countries. Given the strategic importance of energy, investments in this 
industry are likely to face institutional pressures from host countries. The institutional 
pressures are more pronounced with the deterioration of bilateral relations between the 
home and host countries, especially for SWFs from the energy-poor countries.  
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CHAPTER VI  
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
SWF investments have increased dramatically across the globe in recent years. 
The fundamental research question in the small but growing body of SWF literature is 
whether SWFs are politically motivated. Although this is an important question, I argue 
that we should shift our attention to an alternative question to enhance our understanding 
of SWF investment--namely, how state ownership affects SWF investment abroad. This 
is because SWFs are, by definition, assets of the home government, which means they 
inevitably have to help achieve political objectives of the home country. Furthermore, 
we should view SWF investment as a result of the interaction between the investment 
strategies of SWFs and the responses from the host countries. To answer this alternative 
research question, my dissertation offers a theoretical framework and systematic 
empirical evidence based on a new dataset at the deal-level. The results generate several 
important implications for the policymakers in both the home and host countries. In what 
follows, I first highlight the key arguments and empirical evidence of my dissertation. I 
then discuss the implications of my findings for policymakers. Finally, I suggest several 
possible future research directions.  
Summary of Argument and Findings 
The central question of this dissertation is how state ownership affects SWFs in 
terms of both their investments abroad and their responses to discriminatory treatment 
from the host countries. To answer this question, I offer a general theoretical framework 
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to understand the ways in which two political and institutional factors influence SWF 
investments relative to private investments. The first political factor is bilateral relations 
between the home and host countries.  I argue that SWF investments raise more national 
security concerns and thus face additional discrimination from the host countries 
compared to private investments. This discrimination is more pronounced when the 
home and host countries have hostile bilateral relations. Consequently, compared to 
private investors, SWFs are more likely to be associated with acquisition deals in host 
countries that have better bilateral relations with home governments. It should be noted 
that SWFs are strategic actors. Facing these potential obstacles to foreign investments, 
SWFs may seek to collaborate with other firms. By investing in partnership with private 
investors, SWFs send a credible signal to the host government that they are likely to be 
constrained to serve the home government’s political agenda versus managing the firm 
against the free market principle. By investing with SWFs from countries that have 
closer political relations with the host country, an SWF may be identified as a “friend’s 
friend” by the host government. Thus, partnering with other investors may help alleviate 
discriminatory treatment faced by SWFs. 
The second important factor for understanding how state ownership affects SWF 
investments is the institutional distance between the home and host countries. Greater 
institutional distance often implies higher risks to investments.  While both SWFs and 
private investors may wish to avoid risks, there are a number of reasons to believe that 
SWFs are more tolerant to risk than are private investors. The “soft budget constraints”, 
lack of explicit liabilities, domestic conflicts of interest, and the ways through which 
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SWF managers are evaluated make SWFs relatively more willing to take risks. Hence, 
although a high level of institutional distance increases investor’s unfamiliarity with the 
host environment and creates risks and uncertainty, SWFs are less likely to be 
discouraged by institutional distance than private investors are.  
To test these claims, I collected a new dataset on SWF investments from several 
sources. This dataset contains 7142 acquisitions (both SWF and private investments) in 
145 target countries from 10 SWF acquirer countries and 26 non-SWF countries 
between 1981 and 2012.The statistical analysis of this dataset provides consistent 
evidence that bilateral relations, joint investment, and institutional distance are important 
factors behind SWF investments abroad.  
Due to state ownership, SWFs can be required to serve strategic interests on 
behalf of their home governments. However, it is important to avoid over-generalizing 
the investment behavior and impact of SWFs. Precisely because strategic interests are 
heterogeneous among home governments, SWFs’ investment preferences also vary, even 
in a strategic sector such as energy. In order to explore the heterogeneity of SWFs from 
different types of countries, I investigate how state ownership affects SWF investment in 
the energy industry. Energy industry is an intriguing case to study for two reasons. First, 
the energy industry is commonly considered to be a highly strategic sector. Energy is not 
only the most basic power source of social development and economic growth, but also 
is involved in many instances of international cooperation and conflicts in today’s world 
politics. Second, studying the energy industry allows us to identify the diversity of 
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SWFs’ motivations because SWFs from energy-poor countries have concerns over 
energy security for the home country while SWFs from energy-rich countries do not. 
Specifically, I argue that SWFs from energy-poor countries are more likely to 
invest in the energy industry than are SWFs from energy-rich countries and private 
investors from both types of countries, largely due to concerns over energy security. At 
the same time, given the strategic importance of the energy industry, investors are more 
likely to raise national security concerns in the host countries, especially when they seek 
to invest in hostile host countries. This is particularly true for SWFs from energy-poor 
countries.  
To subject these arguments to empirical tests, I analyze the likelihood of SWF 
investment in the energy industry by using data from6,382 cross-border acquisitions 
(with 713 deals in the energy industry) from 1992 to 2012. I find consistent empirical 
evidence to support my arguments. When all else is equal, the probability of energy 
investments is highest for SWFs from energy-poor countries. Moreover, better bilateral 
relations are correlated with energy investment. Substantively, my analysis suggests that 
the move from the best to the worst bilateral relations reduces the probability of energy 
investment by 8.9 percentage points, which amounts to a 78% decrease in probability. 
Policy Implications of Understanding SWFs Investments 
These findings are of particular interest to policymakers. From the perspective of 
the host country, the rise of SWFs has generated concerns over national. Due to these 
political and security concerns, policymakers in the host countries have called for more 
comprehensive regulations on SWF activities. For example, some analysts suggest that 
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SWFs should not be allowed to have voting rights in the companies in which they invest 
(Economist, 2008). These regulations, however, have at least two problems.  
The first problem is that it is difficult to design a “one-size-fits-all” regulation of 
SWFs due to their heterogeneity. Not all SWF investments are politically driven at all 
times and thus, may not generate detrimental effects for the host countries. As shown in 
Chapter 5, SWFs from energy-poor countries are driven by energy security concerns 
when investing in the energy industry, whereas SWFs from energy-rich countries do not 
share the same concern. SWF investments driven purely by commercial motives can 
bring benefits to target firms and host countries without generating negative security 
externalities. As long-term investors, SWFs are unlikely to withdraw their investment 
due to short-term fluctuations in stock values, thus contributing to the stability of the 
firms in which they invest (Makhlouf, 2010). Moreover, they can enhance the survival of 
financially constrained firms, as seen in the wake of the 2007 global financial crisis. 
Therefore, host countries face a dilemma. Namely, they seek to gain access to foreign 
capital, but at the same time, have to minimize the potential national security threat from 
such state-owned funds.  
The second problem with regulating SWF investments is that the host country 
may not be able to distinguish those SWFs that might have political agendas incongruent 
with the national interest of the host country from other SWFs that might have political 
interests in line with the host country. Even if the host country has the ability to identify 
these two different types of SWFs, it is legally and diplomatically difficult to regulate 
SWFs selectively. One solution to this problem is the pre-selection of SWF investments 
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as a result of the bilateral relations between the home and host countries. The results in 
Chapter 4 indicate that host countries probably have distinguished hostile SWF 
investments from benign ones. The quality of political relations serves a useful function 
for the host country to distinguish between these two different types of SWFs, enabling 
it to increase its capital stock without producing negative security externalities. 
The findings of my study imply that host country concerns about SWFs are based 
on attitudes towards the sponsoring country rather than on the ways in which the SWF 
affect the firms in which they invest. For example, U.S. regulators prefer an investment 
by a Singaporean SWF over one by a Chinese SWF. This is not because the Singaporean 
SWF operates more transparently than the Chinese SWF does, but because Singapore is 
not perceived as a potential economic and political rival by the United States. Therefore, 
contrary to the conventional wisdom that the lack of transparency of SWFs creates more 
suspicions from host countries, I argue that enhancing financial transparency alone 
would not significantly alleviate the host country’s resistance to some SWFs. The United 
States would still place Chinese SWFs under close scrutiny even if the latter became 
more transparent.  
 However, SWFs are not completely constrained by home and host country 
bilateral relations. My research suggests that when confronting suspicious host 
governments, an SWF might be able to address the concerns of the host country by 
collaborating with other investors. This finding may be particularly useful for SWFs 
from China and some Middle Eastern countries, which often are linked with 
controversies surrounding their home governments in international politics.    
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Implications for Future Research 
Going beyond this dissertation, I will explore several promising research 
directions in the future. First, although my dissertation is a useful first step in identifying 
political and institutional factors that influence SWF investment, much work remains to 
be done. One issue is the variation in host countries’ attitudes towards SWF investments. 
In this era of globalization, most countries are open to foreign investments, but many are 
sensitive to foreign state investments. The question must be asked: why do some 
countries such as the UK and Australia seem to welcome SWF investments, whereas 
others like the US and Germany are more concerned about these funds?  
Another question concerns how SWFs choose their partners when investing with 
other acquirers. Most studies investigate the target selection of SWFs, but little attention 
has been paid to the selection of their joint venture partners. In my dataset, 17% of cross-
border acquisitions by SWFs involved multiple acquirers. For example, the Temasek 
subsidiaries Singapore Airlines and Dahlia Investment created a joint venture with China 
Great Wall Industries in order to form an air cargo company, Great Wall Airlines. 
Observers suggest that the choice of business partner in this joint venture by Temasek 
seems puzzling if it was driven purely by economic logic (Balding, 2012: 168), because 
Great Wall Industries had no experience or known subsidiary in the transpiration or 
logistics sector, while Temasek had numerous subsidiaries or holdings in this field that 
would seem better suited to manage an air cargo operation. Hence, exploring the 
selection of the joint venture partners would further advance our understanding of the 
motivations behind SWF investments.  
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Third, I propose that future SWF studies should consider withdrawn deals more 
seriously. This is because all the announced deals, whether completed or not, reveal the 
motivations SWF investment. Excluding abandoned deals could introduce sample 
selection bias in our understanding of the political determinants of SWF investment. 
Besides these potentially productive questions regarding SWFs, this dissertation 
also suggests future research directions for FDI studies in general. Most of the existing 
studies explore the impact of political risks on foreign investment. This dissertation 
suggests that state ownership causes SWFs to be more sensitive to discriminatory 
treatment but more willing to take risks associated with foreign investment. It implies 
that various types of risks associated with foreign investment, for example, political risks 
and market risks, may have varying effects on SWF investment behavior. Hence, future 
research should further investigate the heterogeneity of risks faced by foreign investors 
and the ways in which investors formulate strategies to cope with these risks. 
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APPENDIX  
Figure 1. Time Distribution Histogram 
Panel A: By SWFs 
 
Panel B: By private investors 
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Figure 2. Theoretical Framework 
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Figure 3. Diplomatic Risks with China 
Panel A. Temporal Evolution 
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Figure 4. Diplomatic Risks with China (Continued) 
Panel B. Directed Dyad Specificity  
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Figure 5 Average Marginal Effects with 90% Confidence Intervals (Calculated 
From the Results In Model 1) 
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Figure 6. Industry Distribution of SWF Investments 
Panel A. By number of deals 
 
 
Panel B. By deal value 
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Figure 7. Marginal Effects of Each Type of Acquirers Relative to EP SWF Based on 
Model 1 
 
 
 
Note: “EP SWFs” denotes SWFs from energy poor countries; EP Private” denotes 
private investors from energy poor countries; “EP SWFs” denotes SWFs from energy 
poor countries; “ER Private” denotes private investors from energy rich countries; and 
“ER SWFs” denotes SWFs from energy rich countries. 
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Figure 8. Predictive Margins of EP SWFs with 95% Confidence Intervals 
 
Note: “EP SWF” denotes SWFs from energy poor countries. 
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Table 1. Types of SWF Investment Examined in Finance Literature  
 Portfolio 
investment  
Direct investment 
Avendano and Santiso (2009) √  
Bernstein et al.(2013) √  
Boubakri et al.(2011)  √ 
Chhaochahario and Laeven (2009) √  
Dewenter et al.(2009) √  
Dyck and Morse (2011) √  
Fernanades (2009) √  
Fotak et al.(2008) √  
Knill et al.(2012)  √ 
Miceli (2013)  √ 
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Table 2. Number of Deals Acquired by SWFs during 1981-2012 
 
ID SWF country Number of 
deals 
acquired by 
SWFs 
Cumulative 
percentage 
of all SWF 
deals 
Included in 
the sample 
SWF 
country 
1 Singapore 528 50.43% √ 
2 United Arab Emirates 173 16.52% √ 
3 Malaysia 102 9.74% √ 
4 Qatar 78 7.45% √ 
5 China 63 6.02% √ 
6 Kuwait 18 1.72% √ 
7 Oman 15 1.43% √ 
8 Libya 14 1.34% √ 
9 Kazakhstan 13 1.24% √ 
10 South Korea 10 0.96% √ 
11 Australia 7 0.67%  
12 Brunei 7 0.67%  
13 Canada 4 0.38%  
14 Papua New Guinea 3 0.29%  
15 United States 3 0.29%  
16 Russian Fed 1 0.10%  
17 Ireland-Rep 2 0.19%  
18 New Zealand 2 0.19%  
19 Norway 2 0.19%  
20 Hong Kong 1 0.10%  
21 Sri Lanka 1 0.10%  
 Total 1047 100%  
Source: data obtained from SDC database  
 
 148 
 
Table 3. Data Source Composition of the Combined Dataset 
 
Acquirers  Data source Number 
of Deals 
Percent 
SWFs  SDC 350 56.27% 
Zephyr 208 33.44% 
Capital IQ 64 10.29%  
 Total 622 100% 
Private investors SDC 6520 100% 
Total  7142  
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Table 4. Checking Whether One Can Rely on SDC for Non-SWF Deals in 
Singapore’s Case 
Data source SDC Zephyr Capital IQ Total 
Year 1986-2012 1986-2012 1995-2012  
Duplicate deals  3,152a 3,040b 519b 6,711 
Unique deals 4,840 796 199 5,835 
Total 7,992 3,836 718 12,546 
 
Note:  
a. Deals duplicate with Zephyr and/or Capital IQ. 
b. Deals covered by SDC. 
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Table 5. Number of Deals Acquired by 36 acquirer countries in 145 Target Countries 
 
Target Nation By SWFs By 
Private 
Investors 
Total Target 
Nation 
By SWFs By 
Private 
Investors 
Total 
India 217 415 632 Algeria 1 2 3 
United States 206 766 972 Tunisia 1 10 11 
United Kingdom 180 356 536 Libya 1 3 4 
China 144 941 1,085 Syria 1 2 3 
Australia 64 869 933 Lebanon 1 14 15 
Indonesia 60 838 898 Mongolia 1 35 36 
Italy 59 62 121 Sri Lanka 1 47 48 
Brazil 43 50 93 Cambodia 1 39 40 
France 43 92 135 Brunei 1 21 22 
Canada 41 217 258 Jamaica 0 5 5 
Switzerland 38 46 84 Barbados 0 6 6 
Thailand 34 415 449 Antigua and 
Barbuda 
0 1 1 
Germany 32 157 189 Guatemala 0 1 1 
South Korea 30 93 123 Honduras 0 1 1 
Malaysia 29 672 701 El Salvador 0 1 1 
Singapore 29 545 574 Nicaragua 0 1 1 
Russia 25 79 104 Panama 0 7 7 
Spain 22 60 82 Venezuela 0 1 1 
Japan 22 232 254 Suriname 0 2 2 
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Netherlands 20 76 96 Ecuador 0 2 2 
Taiwan 17 137 154 Peru 0 10 10 
Ukraine 16 15 31 Bolivia 0 4 4 
Turkey 11 53 64 Chile 0 17 17 
Egypt 10 74 84 Argentina 0 10 10 
United Arab 
Emirates 
10 80 90 Slovak 
Republic 
0 7 7 
New Zealand 10 106 116 Croatia 0 3 3 
Georgia 9 7 16 Slovenia 0 1 1 
Austria 7 17 24 Cyprus 0 10 10 
Israel 7 15 22 Romania 0 8 8 
Mexico 6 14 20 Estonia 0 4 4 
Denmark 6 24 30 Lithuania 0 2 2 
South Africa 6 73 79 Azerbaijan 0 2 2 
Portugal 5 8 13 Iceland 0 1 1 
Hungary 5 22 27 Mauritania 0 3 3 
Czechoslovakia 5 10 15 Niger 0 2 2 
Sweden 5 31 36 Cote d'Ivoire 0 7 7 
Guinea 5 2 7 Liberia 0 2 2 
Oman 5 30 35 Sierra Leone 0 3 3 
Philippines 5 237 242 Ghana 0 7 7 
Jordan 4 48 52 Togo 0 1 1 
Kyrgyz Republic 4 11 15 Cameroon 0 3 3 
Ireland 3 18 21 Nigeria 0 9 9 
Belgium 3 23 26 Gabon 0 7 7 
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Luxembourg 3 12 15 Chad 0 1 1 
Yugoslavia 3 4 7 Uganda 0 7 7 
Norway 3 45 48 Kenya 0 5 5 
Maldives 3 3 6 Burundi 0 1 1 
Bahamas 2 3 5 Rwanda 0 3 3 
Colombia 2 6 8 Djibouti 0 1 1 
Greece 2 10 12 Eritrea 0 1 1 
Bulgaria 2 2 4 Angola 0 2 2 
Belarus 2 2 4 Mozambique 0 3 3 
Armenia 2 1 3 Zambia 0 4 4 
Finland 2 12 14 Zimbabwe 0 5 5 
Mauritius 2 28 30 Malawi 0 5 5 
Iraq 2 17 19 Namibia 0 2 2 
Saudi Arabia 2 57 59 Madagascar 0 3 3 
Bahrain 2 42 44 Sudan 0 14 14 
Kazakhstan 2 22 24 Iran 0 3 3 
Bangladesh 2 12 14 Yemen 0 3 3 
Papua New 
Guinea 
2 13 15 Kuwait 0 18 18 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
1 0 1 Qatar 0 12 12 
Monaco 1 1 2 Tajikistan 0 3 3 
Poland 1 8 9 Uzbekistan 0 17 17 
Malta 1 4 5 Bhutan 0 1 1 
Latvia 1 4 5 Pakistan 0 59 59 
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Congo 1 2 3 Myanmar 0 13 13 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
1 4 5 Nepal 0 2 2 
Tanzania 1 5 6 Laos 0 5 5 
Ethiopia 1 0 1 Vanuatu 0 1 1 
Seychelles 1 4 5 Solomon 
Islands 
0 2 2 
Morocco 1 10 11 Fiji 0 9 9 
        Marshall 
Islands 
0 2 2 
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Table 6. SWFs in the Sample 
Country Sovereign Fund Name Assets 
$ 
Billion 
Inception Origin 
Dhabi Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority 
627 1976 Oil 
China SAFE Investment Company 567.9 1997 Non-
commodity 
China China Investment Corporation 439.6 2007 Non-
commodity 
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority 296 1953 Oil 
China - 
Hong Kong 
Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority Investment 
Portfolio 
293.3 1993 Non-
commodity 
Singapore Government of Singapore 
Investment Corporation 
247.5 1981 Non-
commodity 
Singapore Temasek Holdings 157.2 1974 Non-
commodity 
China National Social Security Fund 134.5 2000 Non-
commodity 
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority 100 2005 Oil 
UAE - 
Dubai 
Investment Corporation of 
Dubai 
70 2006 Oil 
Libya Libyan Investment Authority 65 2006 Oil 
Kazakhstan Kazakhstan National Fund 58.2 2000 Oil 
UAE - Abu 
Dhabi 
International Petroleum 
Investment Company 
58 1984 Oil 
UAE - Abu 
Dhabi 
Mubadala Development 
Company 
48.2 2002 Oil 
South Korea Korea Investment 
Corporation 
43 2005 Non-
commodity 
Malaysia KhazanahNasional 36.8 1993 Non-
commodity 
Oman State General Reserve Fund 8.2 1980 Oil & Gas 
 
Source: SWF Institute.  
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Table 7. Summary Statistics by Year 
Panel A: By SWF Acquirers 
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Total 
Number of 
Deals 
Number of 
Deals with 
Values 
Disclosed 
Average 
Deal Value 
(Constant 
1982 US$ 
millions) 
Cumulative 
Deal Value 
(Constant 
1982 US$ 
millions) 
Number of 
Acquisitions 
where 
percentage 
of share 
acquired less 
than 10 
Number of 
Acquisitions 
where 
percentage 
of share 
acquired 
more than 
50 and less 
than 100 
Number of 
Acquisitions 
where 
percentage 
of share 
acquired 100 
1987 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1989 2 1 146.29 146.29 1 0 0 
1991 1 1 285.49 285.49 0 0 0 
1992 2 1 81.73 81.73 2 0 0 
1993 4 2 6.17 12.34 3 0 0 
1994 5 2 80.52 161.03 1 0 1 
1995 4 2 19.13 38.25 0 0 1 
1996 3 1 8.96 8.96 0 0 0 
1997 7 6 171.00 1026.02 1 0 0 
1998 5 4 48.43 193.72 1 0 0 
1999 9 8 240.01 1920.10 0 0 1 
2000 22 17 168.30 2861.17 3 0 11 
2001 12 7 27.40 191.80 0 3 4 
2002 18 8 129.45 1035.59 1 1 4 
2003 26 18 86.80 1562.44 9 6 5 
2004 23 14 413.65 5791.15 8 3 7 
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2005 40 26 175.95 4574.74 5 3 15 
2006 46 31 293.38 9094.71 2 3 15 
2007 75 56 414.95 23237.45 22 8 15 
2008 62 44 233.44 10271.37 7 6 11 
2009 44 28 667.27 18683.67 8 4 10 
2010 47 32 306.50 9807.90 7 4 5 
2011 36 19 671.60 12760.38 8 7 7 
2012 52 32 240.14 7684.52 15 4 6 
Total  546 360 4916.567 111430.8 105 52 118 
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Table 8. Summary Statistics by Year (Continued) 
Panel B: By Private Acquirers  
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Total 
Number of 
Deals 
Number of 
Deals with 
Values 
Disclosed 
Average 
Deal Value 
(Constant 
1982 US$ 
millions) 
Cumulative 
Deal Value 
(Constant 
1982 US$ 
millions) 
Number of 
Acquisitions 
where 
percentage of 
share 
acquired less 
than 10 
Number of 
Acquisitions 
where 
percentage of 
share 
acquired 
more than 50 
and less than 
100 
Number of 
Acquisitions 
where 
percentage of 
share 
acquired 100 
1981 1 1 2806.93 2806.93 0 0 1 
1982 3 2 53.63 107.25 0 0 1 
1983 2 2 175.70 351.41 0 0 2 
1984 1 1 481.23 481.23 0 0 1 
1985 4 3 11.21 33.64 1 0 1 
1987 7 4 489.80 1959.19 1 0 1 
1988 4 2 55.41 110.81 0 0 1 
1989 15 11 116.09 1277.02 2 0 8 
1990 23 22 15.84 348.58 3 5 7 
1991 35 21 13.00 273.09 1 8 11 
1992 26 13 11.71 152.24 3 5 9 
1993 91 70 12.16 851.41 8 16 38 
1994 124 92 15.90 1463.15 7 19 46 
1995 141 88 15.91 1399.72 4 31 51 
1996 178 116 27.91 3237.75 9 32 53 
1997 172 119 21.03 2502.33 7 44 49 
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1998 139 75 17.84 1338.06 12 15 59 
1999 122 87 45.34 3944.78 6 25 36 
2000 196 119 19.03 2264.75 8 33 65 
2001 176 96 115.50 11087.77 11 29 45 
2002 204 130 17.23 2240.05 17 35 68 
2003 227 132 25.29 3338.49 21 36 72 
2004 309 193 19.51 3764.83 17 50 100 
2005 462 245 74.48 18247.15 33 71 182 
2006 453 289 45.41 13123.57 21 82 163 
2007 590 378 87.36 33022.53 43 88 176 
2008 639 385 72.42 27881.17 50 78 201 
2009 461 280 54.26 15192.06 44 79 150 
2010 594 393 68.01 26726.16 54 94 212 
2011 612 398 58.93 23452.51 38 86 235 
2012 522 340 52.69 17913.79 33 76 209 
Total 6533 4107 5096.76 220893.44 454 1037 2253 
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Table 9. Intensity of Cross-Border Acquisition Activity by Top Ten SWF countries 
Panel A: by acquirer countries 
Acquirer nation Number of deals Deal value  
(Constant 1982 US$ millions) 
 By 
SWFs  
By private 
investors 
Fraction  SWF 
fraction 
by column 
By SWFs By private 
investors 
Fraction  SWF 
fraction 
by column 
Qatar 50 69 42.02% 9.16% 14128.2 6562.17 68.28% 12.68% 
Kazakhstan 28 49 36.36% 5.13% 1207.65 6902.97 14.89% 1.08% 
Libya 3 9 25.00% 0.55% 516.451 556.157 48.15% 0.46% 
UAE 117 461 20.24% 21.43% 29676 39327.7 43.01% 26.63% 
Oman 8 53 13.11% 1.47% 383.547 687.631 35.81% 0.34% 
Singapore 291 3063 8.68% 53.30% 50563.1 58027.8 46.56% 45.38% 
China 26 608 4.10% 4.76% 11306 47931.2 19.09% 10.15% 
Kuwait 5 223 2.19% 0.92% 1476.65 14297.5 9.36% 1.33% 
Malaysia 16 1477 1.07% 2.93% 1932.24 24100.3 7.42% 1.73% 
South 
Korea 2 521 0.38% 0.37% 241.036 22499.9 1.06% 0.22% 
Total 546 6533 
 
100.00% 111430.8 220893.4 
 
100.00% 
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Table 10. Intensity of Cross-Border Acquisition Activity by Top Ten SWF countries (Continued) 
Panel B: By Target countries 
Target nation Number of deals Deal value  
(Constant 1982 US$ millions) 
 By SWFs  By 
private 
investors 
Fraction  SWF 
fraction 
by 
column 
By SWFs By 
private 
investors 
Fraction  SWF 
fraction 
by 
column 
United States 64 509 11.17% 11.72% 195.74 1929.83 9.21% 0.18% 
China 58 1150 4.80% 10.62% 507.09 61.60 89.17% 0.46% 
United Kingdom 56 247 18.48% 10.26% 250.79 32.80 88.43% 0.23% 
India 35 273 11.36% 6.41% 7962.82 1356.55 85.44% 7.15% 
Indonesia 29 510 5.38% 5.31% 61.06 635.39 8.77% 0.05% 
Australia 29 596 4.64% 5.31% 4025.19 1334.31 75.10% 3.61% 
Malaysia 18 443 3.90% 3.30% 144.30 51.04 73.87% 0.13% 
Canada 18 136 11.69% 3.30% 2290.29 1298.00 63.83% 2.06% 
Switzerland 16 39 29.09% 2.93% 264.86 3613.70 6.83% 0.24% 
France 15 65 18.75% 2.75% 5829.75 4033.29 59.11% 5.23% 
South Korea 14 64 17.95% 2.56% 171.55 129.04 57.07% 0.15% 
Russia 13 38 25.49% 2.38% 1259.98 1060.89 54.29% 1.13% 
Thailand 13 287 4.33% 2.38% 1647.77 1489.15 52.53% 1.48% 
Singapore 12 360 3.23% 2.20% 2862.05 3274.02 46.64% 2.57% 
Brazil 12 30 28.57% 2.20% 117.59 139.00 45.83% 0.11% 
Germany 11 110 9.09% 2.01% 82.06 101.64 44.67% 0.07% 
Japan 10 156 6.02% 1.83% 613.35 767.59 44.42% 0.55% 
Egypt 7 51 12.07% 1.28% 16609.46 20921.79 44.26% 14.91% 
Netherlands 7 51 12.07% 1.28% 2105.10 2779.75 43.09% 1.89% 
 161 
 
Georgia 6 6 50.00% 1.10% 4767.85 6436.33 42.55% 4.28% 
Spain 6 38 13.64% 1.10% 2269.45 3215.64 41.37% 2.04% 
Ukraine 6 9 40.00% 1.10% 17968.16 26094.20 40.78% 16.12% 
Turkey 6 44 12.00% 1.10% 84.67 1784.16 4.53% 0.08% 
Italy 5 37 11.90% 0.92% 60.42 92.05 39.63% 0.05% 
United Arab Emirates 5 57 8.06% 0.92% 715.06 1160.07 38.13% 0.64% 
Mexico 5 11 31.25% 0.92% 14363.42 24025.75 37.42% 12.89% 
Guinea 4 1 80.00% 0.73% 1899.53 3400.29 35.84% 1.70% 
Sweden 4 24 14.29% 0.73% 538.20 980.11 35.45% 0.48% 
Jordan 4 40 9.09% 0.73% 349.63 654.32 34.83% 0.31% 
South Africa 4 44 8.33% 0.73% 4599.51 8815.06 34.29% 4.13% 
Vietnam 4 109 3.54% 0.73% 381.93 796.11 32.42% 0.34% 
Taiwan 4 94 4.08% 0.73% 177.51 4428.90 3.85% 0.16% 
New Zealand 3 79 3.66% 0.55% 19.65 528.69 3.58% 0.02% 
Belgium 3 15 16.67% 0.55% 2221.37 5409.26 29.11% 1.99% 
Denmark 3 19 13.64% 0.55% 1794.43 5805.60 23.61% 1.61% 
Maldives 3 2 60.00% 0.55% 2532.23 8228.54 23.53% 2.27% 
Finland 2 10 16.67% 0.37% 2.72 10.61 20.39% 0.00% 
Hungary 2 16 11.11% 0.37% 5144.52 21896.88 19.02% 4.62% 
Austria 2 13 13.33% 0.37% 52.11 227.11 18.66% 0.05% 
Kyrgyz Republic 2 6 25.00% 0.37% 437.69 2103.61 17.22% 0.39% 
Saudi Arabia 2 47 4.08% 0.37% 85.78 420.56 16.94% 0.08% 
Armenia 2 1 66.67% 0.37% 2997.12 16033.89 15.75% 2.69% 
Philippines 2 143 1.38% 0.37% 70.52 545.38 11.45% 0.06% 
Oman 2 19 9.52% 0.37% 367.92 2976.85 11.00% 0.33% 
Portugal 2 3 40.00% 0.37% 93.42 0 100.00% 0.08% 
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Papua New Guinea 1 8 11.11% 0.18% 377.92 0 100.00% 0.34% 
Malta 1 2 33.33% 0.18% 56.41 5146.51 1.08% 0.05% 
Bangladesh 1 9 10.00% 0.18% 0.16 31.97 0.48% 0.00% 
Sri Lanka 1 32 3.03% 0.18% 0.01 7.78 0.10% 0.00% 
Kazakhstan 1 13 7.14% 0.18% 0.69 1485.15 0.05% 0.00% 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 1 2 33.33% 0.18% 0 7.55 0.00% 0.00% 
Poland 1 6 14.29% 0.18% 0 10.03 0.00% 0.00% 
Brunei 1 19 5.00% 0.18% 0 32.04 0.00% 0.00% 
Tunisia 1 9 10.00% 0.18% 0 120.54 0.00% 0.00% 
Iraq 1 14 6.67% 0.18% 0 8.75 0.00% 0.00% 
Ireland 1 10 9.09% 0.18% 0 807.02 0.00% 0.00% 
Mauritius 1 22 4.35% 0.18% 0 113.28 0.00% 0.00% 
Cambodia 1 23 4.17% 0.18% 0 8.62 0.00% 0.00% 
Algeria 1 2 33.33% 0.18% 0 2.21 0.00% 0.00% 
Belarus 1 1 50.00% 0.18% 0 616.68 0.00% 0.00% 
Libya 1 2 33.33% 0.18% 0 1824.79 0.00% 0.00% 
Tanzania 0 3 0.00% 0.00% 0 80.34 0.00% 0.00% 
Slovak Republic 0 7 0.00% 0.00% 0 1.46 0.00% 0.00% 
Ecuador 0 1 0.00% 0.00% 0 1773.15 0.00% 0.00% 
Zambia 0 4 0.00% 0.00% 0 6.22 0.00% 0.00% 
Colombia 0 4 0.00% 0.00% 0 13.68 0.00% 0.00% 
Greece 0 7 0.00% 0.00% 0 160.08 0.00% 0.00% 
Cote d'Ivoire 0 6 0.00% 0.00% 0 1.96 0.00% 0.00% 
Niger 0 1 0.00% 0.00% 0 260.61 0.00% 0.00% 
Nepal 0 2 0.00% 0.00% 0 1.86 0.00% 0.00% 
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Barbados 0 5 0.00% 0.00% 0 558.42 0.00% 0.00% 
Mongolia 0 21 0.00% 0.00% 0 35.57 0.00% 0.00% 
Malawi 0 4 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.05 0.00% 0.00% 
Bolivia 0 2 0.00% 0.00% 0 132.21 0.00% 0.00% 
Bulgaria 0 2 0.00% 0.00% 0 61.73 0.00% 0.00% 
Yemen 0 3 0.00% 0.00% 0 1.16 0.00% 0.00% 
Lithuania 0 2 0.00% 0.00% 0 2840.41 0.00% 0.00% 
Chile 0 7 0.00% 0.00% 0 2745.55 0.00% 0.00% 
El Salvador 0 1 0.00% 0.00% 0 37.13 0.00% 0.00% 
Eritrea 0 1 0.00% 0.00% 0 229.30 0.00% 0.00% 
Madagascar 0 1 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.16 0.00% 0.00% 
Jamaica 0 3 0.00% 0.00% 0 319.73 0.00% 0.00% 
Mauritania 0 2 0.00% 0.00% 0 8.38 0.00% 0.00% 
Latvia 0 4 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.06 0.00% 0.00% 
Argentina 0 6 0.00% 0.00% 0 446.21 0.00% 0.00% 
Kuwait 0 14 0.00% 0.00% 0 202.07 0.00% 0.00% 
Liberia 0 2 0.00% 0.00% 0 3092.87 0.00% 0.00% 
Sierra Leone 0 1 0.00% 0.00% 0 48.23 0.00% 0.00% 
Croatia 0 1 0.00% 0.00% 0 16.25 0.00% 0.00% 
Czechoslovakia 0 8 0.00% 0.00% 0 74.09 0.00% 0.00% 
Solomon Islands 0 1 0.00% 0.00% 0 299.96 0.00% 0.00% 
Slovenia 0 1 0.00% 0.00% 0 7.40 0.00% 0.00% 
Morocco 0 7 0.00% 0.00% 0 485.10 0.00% 0.00% 
Congo 0 2 0.00% 0.00% 0 2.18 0.00% 0.00% 
Pakistan 0 35 0.00% 0.00% 0 752.10 0.00% 0.00% 
Romania 0 4 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.06 0.00% 0.00% 
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Qatar 0 9 0.00% 0.00% 0 246.16 0.00% 0.00% 
Iran 0 3 0.00% 0.00% 0 151.07 0.00% 0.00% 
Peru 0 6 0.00% 0.00% 0 20.08 0.00% 0.00% 
Yugoslavia 0 2 0.00% 0.00% 0 11.01 0.00% 0.00% 
Israel 0 10 0.00% 0.00% 0 2475.69 0.00% 0.00% 
Cameroon 0 3 0.00% 0.00% 0 2.46 0.00% 0.00% 
Myanmar 0 10 0.00% 0.00% 0 21.61 0.00% 0.00% 
Nigeria 0 5 0.00% 0.00% 0 22.29 0.00% 0.00% 
Uzbekistan 0 10 0.00% 0.00% 0 42.94 0.00% 0.00% 
Namibia 0 1 0.00% 0.00% 0 16.63 0.00% 0.00% 
Norway 0 29 0.00% 0.00% 0 6.85 0.00% 0.00% 
Kenya 0 3 0.00% 0.00% 0 758.20 0.00% 0.00% 
Laos 0 3 0.00% 0.00% 0 756.41 0.00% 0.00% 
Gabon 0 4 0.00% 0.00% 0 0.24 0.00% 0.00% 
Uganda 0 4 0.00% 0.00% 0 114.09 0.00% 0.00% 
Bahrain 0 35 0.00% 0.00% 0 3.05 0.00% 0.00% 
Sudan 0 13 0.00% 0.00% 0 24.22 0.00% 0.00% 
Fiji 0 1 0.00% 0.00% 0 222.40 0.00% 0.00% 
Antigua and Barbuda 0 1 0.00% 0.00% 0 0 .% 0.00% 
Ghana 0 3 0.00% 0.00% 0 0 .% 0.00% 
Lebanon 0 13 0.00% 0.00% 0 0 .% 0.00% 
Burundi 0 1 0.00% 0.00% 0 0 .% 0.00% 
Djibouti 0 1 0.00% 0.00% 0 0 .% 0.00% 
Togo 0 1 0.00% 0.00% 0 0 .% 0.00% 
Iceland 0 1 0.00% 0.00% 0 0 .% 0.00% 
Bhutan 0 1 0.00% 0.00% 0 0 .% 0.00% 
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Estonia 0 1 0.00% 0.00% 0 0 .% 0.00% 
Syria 0 1 0.00% 0.00% 0 0 .% 0.00% 
Honduras 0 1 0.00% 0.00% 0 0 .% 0.00% 
Mozambique 0 1 0.00% 0.00% 0 0 .% 0.00% 
Suriname 0 2 0.00% 0.00% 0 0 .% 0.00% 
Zimbabwe 0 2 0.00% 0.00% 0 0 .% 0.00% 
Angola 0 1 0.00% 0.00% 0 0 .% 0.00% 
Total  546 6533 10.7416 1 111430.8 220893.4 18.2562 1 
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Table 11.  Distribution of Multiple Acquirers by Acquirer Country
 Number of Deals By SWFs Number of Deals By Private 
investors 
Acquirer 
nation 
Single 
acquirer 
Multiple 
acquirers 
Multiple 
acquirer 
deal 
fraction 
Single 
acquirer 
Multiple 
acquirers 
Multiple 
acquirer 
deal 
fraction 
South 
Korea 1 1 50.00% 480 41 7.87% 
Kuwait 3 2 40.00% 200 23 10.31% 
Libya 2 1 33.33% 7 2 22.22% 
Singapore 229 62 21.31% 2929 134 4.37% 
China 21 5 19.23% 571 37 6.09% 
UAE 97 20 17.09% 440 21 4.56% 
Kazakhstan 26 2 7.14% 46 3 6.12% 
Qatar 49 1 2.00% 67 2 2.90% 
Oman 8 0 0.00% 51 2 3.77% 
Malaysia 16 0 0.00% 1418 59 3.99% 
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Table 8.  Distribution of Multiple Acquirers by Acquirer Country (Continued) 
 Deal value By SWFs  
(Constant 1982 US$ millions) 
Deal value By Private Investors  
(Constant 1982 US$ millions) 
Acquirer 
nation 
Single 
acquirer 
Multiple 
acquirers 
Multiple 
acquirer 
deal 
fraction 
Single 
acquirer 
Multiple 
acquirers 
Multiple 
acquirer 
deal 
fraction 
South 
Korea 45.3833 195.652 81.17% 17853.7 4646.26 20.65% 
Libya 287.26 229.191 44.38% 303.17 252.988 45.49% 
Kuwait 928.924 547.728 37.09% 12660.5 1637 11.45% 
Singapore 37787.6 12775.5 25.27% 56355.3 1672.53 2.88% 
UAE 24630.7 5045.32 17.00% 36159.4 3168.32 8.06% 
China 9584.5 1721.52 15.23% 44309 3622.18 7.56% 
Qatar 13449.4 678.748 4.80% 6556.24 5.93223 0.09% 
Kazakhstan 1173.41 34.2365 2.83% 5869.62 1033.35 14.97% 
Oman 383.547 0 0.00% 591.041 96.5899 14.05% 
Malaysia 1932.24 0 0.00% 23077.3 1022.98 4.24% 
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Table 12. Identity of SWF's Co-investors 
Acquirer nation With private 
investors 
With other 
SWFs 
Number of SWF 
joint 
investments 
Singapore 44 9 53 
United Arab Emirates 13 13 26 
China 13 4 17 
Qatar 5 4 9 
Malaysia 5 1 6 
South Korea 2 1 3 
Kazakhstan 2 0 2 
Libya 2 0 2 
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Table 13. A Summary of Cross-Border Acquisitions by SWFs and Private Investors 
 SWFs Private Investors 
Proportion of deals disclosing 
deal value information 
66% 62% 
Proportion of deals acquiring over 
50% stake 
61% 81% 
Proportion of joint investment  19.1% 7.22% 
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Table 14. Number of Acquisition Deals by SWFs and Private Investors between Alliances 
Acquirer 
nation 
Target 
nation  
No. of 
SWF deals 
No. of 
private 
deals 
Acquirer 
nation 
Target 
nation  
No. of 
SWF deals 
No. of 
private 
deals 
Kazakhstan Russia 9 13 Japan United 
States 
0 2 
Kazakhstan Ukraine 6 2 Kuwait Oman 0 1 
Qatar Jordan 4 1 Kuwait Saudi 
Arabia 
0 10 
UAE Egypt 4 29 Kuwait Jordan 0 19 
China Russia 3 3 Kuwait Egypt 0 12 
Qatar United 
Arab 
Emirates 
2 1 Oman Jordan 0 1 
UAE Oman 2 14 Qatar Kuwait 0 3 
Kazakhstan Armenia 1 1 China Pakistan 0 2 
UAE Algeria 1 1 Kuwait Lebanon 0 2 
Qatar Tunisia 1 0 Kuwait Sudan 0 5 
China Kazakhstan 1 4 Russian 
Federation 
Ukraine 0 2 
Kazakhstan Belarus 1 0 United 
States 
United 
Kingdom 
0 4 
Canada Hungary 0 1 UAE Kuwait 0 4 
UAE Jordan 0 15 Kuwait Tunisia 0 6 
United 
States 
Netherlands 0 1 UAE Lebanon 0 2 
Qatar Oman 0 1 UAE Sudan 0 2 
France United 
States 
0 5 Kuwait Morocco 0 3 
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Canada Brazil 0 1 Qatar Saudi 
Arabia 
0 3 
UAE Bahrain 0 7 Qatar Lebanon 0 3 
United 
Kingdom 
United 
States 
0 1 Kuwait Algeria 0 1 
UAE Qatar 0 3 Panama Brazil 0 1 
Oman Kuwait 0 1 United 
States 
Japan 0 2 
South 
Korea 
United 
States 
0 105 Libya France 0 1 
Colombia Brazil 0 1 Qatar Bahrain 0 1 
UAE Morocco 0 3 United 
States 
Brazil 0 1 
UAE Tunisia 0 3 UAE Libya 0 1 
Kuwait Qatar 0 3 Kuwait United 
Arab 
Emirates 
0 8 
Oman United 
Arab 
Emirates 
0 3 Kuwait Bahrain 0 10 
Kuwait Yemen 0 2 UAE Saudi 
Arabia 
0 25 
Oman Bahrain 0 4 Oman Saudi 
Arabia 
0 1 
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Table 15. Description of Variables 
Variable Description  Source  
A. Dyad-level variables   
Diplomatic risks Following the transformation deﬁned by 
Desbordes (2012): 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷 =
−
∑𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 +𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓
∑𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 +∑𝑓𝑓𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 +𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝐷𝐷  
where f and w stand respectively for the 
frequency of and the weight assigned to 
a given event.  
GDELT 
Alliance   
Defense pact Dummy variable equals 1 if target and 
acquirer countries are defense pact 
alliance. 
COW 
UN voting dissimilarity The natural log of rescaled UN voting 
similarity, i.e., 
=log[s2un*(-1)+2], because “s2un” 
ranges from -1 (dissimilar) to 1 (similar). 
The results also hold if not rescaled and 
logged.  
Strezhnev and 
Voeten (2013) 
Institutional distance The summation of absolute difference of 
each item: Corruption, Law and Order, 
and Bureaucratic Quality. Details on 
these subcomponents can be found in 
Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005), 
Table 1. 
International 
Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
Distance Distance between national capitals in 
miles (=ln(distance)) 
CEPII’s 
distances 
measures 
(GeoDist) 
B. Country-level variables   
UK legal origin  Dummy variable equals 1 if the origin of 
the commercial law of a country is 
English Common Law, and zero 
otherwise.  
La Porta et al. 
(1999) 
GDP logarithm of annual GDP (in constant 
2005 U.S. dollars) 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
Fuel exports Fuel exports (% of merchandise exports) World 
Development 
Indicators 
C. Deal-level variables   
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SWF investment Dummy variable equals 1 if the target is 
acquired by an SWF, zero if a private 
investor 
SDC, Zephyr, 
Capital IQ 
Finance Dummy variable equals 1 if the target is 
in finance industry, and zero otherwise 
SDC, Zephyr, 
Capital IQ 
Energy  Dummy variable equals 1 if the target is 
in energy industry, and zero otherwise 
SDC, Zephyr, 
Capital IQ 
Multiple acquirers Dummy variable equals 1 if the deal is 
acquired by multiple investors, and zero 
otherwise 
SDC, Zephyr, 
Capital IQ 
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Table 16. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
SWF investment 6192 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Diplomatic risks 6192 -2.23 1.15 -8 10 
Alliance  6192 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Defense pact 6192 0.06 0.23 0 1 
UN voting 
dissimilarity 6192 0.22 0.31 0 1.07 
Institutional distance 6192 3.46 2.15 0 9.5 
Regime distance 6192 8.87 4.86 0 20 
Multiple acquirers 6192 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Geographical distance 6192 8.06 1.17 4.93 9.87 
Fuel exports(j) 6192 0.54 0.50 0 1 
UK legal origin(j) 6192 25.96 1.12 23.67 30.26 
GDP(i) 6192 27.23 1.58 21.48 30.26 
GDP(j) 6192 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Finance 6192 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Energy  6192 0.08 0.27 0 1 
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Table 17. Descriptive Statistics (Continued) 
Panel B: Correlation of Variables (N=6,192) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Diplomatic 
risks(1) 1             
Alliance (2) -0.06 1            
Defense 
pact(3) -0.06 0.97 1           
UN voting 
dissimilarity(4) 0.13 0.05 0.06 1          
Institutional 
distance(5) 0.09 -0.25 -0.25 -0.15 1         
Regime 
distance(6) 0.04 -0.28 -0.28 0.48 -0.05 1        
Multiple 
acquirers(7) 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.02 -0.02 1       
Distance(8) 0.06 -0.04 -0.04 0.61 -0.18 0.35 0.03 1      
UK legal 
origin(j) (9) 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.37 -0.07 0.10 -0.01 -0.02 1     
GDP(i) (10) 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.36 0.09 0.23 0.08 0.24 0.05 1    
GDP(j) (11) 0.14 -0.07 -0.06 0.60 -0.10 0.27 0.02 0.59 -0.06 0.23 1   
Finance(12) -0.01 0.05 0.06 -0.15 0.00 -0.08 0.04 -0.11 -0.10 -0.14 -0.08 1  
Energy (13) -0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.07 -0.01 0.10 -0.02 -0.15 1 
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Table 18.Logit Analysis of SWF Investment 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Diplomatic risks -0.151** -0.152** 
 
(0.0637) (0.0638) 
Alliance 1.188*** 
 
 
(0.408) 
 Defense pact 
 
0.982** 
  
(0.413) 
UN voting dissimilarity -0.376 -0.322 
 
(0.586) (0.589) 
Institutional distance 0.132** 0.118** 
 
(0.0543) (0.0555) 
Regime distance 0.153*** 0.149*** 
 
(0.0233) (0.0233) 
Multiple acquirers 1.509*** 1.491*** 
 
(0.218) (0.218) 
Geographical distance 0.527*** 0.501*** 
 
(0.164) (0.160) 
Fuel exports(j) 0.00220 0.00133 
 
(0.00493) (0.00550) 
UK legal origin(j) 0.0846 0.0823 
 
(0.192) (0.196) 
GDP(i) -0.693*** -0.687*** 
 
(0.100) (0.101) 
GDP(j) 0.0801 0.0777 
 
(0.0810) (0.0826) 
Finance target 0.850*** 0.946*** 
 
(0.153) (0.161) 
Energy target 
 
0.696** 
  
(0.274) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Constant -7.497* -7.838** 
 
(3.985) (3.996) 
   Observation  6,192 6,192 
 
Note: Robust z-statistics are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 19.  Robustness Check: Alternative Explanations 
  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Diplomatic risks 
 
-0.142** -0.146** -0.123* 
  
(0.0628) (0.0677) (0.0657) 
Diplomatic cooperation 0.959** 
   
 
(0.435) 
   Alliance 1.207*** 0.936 1.305*** 1.102*** 
 
(0.408) (0.654) (0.411) (0.426) 
UN voting dissimilarity -0.459 -1.519** -0.275 -0.104 
 
(0.585) (0.622) (0.626) (0.628) 
FDI restrictiveness 
 
-2.686* 
  
  
(1.617) 
  Trade 
  
0.0555 
 
   
(0.0914) 
 Institution distance 0.118** 0.134** 0.141** 0.0947* 
 
(0.0549) (0.0617) (0.0580) (0.0556) 
Regime distance 0.154*** 0.154*** 0.160*** 0.149*** 
 
(0.0234) (0.0335) (0.0249) (0.0256) 
Multiple acquirers 1.498*** 1.373*** 1.556*** 1.301*** 
 
(0.216) (0.211) (0.230) (0.213) 
Geographical distance 0.520*** 0.812*** 0.533*** 0.457** 
 
(0.163) (0.238) (0.193) (0.184) 
Fuel exports(j) 0.000865 0.00572 0.00310 0.000400 
 
(0.00510) (0.00975) (0.00543) (0.00574) 
UK legal origin(j) 0.116 0.0841 0.151 0.0230 
 
(0.197) (0.303) (0.247) (0.210) 
GDP(i) -0.691*** -0.677*** -0.796*** -0.676*** 
 
(0.101) (0.0942) (0.131) (0.109) 
GDP(j) 0.0775 0.162 0.0172 0.115 
 
(0.0839) (0.101) (0.140) (0.0851) 
Finance target 0.939*** 1.019*** 0.932*** 0.951*** 
 
(0.161) (0.172) (0.172) (0.162) 
Energy target 0.701** 0.598** 0.737** 0.799*** 
 
(0.273) (0.301) (0.318) (0.275) 
Ownership shares acquired 
   
-0.0148*** 
    
(0.00275) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -8.617** -12.62** -3.627 -6.877 
 
(4.294) (4.900) (5.389) (4.280) 
     Observations 6,192 4,029 5,122 5,566 
Note: Robust z-statistics are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 20.  Categorization of SWF Countries 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
SWF country 
Net energy 
imports (% 
of energy 
use) 
Fuel exports 
(% of 
merchandis
e exports) 
SWF 
investments 
Total 
energy 
investments 
SWF 
energy 
investments 
Classification in 
this study 
Classificatio
n obtained 
from SWFI 
Singapore 98.45 11.98 275 201 30 
Energy poor 
countries 
Non-
commodity 
South Korea 80.90 7.02 2 97 1 
Energy poor 
countries 
Non-
commodity 
China 8.30 1.78 25 190 10 
Energy poor 
countries 
Non-
commodity 
Malaysia -47.56 11.95 14 107 0 
Energy rich 
countries 
Non-
commodity 
Kazakhstan -117.42 67.16 27 21 5 
Energy rich 
countries Commodity 
UAE -252.78 65.99 91 61 13 
Energy rich 
countries Commodity 
Oman -365.45 82.89 5 9 0 
Energy rich 
countries Commodity 
Qatar -451.26 82.82 43 3 0 
Energy rich 
countries Commodity 
Libya -452.59 97.19 3 4 2 
Energy rich 
countries Commodity 
Kuwait -454.35 94.36 5 20 1 
Energy rich 
countries Commodity 
Total 
  
490 713 62 
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Table 21. Summary Statistics of Energy Investments 
 EP SWFs EP private ER SWFs ER private 
Number of deals 
Energy deals 43 570 26 108 
Total deals 335 5576 211 793 
Proportion 12.84% 10.22% 12.32% 13.62% 
Number of deals with a missing deal value 
Energy deals with a missing 
deal value 
9 130 8 55 
Total energy deals 43 570 26 108 
Proportion 20.93% 22.81% 30.77% 50.93% 
Cumulative deal value 
Energy deals 11468.62 56747.1 7657.472 13257.77 
Total deals 64042.34 148681 47388.47 54025.75 
Proportion 17.91% 38.17% 16.16% 24.54% 
 
Note: “EP Private” denotes private investors from energy poor countries; “EP SWFs” 
denotes SWFs from energy poor countries; “ER Private” denotes private investors from 
energy rich countries; and “ER SWFs” denotes SWFs from energy rich countries. 
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Table 22. Summary Statistics of Variables Based on Samples in Table 21 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Target energy 6382 0.11 0.32 0 1 
SWFs from energy rich 
countries 
6382 0.03 0.16 0 1 
Private investors from 
energy rich countries 
6382 0.10 0.31 0 1 
Private investors from 
energy poor countries 
6382 0.80 0.40 0 1 
SWFs from energy poor 
countries 6382 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Diplomatic risks 6382 -2.24 1.17 -8 10 
Multiple acquirers 6382 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Oil price 6382 71.64 31.06 18.17 115.22 
Energy per capita(i) 6382 2.12 0.29 1.30 2.66 
Fuel exports (j) 6382 1.94 1.20 -2.30 4.59 
GDP (j) 6382 27.21 1.62 20.14 30.26 
Political regime (j) 6382 4.10 6.95 -10 10 
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Table 23. Correlation Matrix of Variables Based on Samples in Table 21 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
SWFs from energy 
rich countries (1) 
1                     
Private investors from 
energy rich countries 
(2) 
-0.06 1                   
Private investors from 
energy poor countries 
(3) 
-0.34 -0.68 1                 
SWFs from energy 
poor countries (4) 
-0.04 -0.08 -0.46 1               
Diplomatic risks (5) -0.01 -0.05 0.06 -0.03 1             
Multiple acquirers (6) 0.04 0.01 -0.09 0.14 -0.02 1           
Oil price (7) 0.08 0.15 -0.13 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 1         
Energy per capita(i) 
(8) 
-0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0.12 -0.07 -0.01 -0.09 1       
Fuel exports (j) (9) 0.02 0.10 -0.09 0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.19 -0.06 1     
GDP (j) (10) 0.04 -0.14 0.07 0.06 0.14 0.01 0.17 -0.06 -0.21 1   
Political regime (j) 
(11) 
0.06 -0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.13 -0.14 0.18 0.09 1 
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Table 24. The Logit Estimates of the Likelihood of Energy Investments 
Variables   Model (1) Model (2) 
      
SWFs from energy rich countries -0.801*** 
 
 
(0.296) 
 Private investors from energy rich countries -0.568*** 
 
 
(0.194) 
 Private investors from energy poor 
countries 
-0.556*** 
 (0.151) 
 SWFs from energy poor countries 
 
-0.393 
  
(0.516) 
Diplomatic risks -0.0907** -0.0775* 
 
(0.0446) (0.0450) 
Diplomatic risks*SWFs from energy poor 
countries  
-0.301* 
 
(0.181) 
Multiple acquirers 0.449*** 0.449*** 
 
(0.156) (0.157) 
Real oil price 0.257*** 0.252*** 
 
(0.0887) (0.0882) 
Energy use per capita (i) -1.541*** -1.552*** 
 
(0.137) (0.137) 
Fuel exports (j) 0.577*** 0.580*** 
 
(0.0535) (0.0536) 
GDP(j) -0.107*** -0.107*** 
 
(0.0377) (0.0378) 
Political regime(j) 0.0698*** 0.0698*** 
 
(0.0106) (0.0104) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Constant -26.59*** -26.54*** 
 
(10.32) (10.27) 
   Observations 6,382 6,382 
Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
Robust standard errors below coefficient estimates.
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Table 25. Robustness Checks 
  Model (3) Model (4) 
Variables  
Target 
energy Deal value 
      
SWFs from energy rich countries -0.955*** -0.309** 
 
(0.294) (0.146) 
Private investors from energy rich 
countries -0.699*** -0.388*** 
 
(0.171) (0.0914) 
Private investors from energy poor 
countries -0.584*** -0.377*** 
 
(0.155) (0.0781) 
Diplomatic risks -0.0839* -0.0259*** 
 
(0.0453) (0.00992) 
Multiple acquirers 0.438*** 0.242*** 
 
(0.156) (0.0792) 
Real oil price 0.256*** 0.00275*** 
 
(0.0889) (0.000755) 
Energy use per capita (i) -1.545*** -0.593*** 
 
(0.135) (0.0651) 
Fuel exports (j) 0.579*** 0.0835*** 
 
(0.0535) (0.0107) 
GDP(j) -0.110*** 0.00826 
 
(0.0376) (0.00742) 
Political regime(j) 0.0669*** 0.00647*** 
 
(0.0107) (0.00149) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Constant -26.32** 0.957*** 
 
(10.34) (0.268) 
Observations 6,382 6,228 
R-squared   0.072 
Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
Robust standard errors below coefficient estimates.  
